Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
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the end of the eighteenth century, the indicators of social status, privilege, and group
affiliation have been increasingly supplemented, if not replaced, by a range of degrees of
normality that simultaneously indicate membership in a homogeneous social body (a
population) and serve to distinguish subjects from each other, to classify them, and to
rank them in a host of hierarchies.
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1977) noted that
normalization initially emerged in eighteenth-century military schools, orphanages, and
boarding schools as an effective form of punishment, “a perpetual penalty,” a persistent
disciplining. In Foucault’s terms, discipline is neither an institution nor an apparatus but
rather a type of power and a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, and targets. Discipline is an
“anatomy” of power, a technology of power that may be assumed by (1) particular
institutions—such as schools or hospitals—in order to achieve a certain end, or (2)
authorities that use it as a means to reinforce and reorganize their established means of
power, or (3) apparatuses that use it as their mode of functioning, or (4) state
apparatuses whose primary function is to assure that discipline reigns over society in
general, namely, the police (215–216). As a technology that has facilitated the expansion
of biopower, disciplinary normalization aims to make the body more efficient and
calculated in its acts, movements, gestures, and expression, to produce a body that is
“docile,” that is, a body that can be subjected, used, transformed, and improved. Modern
discipline can be summed up thus: it enables subjects to act in order to constrain them.
Disciplinary “punishment”—that is, normalization—has brought into play five distinct
normalizing operations. First, individual actions are referred to a totality that is
simultaneously a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and a rule to be followed.
Second, individuals are in turn differentiated from each other in relation to this rule that
functions as a minimal threshold, as an average, or as an optimal outcome toward which
individuals must move. Third, the natures, grades and levels, and abilities of individuals
are hierarchized and quantified. Fourth, these quantifying and hierarchizing measures
introduce the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Fifth, the limit of
difference, the far side of “the abnormal” that will define difference per se in relation to
all other specific differences, is codified and enforced by penalty (correction, segregation,
and so on). The five elemental modes of normalization are thus comparison,
differentiation, hierarchy, homogeneity, and exclusion. The punitive impulse that
regulates normalization compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, and excludes individuals
in order to homogenize a population that, by virtue of its homogeneity, can be more
effectively utilized and modified. In short, the disciplinary power of the norm relies on
coercion, rather than open repression or violence. Hence, Foucault pointed out, the
centrality of normalization to a form of power (biopower) that aims to exert a more
positive influence on life, undertaking to administer it, to multiply it, and to impose on it a
system of regulations and precise inspection (1977, 182–184; see also Knobe 2017).