IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 3-271 / 12-1712 Filed

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 3-271 / 12-1712

Filed April 24, 2013

JYLL M. NEWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

JDS HOLDINGS, L.L.C. and

JACQUELYN PRESTON,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

Jyll Newell appeals from the grant of summary judgment on various claims

arising from the termination of her employment with JDS Holdings, LLC.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

Matthew J. Reilly of Eells & Tronvold Law Offices, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids,

for appellant.

Bruce L. Gettman Jr. and Bradley M. Strouse of Redfern, Mason, Larsen

& Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellees.

Heard by Eisenhauer, C.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ.

TABOR, J.

After being fired from her position as a massage therapist, Jyll Newell

sued her employer, JDS Holdings, and her supervisor, Jacquelyn Preston.

Newell alleged she was wrongfully discharged in violation of public policy

because she declined to sign a form acknowledging receipt of an employee

handbook without first consulting an attorney. She also alleged Preston defamed

her and intentionally interfered with her prospective business advantage because

Preston lied to the company’s owner about Newell’s conduct. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all three claims, and

Newell appealed.

We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim

because Newell did not show she was fired for engaging in protected activity.

We also find summary judgment was proper on Newell’s claim that Preston

intentionally interfered with her prospective business advantage because the

record contains no evidence Preston aimed to financially injure Newell. But we

reverse the grant of summary judgment on Newell’s defamation claim because

the record reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Preston abused

her qualified privilege.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Dr. John Schofield owns JDS Holdings, LLC, which operates Elements

Therapeutic Massage (Elements) studio in Cedar Falls. Jyll Newell is a massage

therapist. She began working at Elements in January 2008. Her employer

presented Newell with an employee handbook and an acknowledgment form,

which she signed and dated on March 24, 2008. The acknowledgment form

stated that the policies and benefits described in the handbook were subject to

revision. It also explained Newell was an at-will employee of Elements.

On May 5, 2008, Newell received her first performance evaluation from

studio manager Kathy Mundfrom. One a scale of one to five, Newell received a

rating of five (excellent) in each of the seven categories on the three-month

review. In her first annual performance review, Newell again scored five out of

five in each of the seven categories on the evaluation form. Newell earned a

raise effective January 1, 2009. On December 17, 2009, Newell received her

second annual performance evaluation. Her supervisor rated her at the top of

the scale in each of the eight categories listed. Again, she received a raise.

Elements hired Jacquelyn Preston as studio manager in March 2010.

That month, Preston jotted a favorable note in Newell’s file: “Thanks for taking

later hours on Monday night. Clients are very glad to have that scheduling

option. I appreciate your assistance in interviewing and mentoring.

MARVELOUS.” But Newell’s file also revealed a number of absences in 2010.

On January 7, 2011, Preston completed Newell’s three-year performance

evaluation. Newell received scores of four (above average) or five (excellent) in

nine of the ten categories. In the category of “Accurate and timely SOAP

notes

on all clients and follows other company procedures,” Preston rated Newell at

four with the following explanation: “Getting better. SOAP notes commonly

missed as noted in comm. log but significant efforts to improve.” In the category

SOAP is an acronym for Subjective, Objective, Assessment, and Plan.

of “Arrives to work on time,” Newell received a score of between three (Average)

and four (Above Average) with the following note: “Arrives on time but

attendance has been an issue.” The evaluation stated that Preston and

Schofield advised Newell that her attendance was problematic, but she was

“working on the concern.” Newell’s total performance score was forty-three out

of a possible fifty, or eighty-six percent. Newell again received a raise, which

moved her to the top of Element’s pay scale.

On February 24, 2011, the employer presented a revised employee

handbook to Newell and asked her to sign a form acknowledging its receipt. The

form stated:

By signing below, I certify that I have received and

understand that I should read and must abide by this handbook.

Without limiting the foregoing, I understand that my employment

with elements therapeutic massage is at-will and that either I or the

elements therapeutic massage may terminate the employment

relationship at any time, with or without reason.

Newell told Preston she wanted to read the handbook before signing the

acknowledgment. Preston told her to sign the acknowledgment and read the

handbook later. Newell did not sign the form that day.

On February 25, 2011, Newell signed and dated the receipt and

acknowledgment form. Below her signature, she wrote: “I have concerns with

3.16, 5.1 (suspension for not receiving a massage), and 6.2 communication

devices. I have spoken with Jackie Preston regarding these concerns.” Later

that day, Preston showed Newell an email from Schofield which read: “Jackie-

Tell Jyll to sign the agreement as written, without ambiguous comments or face

termination for cause.” Newell also saw an email from JDS Holdings’ attorney

Bradley Strouse, which stated:

The employee handbook is a condition of employment. We

have the right to change it whenever we want without notice. That

is part of employment at will. Employees can either sign and return

the receipt of handbook page or face termination for cause. You

could point out that while he/she might not like everything in there,

it is take it or leave it. We should insist that she sign the receipt

and acknowledgment without ambiguous comments.

If he/she or a lawyer thinks one of the policies in the

handbook is contrary to law, he or she can write me, with citations,

explaining exactly how they believe the handbook violates the law.

When Newell balked at signing the acknowledgment without first

consulting her attorney, Preston told her if she did not sign it immediately she

was fired. Preston then left the room and Newell called her attorney. Newell did

not sign the form that day. Schofield called Newell that Friday night and told her

that she was not fired after all. He asked her to report for her regularly scheduled

shift that Sunday. Schofield told Newell she could review the handbook and they

would meet later to discuss it.

Newell continued to work her regular schedule. On February 28, 2011,

Newell provided massage therapy to Amy Tomlyanovich. Preston claimed she

overheard Newell tell client Tomlyanovich that it was “scary” to work for JDS

Holdings.

On March 4, 2011, Newell signed the employee handbook

acknowledgement form without qualification.

Schofield and Preston met to discuss Newell’s absences, her failure to do

SOAP notes, and her complaining. Preston mentioned the “inappropriate”

conversation Newell was alleged to have had with Tomlyanovich earlier that

week. Schofield and Preston also discussed Newell’s failure to sign the

employee handbook. In addition, the pair raised a concern that Newell was

performing massage therapy on clients outside of Elements.

On March 6, 2011, Schofield and Preston met with Newell and terminated

her employment. When Newell asked why she was being fired, Schofield asked

if she recalled her conversation with Tomlyanovich. The employer also

mentioned her failure to sign the handbook. A separation of employment form

signed on that date provided the following explanation for her termination:

“Continued attendance issues. Repeated counseling re: attendance + contact

logs. Refusal to sign handbook multiple times. Breach of proper conduct in

behaviors. Threat to violate non-compete agreement by working anywhere and

taking clients.”

Newell filed a petition against JDS Holdings and Preston on May 2, 2011.

She alleged she was wrongfully discharged in contravention of public policy. She

also alleged Preston defamed her by communicating false allegations to one or

more parties, including Schofield. Finally, Newell alleged Preston intentionally

interfered with her prospective business advantage.

The defendants moved for summary judgment and Newell timely resisted.

Following a hearing, the district court entered its order granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on all three of Newell’s claims.

II. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law.

Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 500 (Iowa 2013).

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 501.

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

We afford the nonmoving party “every legitimate inference that can be

reasonably deduced from the evidence. Id. If reasonable minds can differ on

how the issue should be resolved, a fact question is generated and the court

should deny summary judgment. Id.

III. Analysis

A. Wrongful Discharge

Newell first contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment

on her claim of wrongful discharge. She alleges her firing violated public policy

because it was based on her refusal to sign the employee handbook form without

consulting with an attorney. She also asserts a number of the policies contained

in the handbook violate public policy.

While Iowa adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, we have adopted

an exception recognizing the intentional tort of wrongful discharge when the

reasons for the discharge contravene a well-established public policy of the state.

Berry v. Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 2011).

The elements for a cause of action for wrongful discharge are:

(1) existence of a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy

that protects the employee’s activity; (2) this public policy would be

undermined by the employee’s discharge from employment; (3) the

employee engaged in the protected activity, and this conduct was

the reason the employer discharged the employee; and (4) the

employer had no overriding business justification for the discharge.

Id. at 109–10.

The existence of a public policy and the question of whether that policy is

undermined by a discharge from employment are questions of law to be

determined by the court. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275,

282 (Iowa 2000). Therefore, these questions are properly resolved by a motion

for summary judgment. Id. Questions of causation and motive, on the other

hand, are factual in nature and are to be resolved by the fact finder. Id. To

withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must not only satisfy the court on the

clear public policy and jeopardy elements, but also offer adequate evidence from

which a fact finder may infer a lack of justification for termination. Id.

In rejecting Newell’s wrongful discharge claim, the district court found

Newell failed to identify a clearly defined public policy that protects employee

activity. The court noted that while Newell claimed six separate provisions of the

employee handbook are contrary to public policy, the issue was not whether the

inclusion of these provisions violated public policy; the question was whether

Newell’s termination violated public policy. The court concluded that unless

Newell was terminated for not following one or more of the employee handbook

provisions, their existence was “immaterial.”

The court then returned to Newell’s contention she was fired for initially

refusing to sign the handbook receipt without consulting an attorney. It found

while JDS Holdings denies firing Newell for that reason, when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Newell, it is possible that was the

employer’s ground for termination. But the court concluded termination based on

her reluctance to sign the form did not violate public policy. The court noted

Newell’s failure to cite any specific statutes, administrative regulations, or

constitutional provisions to support her position. The court held: “While the Court

agrees with Newell that encouraging employees to thoroughly review an

employee handbook with or without benefit of counsel is desirable, Newell has

not demonstrated that this desirable conduct rises to the level of a clearly defined

and well recognized public policy.”

On appeal, Newell maintains her firing was inconsistent with her right to

consult an attorney. She also identifies provisions of the employee handbook

that allegedly violate public policy, and claims the employer retaliated against her

for seeking legal advice concerning those questionable provisions.

Newell relies on Thompto v. Coborn’s Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Iowa

1994). In that case, the federal court determined the Iowa Supreme Court would

likely recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on an

employee’s threat to consult with an attorney as a violation of public policy. Our

supreme court has yet to verify that prediction. See Ballalatak v. All Iowa

Agriculture Ass’n, 781 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Iowa 2010). In Davis v. Horton, the

Iowa Supreme Court rejected an employee’s argument she was fired for seeking

legal assistance: “[O]n the facts of the present dispute, it is clearly impossible to

separate Davis’s act in hiring an attorney from her act in challenging a personnel

decision made by her employer.” 661 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 2003). The court

held an employee’s rebuke of an employer’s personnel decision is not “insulated

from sanction merely because it has been carried out through an attorney.” Id.

Like the situation in Davis, it is difficult to segregate Newell’s desire to

consult with a lawyer from her challenge to the employer’s mandate that she

promptly sign the handbook acknowledgment form. Accordingly, we question

whether she has articulated a clearly defined public policy that would be

undermined by her firing. But we opt to affirm on different grounds. See Kern v.

Palmer College of Chiropractic, 757 N.W.2d 651, 662 (Iowa 2008) (noting we

may affirm a summary judgment ruling on a proper ground urged below but not

relied upon by the district court).

Even assuming Newell has shown the existence of a clearly defined public

policy that would be jeopardized, she cannot prove the existence of a fact

question on the third or fourth elements of a wrongful discharge claim: that she

was engaged in the protected activity and it was the reason for her discharge,

and no overriding business justification accounted for her termination. Newell

admits she was not fired on February 25, 2011, the day she voiced her desire to

speak to her attorney about the handbook. Schofield contacted her that night to

inform her she was not fired. Newell admits Schofield said their lawyers “could

discuss things” and acknowledged, “I understand that it takes attorneys time to

look at things.”

Newell’s employer mentioned her failure to promptly sign the form in the

meeting at which she was fired and listed that conduct on the separation of

employment form. But that conduct served as one of several justifications given

for her termination. When Newell first asked why she was being fired, Schofield

responded by asking if she remembered the conversation she had with

Tomlyanovich. Other concerns included Newell’s attendance, behavioral and

attitude issues, and concerns that Newell was performing massage therapy on

clients outside of Elements. On this record, Newell failed to generate a fact

question on the claim that her employer fired her for requesting to speak with her

attorney before signing the handbook receipt form, without any overriding

justification for the termination. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary

judgment in favor of JDS Holdings.

B. Defamation.

Newell next contends the district court erred in granting summary

judgment on her claim Preston defamed her. At the heart of Newell’s defamation

claim is Preston’s report to Schofield regarding a conversation Preston allegedly

overheard between Newell and a massage client. According to Preston, Newell

complained to Amy Tomlyanovich that working for JDS Holdings was “scary.”

Newell also alleges Preston told Schofield that Newell continued to have

problems with attendance and turning in her SOAP notes. Newell alleges these

statements were false, and Preston knew they were false.

Defamation is the publishing of written or oral statements that tend to

injure a person’s reputation and good name. Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d

216, 221 (Iowa 1996). Generally, a plaintiff must prove the statements were

false, made with malice, and caused damage. Id. Publication, or the

communication of statements to one or more third parties, is also an essential

element of defamation. Id. The publication must reach beyond the person being

defamed. Id. If a statement is not heard and understood by a third person to be

defamatory, the defamatory statement is not published and is therefore not

actionable. Id.

JDS Holdings challenges whether Preston’s statements were published

because they were made by a supervisory employee within the company. Some

jurisdictions hold intra-office defamation “is simply the corporation talking to

itself,” and therefore does not qualify as publication to a third party. Taggart v.

Drake Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802-03 (Iowa 1996). Other jurisdictions hold

communications between supervisory employees of a corporation regarding

another employee may be qualifiedly privileged, but are still considered

publications. Id. at 803. Our supreme court has not embraced either position,

leaving the issue unresolved in Taggart because it found the plaintiff could not

succeed under either view. Id. at 802-03.

Those jurisdictions which do not recognize internal corporate

communications as publication to a third party represent the minority position.

Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Law of Defamation § 15:8 (2012). The roots of this position

can be traced to an early case involving a stenographer. Id. (citing Owen v.

Ogilvie Publishing Co., 53 N.Y.S. 1033, 1035 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898)). In that

case, an employee sued her corporate employer for defamation, alleging its

general manager defamed her by alleging she had taken money from the cash

drawer during her employment. Owen, 53 N.Y.S. at 1034. The general manager

sent a letter to Owen, stating his suspicions that she stole the money. Id. While

the court believed the letter was libelous, it found no publication to a third party

even though the general manager had dictated the letter to a stenographer

because “[t]hey were both employed by a common master, and were engaged in

the performance of duties which their respective employments required.” Id. The

Owen court explained that where the duties of the servant “are distinct and

independent of the process by which the libel was produced, he might well stand

in the attitude of a third person through whom a libel can be published.” Id. at

1035. The difference in Owen was the acts of the manager and stenographer

were intimately related and the production was the joint act of both. Id.

The no-publication position expanded over time. Citing Owen, the

Washington Supreme Court held a defendant corporation could not be liable for

the libelous letter written by one manager about another manager of the

corporation and sent to its branch office. Prins v. Holland-North America Mortg.

Co., 181 P. 680, 680-81 (Wash. 1919). The court held when certain officers and

agents of a corporation act in the line of duty to the common employer, “the acts

of the one are to be accorded the same legal effect as the acts of the other.” Id.

at 681. The Prins court reasoned:

Agents and employés of [the same principal] are not third persons

in their relations to the corporation, within the meaning of the laws

pertaining to the publication of libels. For the time being, they are a

part and parcel of the corporation itself, so much so, indeed, that

their acts within the limits of their employment are the acts of the

corporation. For a corporation, therefore, acting through one of its

agents or representatives, to send a libelous communication to

another of its agents or representatives, cannot be a publication of

the libel on the part of the corporation. It is but communicating with

itself.

Id. at 680-81.

The “contemporary view” is that intra-office communications do count as

publications, but are protected by a qualified privilege, which allows an employee

to recover only if the employer abuses the privilege. See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T.

Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 523, at 185 (2d ed. 2011). The

Restatement of Laws (Second) on Torts rejects an intra-office exception to

publication, and promotes the view that communication between two agents of

the same principal constitutes publication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577

cmt. i (1977); see also W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of

Torts, § 113, at 798 (5th ed. 1984)

(“There may be publication to any third

person. It may be made to . . . the plaintiff’s agent or employee. It may be made

to the defendant’s own agent, employee or officer, even where the defendant is a

corporation.” (footnotes omitted)). A majority of jurisdictions that have addressed

this publication issue have rejected full immunity from defamation for intra-

corporate communications. See Dube v. Linkins, 167 P.3d 93, 105 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 2007).

The question before us here differs a bit from Prins, where the corporation

was the defendant. Newell brought her defamation claim against Preston, not

JDS Holdings. Newell alleges Preston defamed her to Schofield, a third party,

which resulted in her termination. To exempt this type of communication from

liability because the plaintiff’s supervisor only shared it with the company owner

would run counter to the purpose of our defamation law. “A defamatory

statement made to one’s employer can harm one’s business reputation with the

employer, whether the defamer is a co-worker or is instead removed from the

employment relationship.” Wallulis v. Dymowski, 918 P.2d 755, 760 (Or. 1996).

Instead, we find a qualified privilege applies to this type of communication.

Our supreme court has recognized an employer’s limited privilege with

regard to

communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which

the [person communicating] has an interest, or with reference to

which he has a duty . . . if made to another person having a

corresponding interest or duty, on a privileged occasion and in a

manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion

and duty, right or interest.

Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 83-84 (Iowa 2001) (quoting

50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 276, at 547). This privilege applies where a

defendant proves: “(1) the statement was made in good faith, (2) the defendant

had an interest to uphold, (3) the scope of the statement was limited to the

identified interest, and (4) the statement was published on a proper occasion, in

a proper manner, and to proper parties only.” Id. at 84. “[T]o defeat a qualified

privilege, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with knowing or reckless

disregard of the truth of the statement.” Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111,

121 (Iowa 2004).

In its summary judgment ruling, the district court found that when viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to Newell, the qualified privilege applied to

Preston’s statement to Schofield. It found Preston, as supervisor, had an interest

in her employees’ performance, as well as a corresponding duty to apprise

Schofield of their performance. The court found Schofield—as the listener—had

an equally clear interest in the performance of his employees. The court

determined the issue of whether a qualified privilege applies to the

communication turned on whether Preston acted in good faith, or if Newell could

show Preston spoke with actual malice. The court decided the record did not

demonstrate Preston acted with knowledge her statements were false or with a

reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. The ruling stated: “While Preston may

have been mistaken or inaccurate in some of what she said, it is a big leap from

that to actual malice. It is a leap this Court is unwilling to make absent any

authority on the issue, which Newell has not provided.”

Our task is to decide whether, under the circumstances, Preston’s

statements were qualifiedly privileged. See Barreca, 683 N.W.2d at 118. If they

were privileged, we must decide whether she abused that privilege by publishing

her statements about Newell with actual malice. See id. The test for actual

malice does not probe for an improper purpose on Preston’s part; the inquiry is

whether Preston acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the

truth.

See id. at 123. In general, the question whether a statement is qualifiedly

privileged is for the judge and the question whether the privilege was abused is

for the jury. Id. at 118.

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Newell, we find a

material question of fact exists regarding whether Preston published her

statements about Newell with knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard

for the truth. Newell presented evidence that Preston informed Schofield that

The Barreca court explained “reckless conduct is not measured by whether a

reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before

publishing.” Id. at 123. The evidence must show the defendant entertained serious

doubts as to the truth of his publication because the actual malice standard requires a

high degree of awareness of probable falsity.” Id.

Newell disparaged the company to a client by saying it was “scary” to work for

JDS Holdings. Newell also offered evidence that information led to her

termination. Newell denied making any negative statements about her employer

to client Tomlyanovich.

In response to the summary judgment motion, Newell submitted

Tomlyanovich’s deposition, in which Tomlyanovich swore Newell never described

JDS Holdings as “scary” or aired any complaints about her employer.

Tomlyanovich testified she and Newell may have used the word “scary” when

discussing an unrelated topic, but she did not remember if that conversation

occurred on the date in question. Tomlyanovich also said Schofield contacted

her to ask whether Newell told her JDS Holdings was “scary” and Tomlyanovich

informed him that Newell never said that—though it is unclear when this

conversation occurred.

Preston’s deposition testimony also appears in the summary judgment

record. Preston testified she overheard a conversation between Newell and

Tomlyanovich while in a space adjoining the massage room. She recalled

hearing Newell tell the client it was “scary” to work there. Preston did not recall

hearing anything else clearly. When confronted with Tomlyanovich’s statement

that Newell did not mention any work-related grievances, Preston stated, “That’s

not what I heard.” Preston also acknowledged that after hearing Newell’s

statement to Tomlyanovich, Preston told another Elements employee, Melissa

Champion, something to the effect: “You might have to verify this later, but you

know that I was back there measuring the cart, not listening in on conversations.”

Newell also contends that Preston’s representations to Schofield that

Newell had current issues with attendance and turning in client SOAP notes were

made with a reckless disregard for the truth. In her deposition, Preston

confirmed that Newell had made a significant effort to improve her attendance

through the last four months of her employment at Elements. And Newell offered

deposition exhibits to show that Preston evaluated her at average to above

average in the categories of accurate and timely SOAP notes and attendance—

just two months before firing her. Newell also presented evidence that other

employees with worse attendance and SOAP note issues continued to work for

Elements.

We find a reasonable juror could have determined that Preston

entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements about Newell that

she shared with Schofield on the eve of Newell’s termination. Whether Preston

sincerely believed she overheard Newell tell a customer that working for JDS

Holdings was “scary” is a credibility call. The court is not entitled to make

credibility findings on summary judgment because such determinations are

reserved for the fact finder. Frontier Leasing Corp. v. Links Eng’g, LLC, 781

N.W.2d 772, 776 (Iowa 2010). We cannot say as a matter of law that Preston did

not act with actual malice. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on this claim.

C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage

Finally, Newell asserts the district court erred in granting summary

judgment on her claim that Preston improperly interfered with her prospective

business advantage. Essentially, Newell claims Preston gave Schofield

misinformation in an attempt to have her fired.

To prove her claim of interference with a prospective business advantage,

Newell must show she had a prospective business relationship with JDS

Holdings; Preston knew of the prospective relationship; Preston intentionally and

improperly interfered with the relationship by relaying misinformation to Schofield;

the interference caused JDS Holdings not to continue the relationship; and the

amount of her damages. See Nesler v. Fischer & Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191, 199

(Iowa 1990). In a claim of intentional interference with a prospective business

advantage, the plaintiff must prove the defendant intended to financially injure or

destroy the plaintiff. Burke v. Hawkeye Nat. Life Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 110, 114

(Iowa 1991). Newell predicates this cause of action on the same facts as her

defamation claim.

The district court rejected Newell’s intentional interference claim, finding

that even viewing the record in the light most favorable to her, “there is no

evidence that Preston’s actions were improper, let alone that they were done with

the sole or predominant purpose to financially injure or destroy Newell.” The

court found it was “entirely proper” for a supervisor to discuss a subordinate’s job

performance with the employer. Importantly, the court found no evidence

Preston communicated misinformation to Schofield with the intent of getting

Newell fired, and that Newell’s resistance “contains no evidence to support this

theory that Preston had some sort of vendetta against Newell and that she

engaged in all of this conduct to ensure that Newell lost her position with JDS.”

We agree with the district court’s finding that Newell has not met her

burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Preston

intended to financially injure or destroy her. While there is evidence by which the

fact finder could determine Preston knew the information she gave Schofield was

false or that she acted with reckless disregard for the truth when discussing

Newell’s conversation with Tomlyanovich and Newell’s attendance and SOAP

note proficiency, that evidence does not support a claim of intentional

interference with a prospective business advantage. See Willey v. Riley, 541

N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 1995) (holding defendant’s improper purpose to

financially destroy plaintiff must predominate to create liability). Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.