LONG-TERM
RECOVERY OF
RENTAL HOUSING:
A Case Study of Highly Impacted
Communities in New Jersey after
Superstorm Sandy
DECEMBER 2019
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 2
The National Low Income Housing Coalition
1000 Vermont Avenue, NW • Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005
202-662-1530 • www.nlihc.org
ABOUT NLIHC:
Established in 1974 by Cushing N.
Dolbeare, the National Low Income
Housing Coalition is dedicated solely to
achieving socially just public policy that
ensures people with the lowest incomes
in the United States have affordable
and decent homes. NLIHC educates,
organizes, and advocates to ensure
decent, affordable housing for everyone.
LONG-TERM
RECOVERY OF
RENTAL HOUSING:
A Case Study of
Highly Impacted
Communities in
New Jersey after
Superstorm Sandy
ANDREW AURAND, PHD., MSW
Vice President for Research
DAN EMMANUEL, MSW
Senior Research Analyst
DAN THREET, PhD.
Research Analyst
CATHERINE PORTER
Research Intern
© 2019 NLIHC Design by Ikra Ra, NLIHC Creative Services Specialist
Contents
3 Introduction
3 Background
5 Previous Research on the Re-
covery of Rental Housing
6 Methods and Data Sources
6 Findings
12 Considerations for Future Poli-
cy Development and Research
14 Conclusion
14 References
16 Appendices
MADE POSSIBLE BY THE GENEROSITY
OF:
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 3
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
Contents
3 Introduction
3 Background
5 Previous Research on the Re-
covery of Rental Housing
6 Methods and Data Sources
6 Findings
12 Considerations for Future Poli-
cy Development and Research
14 Conclusion
14 References
16 Appendices
Introduction
D
uring a three-year period between August 2016
and August 2019, nine disasters in the U.S.
caused damages of at least $10 billion each,
including wildfires in California, flooding in Louisiana,
and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, Florence, and
Michael (NOAA, 2019). Climate-change experts expect
the frequency and intensity of such events to increase.
Renters are potentially more vulnerable to harm
from these events than homeowners. Renters have
lower incomes, fewer financial resources, and fewer
neighborhood social networks to plan for and recover
from disasters (Lee & Van Zandt, 2019). When their
homes are damaged, renters have little, if any, control
over their repair because they do not own the properties.
Low-income renters are at even greater risk because
rental housing affordable to them is often of lower
physical quality and located in less desirable and risk-
prone areas (Rumbach & Makarewicz, 2016; Lee & Van
Zandt, 2019).
The few studies that have examined the recovery
of rental housing after disasters underscore these
challenges. Evidence indicates that rental housing suffers
greater storm damage and recovers more slowly than
owner-occupied homes, with multifamily housing and
duplexes faring worse (Peacock et. al., 2014). Without
public subsidies for recovery, affordable housing for
low-income households is likely to be lost because of
the costs of repair and rebuilding. Government recovery
resources, meanwhile, have tended to skew towards
homeowners (GAO, 2010; Spader & Turnham, 2014).
To better understand the barriers to the recovery of
affordable rental housing after disasters, the National
Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) conducted a case
study focused on recovery programs and outcomes in
New Jersey after Superstorm Sandy. More than 16,500
rental homes were damaged throughout the state, many
of them concentrated in three counties. Our key findings
and recommendations include:
• Deep housing subsidies should be available during
recovery for developments that include affordable
rental homes for extremely low-income renters.
• Government agencies should provide longer-term
rental assistance of more than two years during
recovery, given the length of time required for
the construction and rehabilitation of affordable
multifamily housing.
• States or local municipalities should consider rental
registries which include location, number of units,
and owners to reliably identify rental properties,
including single-family homes and small multi-unit
properties, for both pre- and post-disaster planning.
• Private landlords of low-cost rental housing may be
unable or unwilling to repair or rehabilitate their
properties as affordable low-cost rental housing.
Ensuring an adequate supply of subsidized
affordable housing before a disaster could minimize
the displacement of low-income renters after a
disaster.
• Small rental properties were lost from some
communities’ housing stock. Future research
should aim to better understand the needs, market
incentives, and behaviors of small-scale landlords
during recovery.
Background
When Superstorm Sandy made landfall on October 29,
2012, its tropical-force winds stretched along a record-
breaking 943 miles of the U.S. east coast, causing more
than $70 billion in damages (Masters, 2018; NOAA,
2019). New Jersey, where the storm made landfall,
was particularly hard hit by storm-surge flooding, wind
damage, and power outages. The state suffered 35
fatalities and an estimated $29 billion in damages to
personal properties, businesses, and transportation
and utilities infrastructure (NJ SLDHTF, 2012).
More than 259,000 New Jersey residents, including
150,000 homeowners and 109,000 renters, registered
for financial assistance from FEMA’s Individuals and
Households Program (IHP) to obtain help with their
housing and other needs (Table 1) (FEMA, 2019).
One analysis indicated that 67% of renter registrants
had annual incomes of less than $30,000 (Enterprise
Community Partners, 2013).
FEMA property inspections indicated that more
than 76,000 homes were damaged, including at
least 16,500 rental homes. More homes were likely
damaged but not inspected by FEMA. Based on
FEMA’s inspections alone, the state initially estimated
DEEP HOUSING SUBSIDIES
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE DURING
RECOVERY FOR DEVELOPMENTS
THAT INCLUDE AFFORDABLE
RENTAL HOMES FOR EXTREMELY
LOW-INCOME RENTERS.
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 4
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
that the cost to repair or replace the damaged housing
would be at least $4.3 billion (NJ DCA, 2013).
To meet the immediate housing needs of those
impacted by Sandy, FEMA’s Transitional Sheltering
Assistance Program temporarily placed more than 5,500
households, including 3,500 renters, in hotels across the
state from November 3, 2012 to April 30, 2013 (Kalet,
2013). And more than 21,000 renters were approved
for nearly $104 million of assistance from FEMA’s IHP,
including $66 million in rental assistance for temporary
housing (FEMA, 2019).
The repair and rebuilding of permanent housing
after a large-scale disaster like Sandy is a significant
component of long-term recovery. Major sources of
recovery funding after Sandy included payouts from the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and disaster
loans from the Small Business Administration (SBA).
NFIP eventually paid out approximately $3.8 billion in
claims in New Jersey (FEMA, 2017). The SBA, which
offers low-interest disaster loans, approved more than
$639 million in loans in New Jersey to homeowners and
renters. The vast majority were likely to homeowners
since most loans included damage to real estate
property, which is not owned by the renter (SBA, 2017).
The SBA provided another $401 million of disaster
loans to businesses in the state.
The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013
appropriated $16 billion of federal Community
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
DR) funds for the states most impacted by Sandy to
cover communities’ unmet needs not addressed by
FEMA funds, SBA loans, or private insurance (NJ DCA,
2013). HUD announced an initial allocation of $1.83
billion of CDBG-DR funds to New Jersey on February
6, 2013. Subsequent allocations eventually brought
the total to $4.2 billion. The New Jersey Department of
Community Affairs (NJ DCA) circulated an Action Plan
on March 12 for using the funds, and HUD approved
the plan on April 29. The plan established a variety of
homeowner and renter assistance programs. Most of
these programs were launched in May of 2013.
The largest
housing program
in the plan was the
Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation,
Elevation, and
Mitigation (RREM)
program, initially
allocated $600 million.
The program provided
homeowners with
grants of up to $150,000 for the reconstruction of their
primary homes. With additional allocations over time,
RREM allocations totaled more than $1.3 billion.
The second largest program (and largest rental
program) was the Fund for the Restoration of Multifamily
Housing (FRM), initially allocated $179.5 million. The
state initially proposed approximately $100 million
for FRM, but pressure from housing advocates led to
the higher amount in the Action Plan approved by
HUD. FRM provided zero- or low-interest loans for the
construction or rehabilitation of affordable multifamily
housing for low-income households. The state expected
these funds to be leveraged with Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits (LIHTCs). Subsequent allocations raised
FRM’s total allocation to $661.9 million. A second rental
housing program, the Landlord Rental Repair Program
(LRRP), was initially allocated $70 million to provide
landlords of small properties of fewer than 25 units with
a forgivable zero-interest loan of up to $50,000 per
unit to repair and elevate the housing, as long as the
units were kept affordable to renters with incomes less
than 80% of the area median income (AMI). This initial
allocation was eventually reduced to $54 million.
Fair Housing advocates contested the state’s initial plan.
In April of 2013, the Latino Action Network, Fair Share
Housing Center, and the New Jersey NAACP filed a
complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), alleging that New Jersey’s
initial plan underestimated the impact of Sandy on
renters, particularly lower-income African-American and
Latino renters, and so did not allocate funding fairly.
A subsequent lawsuit in September 2013 forced the
state to turn over information about the criteria used
to distribute funding. The data revealed that African-
American applicants were denied housing assistance at
more than twice the rate of white applicants, inaccurate
funding information was included in Spanish-language
materials, and funds were directed toward projects
undamaged by the storm at the expense of renters
in the most-impacted counties (Fair Share Housing,
et. al., 2015). A settlement was reached in May 2014.
Among other things, the state committed to distribute
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF SANDY’S IMPACT ON NEW JERSEY
Homeowners Renters
Applied for FEMA IHP assistance 150,259 109,144
FEMA-inspected homes with damage 59,999 16,533
Approved for FEMA IHP assistance 39,578 21,736
Source: FEMA, 2019
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 5
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
more funds to the most impacted communities, to a
Tenant-Based Rental Assistance (TBRA) program to
give short-term vouchers to low- and moderate-income
households, and to the construction of more special-
needs housing (Fair Share Housing, 2014 & 2015). The
state also committed to deeper income targeting in the
FRM program for multifamily housing. The settlement
required 50% of units be affordable for renters with
household incomes below 50% of AMI, including 10%
for renters with incomes below 30% of AMI (Fair Share
Housing, Email Communication). Over time, the state
also allocated more funds to the FRM.
When the TBRA program opened for applications in
the first quarter of 2015, more than 3,000 households
applied for only 1,400 vouchers. By October 2015,
however, only 143 households had been issued
vouchers (NJ DCA, 2015). The NJ DCA attributed the
slow uptake to challenges applicants faced in providing
proof of residence and paying their own security
deposits (NJ DCA, 2016). The program was amended
in August 2016 to provide a one-time security deposit
on behalf of tenants. TBRA program subsidies ended in
December 2018.
Appendix A provides a list of major housing recovery
programs in New Jersey targeted to the repair or
construction of homes after Superstorm Sandy. The
state also funded assistance programs like the Sandy
Homeowner and Renter Assistance Program (SHRAP),
the Rental Assistance Program and TBRA to help renters
and homeowners pay their rents or mortgages for a
limited time during the recovery.
Previous Research on
the Recovery of Rental
Housing
Evidence indicates that damage is typically greater
and recovery slower for rental housing than for owner-
occupied homes (Zhang & Peacock, 2009; Peacock
et. al, 2014). In one study, multifamily housing and
duplexes fared the worst in both damage and recovery
(Peacock et al., 2014). Renters and landlords typically
do not maintain the physical quality of housing as
well as homeowners and have less incentive to invest
in protective features, putting rental housing at
greater risk. Rental housing affordable to low-income
households is likely at even greater risk because it is
more often located in less desirable and more risk-
prone areas and characterized by lower physical quality
(Lee & Van Zandt, 2019).
When their property is significantly damaged, landlords
must decide whether to renovate their property or
divest of their investment. In this regard, landlords have
potentially different incentives than homeowners whose
decisions are about their primary homes. At the same
time, FEMA assistance, unlike for homeowners, is not
available to landlords for repairs (Been et al., 2015),
so they must rely on their own resources, insurance, or
loans. Few studies have examined landlord decision-
making after disasters, but barriers to rental recovery
may include the landlords’ limited financial resources
to cover repair costs and the limited availability of
government assistance (Comerio, 1997; Been et. al.,
2015; Lee & Van Zandt, 2019).
Private landlords of rental housing may find it difficult
to absorb the costs of repairing their housing
without raising rents. Rents affordable to low-income
households may not be adequate to recoup high
repair costs, especially if the renovated housing, such
as that in a flood plain, must meet newer regulations
or guidelines to mitigate future damage. Affordable
rents, therefore, cannot be maintained without public
resources to help with recovery costs (Rumbach &
Makarewicz, 2016).
Disasters may give landlords and developers an
opportunity in some instances to pursue greater
profits with redevelopment geared toward more
affluent households. Rent gap theory suggests that
low-income neighborhoods may experience socio-
economic change after disasters because landlords
and developers can take advantage of lower values
in low-income neighborhoods and redevelop for
higher values. The process potentially displaces
low-income households from their pre-disaster
neighborhoods (Wyczalkowski et. al., 2019). Other
research, however, finds that properties in low-income
neighborhoods recover more slowly than in higher-
income neighborhoods because property owners have
fewer resources (Peacock et. al., 2014). Either way, the
outcome is not favorable for rental housing affordable
for low-income renters.
Post-disaster housing recovery efforts have largely
been skewed toward homeowners, limiting the
recovery of rental housing, especially affordable rental
housing. FEMA assistance is not available to landlords
for repairs, and CDBG-DR funds have historically
been disproportionately allocated to programs
serving homeowners (Spader & Turnham, 2014; Fair
Share Housing et. al., 2015). The U.S. Government
Accountability Office, for instance, found that in
response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, 62% of
damaged homeowner units and just 18% of damaged
rental units were assisted (GAO, 2010).
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 6
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
Political pressures may factor into why fewer resources
are dedicated to rental housing during disaster
recovery. “Not in my backyard” (NIMBY) sentiments
generally generate opposition to rental housing,
particularly affordable rental housing. Similar sentiments
can influence disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2012; Lowe,
2012). Beyond NIMBYism, the fact that poor renters
are more likely to be displaced from their communities
immediately after a disaster can mean their voices are
not represented in public meetings when recovery
decisions are made (Rumbach & Makarewicz, 2016;
Hamideh & Rongerude, 2018).
Methods and Data
Sources
This report utilizes a case study examining the region
where Superstorm Sandy caused the greatest damage
to rental housing in New Jersey. The region includes
Atlantic, Ocean, and Monmouth counties, which are
adjacent counties located directly along the New Jersey
coastline. These three counties combined accounted
for more than three-quarters of all damaged homes in
the state (NJ DCA, 2013; FEMA, 2019).
Quantitative data from FEMA IHP, the American
Community Survey (ACS), and New Jersey’s MOD IV
property tax system provided a limited framework to
analyze the long-term trends in rental housing after
Superstorm Sandy. Data from FEMA IHP were used to
measure damage to rental housing, 5-year data from
the ACS provided longitudinal data on households and
the affordable housing stock, and the MOD IV property
tax system provided parcel-level, longitudinal data on
property values and tax assessments. Given its limited
sample size, ACS estimates for small communities
are subject to low reliability. We used tax assessment
data and key stakeholder interviews to explore trends
suggested by the ACS. Throughout the report we
focused on rental homes assumed to be available year-
round and did not include seasonal or vacation homes.
We employed qualitative interviews with a convenience
sample of 20 stakeholders who had direct knowledge
of the rental housing recovery in the three counties
to gain a deeper understanding of the rental housing
recovery after Sandy. We chose the interviewees based
on their knowledge and experiences related to rental
housing recovery. Stakeholders included state and local
government officials, housing and recovery program
administrators, for-profit and non-profit real estate
practitioners, and staff from key civil society groups.
Many of the interviewees shared their perspectives not
only as professionals involved in the recovery, but as
survivors of Superstorm Sandy.
The interviews were semi-structured, allowing for
open-ended conversations, and focused on three main
topics: the state of rental housing prior to Sandy, the
immediate and long-term impacts of Sandy on rental
housing, and the underlying issues of the rental housing
recovery. All interviews were conducted by phone by
at least two NLIHC staff and lasted approximately one
hour. The authors completed interviews in August 2019
and subsequently analyzed and compared notes to
identify themes. Themes from the interviews were also
compared to the quantitative findings. The interviews
helped corroborate and explain findings from the
quantitative analysis, added essential context, and
provided further insights into challenges for the long-
term rental housing recovery after Sandy.
Findings
Flooding was the primary source of damage to the
housing stock in Atlantic, Monmouth, and Ocean
Counties, leading to both immediate structural damage
and mold. This damage occurred at a time when all
three counties were already experiencing significant
affordable housing shortages for the lowest-income
renters. In 2012, Atlantic County had a deficit of 5,290
affordable and available rental homes for households
earning less than 30% of the area median income;
Monmouth County had a shortage of 10,520; and
Ocean County had a shortage of 8,580 (NLIHC, 2013).
Thirty-two thousand renters from the three counties
applied for assistance from FEMA IHP. More than
11,000 rental homes inspected by FEMA in the three
counties had damage, accounting for 69% of the
state’s damaged rental homes, and the 14,072 renters
approved for IHP assistance accounted for 65% of all
approved renters in the state (Table 2).
The state’s supply of rental homes has increased by
6% between 2011 and 2017 from homeownership
conversions to rentals and new construction. Despite
the significant damage to their rental housing stock,
Atlantic, Ocean, and Monmouth Counties saw similar
increases (Table 3). Low-cost affordable rental homes
with monthly rents less than $750, however, have
been lost. Assuming a 30% rent-to-income ratio for
affordability, this rent level would be considered
affordable for households with annual incomes of
$30,000, which is approximately the income-threshold
for extremely low-income families in Monmouth and
Ocean Counties.
A jurisdiction’s low-cost rental housing stock is
impacted by numerous factors in addition to weather-
related shocks, including population and demographic
changes, development costs, consumer preferences,
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 7
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
and public resources. Like many areas across the
country, the increase in rental housing in the three
counties did not keep pace with growing demand. All
three counties saw a decline in rental vacancy rates as
the number of renter households grew faster than the
number of additional rental homes between 2011 and
2017. At the same time, most new rental development
is unaffordable to the lowest-income renters. In 2017,
the median gross rent of rental housing built in 2014 or
later was $1,558 and $2,264 in Monmouth and Ocean
Counties, far greater than what is affordable to a family
with poverty-level income.
The state experienced a 12% decline in low-cost
rental homes between 2011 and 2017, losing more
than 29,000 units. Despite significant Sandy-related
damages to rental housing, Atlantic, Monmouth, and
Ocean Counties, as a whole, showed no discernibly
greater loss than the state overall. Monmouth lost 14%
of its low-cost rental homes and Ocean lost 8%, while
TABLE 3: SELECTED COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS (2011 AND 2017)
% Change
in All Rent-
als
(Absolute
change)
% Change in
Renter House-
holds (Abso-
lute Change)
% Change in
Low-Cost
Rentals
(Absolute
Change)
Median Gross
Rent of
Occupied
Units built
2014 or later
(# of units)
2011
Rental
Vacancy
rate
2017
Rental
Vacancy
rate
2017
Median
Household
Income
% Change in
Median
Household
Income
Since
2011
New Jersey
6.0%
(69,028)
7.9%
(84,107)
-12.2%
(-29,562)
$2,002
(7,974)
8.2% 6.5% $76,475 7.4%
Atlantic
County
6.0%
(2,007)
10.3%
(3,067)
1.6%
(173)
$746
(126)
10.7% 7.1% $57,514 4.2%
Monmouth
County
5.3%
(3,207)
7.7%
(4,347)
-14.2%
(-1,516)
$2,264
(481)
7.1% 5.0% $91,807 9.5%
Ocean
County
7.3%
(3,142)
(10.5%
(4,250)
-8.9%
(-537)
$1,558
(303)
6.5% 3.6% $65,771 8.3%
Low-cost rental units have monthly contract rents less than $750 (inflation-adjusted dollars by CPI less shelter costs). Source: 5-yr American Commu-
nity Survey, 2007-2011 & 2012-2017.
TABLE 2: RENTER REGISTRANTS, INSPECTED DAMAGE,
AND APPROVAL FOR FEMA IHP ASSISTANCE
Renter Registrants for IHP
Assistance
FEMA-Inspected Damage
FEMA-Approved IHP
Assistance
Renter
Households
(2011)
Number
As % of Renter
Households
Number
As % of Renter
Households
Number
As % of Renter
Households
Atlantic County 29,748 9,964 33% 3,326 11% 4,330 15%
Monmouth County 56,575 11,221 20% 3,586 6% 3,961 7%
Ocean County 40,315 10,815 27% 4,566 11% 5,781 14%
State of New Jersey 1,062,931 109,144 10% 16,533 2% 21,736 2%
Source: 5-yr American Community Survey, 2007-2011; FEMA Housing assistance data (archived).
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 8
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
Atlantic experienced a negligible gain. An interviewee
commented that Monmouth experienced a loss of
low-cost rental homes not just directly from damage,
but also likely from gentrification in some communities
that were not the hardest hit by Sandy. Atlantic County
is generally a weaker market with higher vacancy
rates, lower incomes, and lower income growth over
the past six years than the other two counties. Median
household income, for example, grew by 9.5% and
8.3% in Monmouth and Ocean Counties, respectively,
and by only 4.2% in Atlantic County between 2011 and
2017.
Within these counties, communities significantly
impacted by Sandy experienced a range of outcomes,
including some with major losses to their stock of
affordable rental housing. Coastal communities, both
big and small, were some of the most heavily impacted.
Damage to low-cost rental homes was heavily
concentrated in coastal communities where older
single-family homes, often described as bungalows or
cottages, and small multifamily properties formed the
backbone of the long-term rental stock. Among the
twenty communities whose rental housing was most
heavily impacted (Figure 1), an average of 71% of
long-term rentals in 2011 were in single-family or small
multifamily properties of fewer than 5 units. Hotels and
vacation homes available as short-term, low-cost rentals
in the off-season also sustained damage in these
communities. One interviewee referred to these rental
options damaged by Sandy collectively as the “welfare
rental market.”
Figure 1 and Appendix B show the 20 communities
where Sandy damaged at least 100 rental homes,
according to FEMA inspections, and which had at
least 20 low-cost rental homes in 2011 according to
ACS estimates. Nearly 2,000 rental homes in Atlantic
City and more than 1,000 in Ocean County’s Seaside
Heights were damaged. Smaller communities also took
a significant hit. These 20 communities accounted for
more than three-quarters (77%) of the damaged rental
homes in the three-county area and more than half
(53%) of all damaged rental homes in the state.
Jurisdictions with relatively high poverty rates and
large proportions of people of color prior to Sandy
seemed less likely to lose their low-cost rental housing
in the long-run and they experienced a slower rate
of recovery. Despite their relatively large number of
damaged rental homes, a handful of communities like
Atlantic City and Pleasantville in Atlantic County and
Seaside Heights in Ocean County did not appear to
experience the same loss of low-cost rental housing
as other hard-hit communities. These communities
had relatively high poverty rates prior to Sandy that
have continued to worsen. Property tax data indicate
that damaged properties in these communities did
not recover their value by 2017 to pre-Sandy levels,
indicating a potential lack of recovery. A worsening
local economy may be partially to blame in Atlantic
City, where median household income declined by 9%
between 2011 and 2017.
Toms River in Ocean County also did not see a long-run
decline in low-cost rental housing despite significant
damage to its rental homes, but for a different reason.
Local officials indicated that new large-scale rental
developments after Sandy, some of which were
approved prior to Sandy, helped increase the rental
housing stock during recovery.
Smaller beach communities in Ocean and Monmouth
Counties consisted predominantly of owner-occupied
and vacation homes rather than long-term rentals,
but the low-cost rental housing that did exist prior to
Sandy appears to have declined significantly. Ocean
County’s Beach Haven and Seaside Park, for example,
saw increases in homeownership rates and median
household incomes, along with declines in their rental
housing and the disappearance of their low-cost rental
stock. ACS data suggest similar trends of large rent
increases and losses of affordable rental housing in
other communities, including Long Beach, Margate,
and Point Pleasant Beach.Tax assessment data indicate
that damaged properties in some of these coastal
communities were redeveloped into more valuable
homes post-disaster, potentially eliminating low-cost
housing and displacing lower- and moderate-income
households. Figure 2 shows the change in average
improvement value of properties by level of damage in
three jurisdictions that had significant losses of low-
cost rental housing and increases in median household
income. The graphs for Beach Haven, Belmar, and
DAMAGED PROPERTIES IN
SOME OF THESE COASTAL
COMMUNITIES WERE
REDEVELOPED INTO MORE
VALUABLE HOMES POST-
DISASTER, POTENTIALLY
ELIMINATING LOW-COST
HOUSING AND DISPLACING
LOWER- AND MODERATE-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS.
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 9
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
FIGURE 1:TOP 20 MUNICIPALITIES
WITH GREATEST RENTAL HOUSING
DAMAGE IN ATLANTIC, OCEAN
AND MONMOUTH COUNTIES
MONMOUTH
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
MUNICIPALITIES WITH GREATEST
RENTAL DAMAGE
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 10
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
Manasquan each indicate the homes that likely incurred
significant damage from Sandy saw an increase in their
tax-assessment value that exceeded that of homes that
had not been damaged (Figure 2). Tax data exhibited
similar trends to varying degrees in Ocean Gate, Long
Beach, Margate, Toms River, and Highlands. Many
pre-Sandy owners in these communities likely found
it in their interests or were required by mitigation
requirements to significantly improve their properties,
or they decided to sell to new owners who made
significant improvements.
Underlying Issues of the Rental Housing
Recovery
Why didn’t low-cost rental housing recover in some
coastal communities in the long-term? While it is not
possible to entirely separate changes in the broader
housing market from the impact of Sandy, interviewees
consistently viewed Sandy as having a long-term impact
on rental housing, particularly in coastal communities
in Ocean and Monmouth counties. They identified
multiple contextual factors and mechanisms through
which low-cost rental housing was lost rather than
recovered.
Housing markets in these communities were heating
up throughout the recovery and real estate investors
were actively seeking investment opportunities.
Damage to the rental housing stock created significant
opportunities for investors to buy properties during the
recovery, especially when recovery of a structure no
longer made financial sense for the existing owners or
when their available resources fell short.
Many property owners struggled to afford the cost of
recovery, with some either choosing or being forced
to sell their properties. Some simply did not carry
flood insurance, while many who had flood insurance
faced systematic underpayments from insurers. Several
interviewees viewed Small Business Administration
(SBA) loans, an important federal resource for disaster
recovery, as providing unattractive or confusing terms
for rental property owners. At the same time, the
cost of new mitigation requirements, such as newly
imposed minimum elevation standards, and escalating
labor costs due to a high demand for construction
workers also presented financial burdens for owners
of damaged properties. The characteristics of the
rental stock in many coastal communities also meant
that owners were often small-scale landlords of older
housing who may not have had adequate reserves or
access to capital, depending on the cashflow from their
properties.
Key rental housing recovery programs funded by
CDBG-DR were intended to fill the gap between
existing resources, like insurance and SBA loans, and
actual recovery costs. The LRRP program was targeted
to damaged rental properties of fewer than 25 units.
LRRP provided grants of up to $50,000 per unit to
owners for the restoration of rental units in exchange for
keeping rents affordable to low- to moderate-income
households after the completion of repairs. LRRP was
funded at significantly lower levels than FRM, the rental
recovery program targeted to larger-scale developers,
and RREM, the rehabilitation and reconstruction
program for homeowners. The program suffered from
lower-than-expected participation. The initial allocation
to LRRP of $70 million was reduced in June of 2017 to
$54 million.
One interviewee attributed the relatively low funding for
Figure 2: Tax Assessment of Residential Parcels Over Time
Improvement Value Relative to 2012
Note: Damage defined as 2013 improvement value relative to 2012; Significant damage = <.75 and Moderate Damage = .75 to .95.
Year
Significant Damage Moderate Damage No Damage
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Beach Haven
Belmar
Manasquan
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 11
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
LRRP to the view that landlords were business owners
and, therefore, a relatively lower priority for government
assistance compared to homeowners in the community.
Another interviewee held that small-scale landlords
were systematically disregarded by NJ DCA across all
its housing programs. These views are evidenced by the
much larger sums allocated to RREM and FRM. Another
interviewee maintained that challenges in quantifying
the stock of rentals in single-family and small multifamily
dwellings made estimating the potential needs of small-
scale landlords difficult.
Interviewees provided three explanations for the low
LRRP participation rate. The small monetary value
of LRRP grants relative to repair and reconstruction
costs, coupled with the affordability requirements, was
simply unattractive to small-scale landlords, especially
in communities where landlords could redevelop or
repair and command higher rents. Another view held
that racism played a role insofar as small-scale landlords
associated affordability requirements with people of
color. Others contended that LRRP carried extensive
requirements for regulatory compliance associated with
the CDBG-DR program, which made it difficult for small-
scale landlords to use. Examples of such requirements
included extensive cost-tracking, wage standards (i.e.
Davis-Bacon wages), and environmental review.
The FRM program represented an approach to rental
housing recovery different from LRRP. According to
key public officials with direct knowledge, FRM was
specifically developed to expand the affordable rental
housing supply in a recovery context that included a
significant shortage. FRM was paired with Low-Income
Housing Tax Credits to provide critical gap financing for
larger multifamily rental projects. Nearly all FRM-funded
projects were for new construction.
The pairing of FRM funds with LIHTC limited the
program mostly to large developers with the capacity
to navigate the complex financing associated with tax
credits. Some interviewees contended FRM allocations
favored a group of developers frequently referred to
as the “big five” or “big six” to the exclusion of smaller,
local non-profit developers. Virtually all interviewees
shared that the initial round of FRM funding went
to communities far away from areas most impacted
by Sandy. An interviewee with firsthand knowledge
noted this was due to intense public pressure to
rapidly mobilize recovery funding. Subsequent rounds
specifically targeted communities in Atlantic, Ocean,
and Monmouth counties due in large part to the
settlement the state reached with fair housing advocates
in May 2014 to target heavily impacted communities in
subsequent funding rounds.
Another criticism of the FRM program offered by several
interviewees was that projects did not typically offer
units affordable to the lowest-income households who
were most vulnerable during the recovery. LIHTC units,
under federal law at the time, served households with
incomes up to 60% of AMI with maximum rents set at
30% of 60% AMI. Along with FRM’s requirement to serve
low- to moderate-income households, this meant FRM
units were not initially required to serve the lowest-
income households. Later allocations of FRM funding, as
a result of the state’s May 2014 settlement reached with
advocates, required deeper targeting with a minimum
of 50% of units set aside for tenants with incomes
below 50% AMI, including10% for tenants with incomes
below 30% AMI. Yet even in cases where maximum rents
might have been targeted to lower-income households,
the flat rent structure of the LIHTC program means any
occupants with incomes below the eligibility threshold
would be housing cost-burdened, spending more than
30% of their incomes on rent and utilities, unless they
also had rental assistance.
One interviewee also highlighted the difficulty created
by rising incomes in some communities, which in turn
led to higher LIHTC rents during the recovery. This
issue would have been felt most acutely by vulnerable
households with fixed incomes, such as those headed
by seniors or people with disabilities. The Sandy Special
Needs Funding program possibly provided a more
similarly priced replacement for the lowest-cost rental
units, but the program was funded at just $59.7 million
and limited to people with disabilities and other at-
risk populations. All told, FRM units did not necessarily
provide a similarly priced replacement for the lowest-
cost rental units lost.
The FRM program faced challenges afflicting new
construction of rental housing more generally in many
coastal communities. Interviewees with significant
experience in multifamily development stressed the
burdensome, protracted nature of the development
process in New Jersey where municipalities have a
significant degree of control over the zoning and
approvals process. In addition to local regulatory issues,
several interviewees cited additional regulatory burdens
and limitations imposed by the state’s Coastal Areas
Facilities Review Act (CAFRA), which controls coastal
development. Some challenges that interviewees
associated with CAFRA included increased soft costs
associated with compliance and strict limitations on
impervious surface coverage. Other interviewees,
however, appreciated the need to protect New Jersey’s
coastal environments, and some highlighted the role
of CAFRA in promoting disaster resilience by pushing
development further inland.
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 12
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
NIMBYism from both local government officials and
residents also presented challenges. NIMBYism ranged
from elected officials expressing concerns about the
impact of multifamily rental housing on the tax base
and expected blowback from constituents to residents
expressing outright racism. One interviewee explicitly
accused town officials of using Sandy to remove
inexpensive rental housing and displace people of color
from her community.
Interviewees described new development, particularly
of affordable rental housing, as being prohibitively
expensive in coastal communities due to formidable
land costs, more stringent building codes to ensure
resiliency, and flood insurance. One interviewee in a
position of authority indicated that per-unit cost-limits
for LIHTC projects likely served as an incentive for
developers of FRM projects to build further inland in
less expensive locations.
High costs, inadequate or difficult access to recovery
resources, and strong market incentives to redevelop
existing low-cost rentals as higher-cost housing all
contributed to what many interviewees described as the
gentrification of some coastal communities after Sandy.
Rental housing, particularly units in smaller properties,
was lost due to demolition, conversion, or upwards
filtering in some communities. At the same time,
state recovery policy prioritized the new construction
of rental housing through the FRM program, much
of which occurred further inland in Atlantic, Ocean,
and Monmouth counties due to issues ranging from
resistance in coastal communities to cost containment.
The unsubsidized rental housing supply also grew
further inland during the recovery likely for similar
reasons.
The extent to which the new construction of affordable
rental housing through the FRM program and gains in
the rental stock further inland truly addressed losses
of low-cost rental housing in coastal communities
rests on whether that new construction housed renters
displaced from those communities. As a result of the
protracted development process, FRM-funded projects
took years to come online and were not available to
immediately meet the housing needs of displaced
residents. More than two years after the storm, NJ DCA
reported that only one project funded through FRM
had been completed, amounting to 51 units. Programs
providing short-term rental assistance for temporary
housing assumed that families would be able to move
home after two years, while the pace of recovery was
often much slower (Fair Share Housing et. al., 2015),
reportedly leading to long-term displacement when
short-term rental assistance expired.
Unfortunately, no centralized tracking occurred of
Sandy survivors and their subsequent housing moves,
so it is not possible to know the extent to which FRM
units served households directly displaced by Sandy in
the longer term. Several interviewees who worked on
affordable housing issues in these communities were
unaware that Sandy survivors were given priority in
FRM-funded projects following the 2014 settlement with
fair housing advocates.
Our findings suggest that Sandy exacerbated the
underlying rental housing crisis faced by lower-income
households in many of the coastal communities
impacted by Sandy. In many coastal communities,
households already dealing with housing instability
were further destabilized through displacement, rents
grew as landlords took advantage of even greater
scarcity, and losses to the low-cost rental housing
stock accelerated as investors seized opportunities to
renovate or redevelop housing. Some interviewees
viewed these outcomes negatively, while others viewed
them as a result of disaster mitigation efforts, improved
quality of the housing stock, or the recovery of
property tax revenues that had sharply declined due to
housing damage caused by Sandy. While government
intervention brought necessary resources to aid the
recovery of the rental housing stock, it proved unable
to prevent the loss of low-cost rental housing in some
communities.
Considerations for Future
Policy Development and
Research
In what follows, we offer considerations for future policy
development and research based on what we observed
from long-term rental housing trends after Sandy and
learned from key stakeholders about the recovery of
affordable rental housing.
MORE THAN TWO YEARS
AFTER THE STORM, NJ DCA
REPORTED THAT ONLY ONE
PROJECT FUNDED THROUGH
FRM HAD BEEN COMPLETED,
AMOUNTING TO 51 UNITS.
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 13
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
Robust Data on the Rental Housing Stock and
its Tenants are Essential to Recovery
Public officials and impacted communities faced
challenges in planning for and implementing an
equitable recovery for renters after Sandy due to
significant data limitations. In particular, New Jersey
lacks statewide data that allows for the reliable
identification of small rental properties. This lack of
information directly impacted the ability of recovery
stakeholders to fully appreciate the extent to which
small rental properties were critical to the provision of
rental housing in coastal communities prior to Sandy.
Statewide rent registries with data including location,
number of units, rents, and ownership could be
established. Combined with unit-level data on housing
damage after a disaster, recovery officials would have
the data necessary to sufficiently plan for and evaluate
rental recovery based on the type of rental housing that
was damaged.
The Needs of Owners of Small Rental
Properties Should be Better Understood
We have limited knowledge about the behaviors
of owners of small rental properties after disasters
because of both data limitations and a lack of research.
Future research should aim to better understand the
needs of small-scale landlords during a recovery,
as well as how their decisions are shaped by public
resources and private incentives. This information could
be used to improve pre- and post-disaster recovery
planning, particularly in communities where small rental
properties play a large role in the rental housing market.
Further research is also needed to better understand
how regulatory compliance with the CDBG-DR program
might present barriers to participation for landlords of
small properties.
Longer-Term Rental Assistance Would Better
Protect Displaced Renters
The initial rental assistance programs during recovery
assumed rental assistance would not be needed
after two years. The financing and development of
multifamily affordable housing, however, is complex
and often takes significant time. Two years after Sandy,
few new affordable rental homes had been completed
(Fair Share Housing Center et al., 2015). At the same
time, nearly one-quarter of renters responding to a
survey still needed rental assistance because affordable
housing was not available (Monmouth University, 2014).
The state’s TBRA program was established in the first
quarter of 2015 to provide two additional years of rental
assistance to low-income households with priority given
to those with extremely low incomes. The program,
however, took nearly a year and half to enroll a sizeable
number of applicants.
States and federal agencies should recognize the time
often needed for recovery after a large-scale disaster
and consider developing rental assistance programs
longer than two years to avoid lapses of assistance and
potentially more housing instability among displaced
renters. Rental assistance should be available until
construction and rehabilitation programs for rental
housing recovery are well underway or completed.
Deep Subsidies are Necessary for Renters with
Extremely Low Incomes
The FRM program provided zero- or low-interest loans
to leverage LIHTC for affordable housing development.
Maximum-allowable rents in the LIHTC program are
not necessarily affordable to renters with extremely
low incomes, but these renters often face the greatest
challenges finding housing. Nearly every community
in the U.S. has a shortage of homes for extremely
low-income renters even before a disaster, which is
exacerbated after a disaster. Because the rents that
extremely low-income renters can afford to pay are so
low, supplemental funds should be made available for
developments that include affordable units set aside for
extremely low-income renters.
Housing Choice Vouchers provide a deep subsidy in the
form of rental assistance to low-income renters, with the
level of subsidy based on their income. A fully-funded
Housing Choice Voucher program would provide a
portable subsidy that recipients could use for both
temporary housing during the recovery process and
for permanent rental housing created through recovery
funds. Public Housing Agencies administering voucher
programs should be able to raise voucher payment
standards during recovery in markets where rental
prices increase significantly after a disaster.
Displaced Renters Should Receive Priority in
Rental Housing Recovery
Eligible renters displaced by Sandy were to receive
priority for housing developed or rehabilitated through
the FRM program or LRRP. At least regarding FRM, little
information appears to be known about the extent to
which displaced renters were served by the 4,900 units
completed to-date. Several interviewees were even
unaware of the priority. States should consider how to
make sure displaced renters benefit from the programs
intended to help them.
Displaced renters are not well tracked after disasters,
so little is known about their experience, the extent
to which they relocate, and how well they are served
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 14
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
by our disaster recovery programs. FEMA and other
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should
consider how to better track displaced tenants who may
have multiple addresses over a fairly short period of
time until they find permanent housing.
Expediency and Equity are Vital Considerations
in Shaping Housing Recovery Programs
Housing recovery programs should, to the greatest
extent possible, be equitable and deployed as rapidly
as possible to minimize adverse effects experienced
by vulnerable populations. Inequitable funding levels
and delays in allocations disproportionately impact
the lowest-income renters who are most vulnerable
to the worst impacts of disasters, including long-term
displacement.
Current legislation in Congress, the “Reforming Disaster
Recovery Act of 2019,” would permanently authorize
the CDBG-DR program and help ensure that recovery
resources reach the most vulnerable households in a
more timely manner. The bill permanently establishes
the requirement that 70% of CDBG-DR funds serve
low- and moderate-income households; requires a
proportionate distribution of funds between renters,
homeowners, and people experiencing homelessness;
and mandates that HUD allocate federal disaster
assistance money within 60 days after Congress
approves CDBG-DR funding.
We Must Expand the Supply of Affordable
Housing for Future Resilience
Disasters can exacerbate existing affordable housing
shortages. The lowest-income renters are at significant
risk of housing instability and displacement in the
best of times, and even more so following a disaster.
The costs of repairing or rebuilding low-cost rental
housing may be too high for property owners to
maintain low-cost rents. The experience with LRRP
indicates that, in certain market conditions, the financial
incentives for owners to sell, redevelop to higher cost
housing, or convert to another land use after a disaster
may outweigh the benefits of government recovery
assistance, especially if those benefits carry affordability
requirements.
One way to avoid or minimize the displacement of
the lowest-income renters after future disasters is to
expand public resources now for an adequate supply
of affordable rental housing outside the private market
before disasters strike. Deed-restricted, affordable
rental housing is not subject to loss through upwards
filtering like housing in the private market. Given the
threats posed by climate change and the highly likely
increased frequency of disasters, this expansion should
include green and disaster-resilient development
standards to the greatest extent possible. An adequate
supply of affordable rental housing is essential to
creating and maintaining inclusive, disaster-resilient
communities.
Conclusion
Climate-change experts anticipate an increase in the
frequency and intensity of weather-related disasters
in the foreseeable future, putting low-income renters
and their communities at increasingly greater risk.
Rental housing for low-income households is likely the
most at-risk for being lost when it is damaged. While
we must improve our knowledge about landlords’
decision-making, motivations, and needs after disasters
and do more to learn about renters’ experiences, we
can implement programs and policies now to ensure
the recovery of low-cost affordable rental housing
and adequate assistance to low-income renters when
disasters strike. These steps include a more expedient
distribution of recovery dollars, longer-term rental
assistance for the duration of recovery, and deep
subsidies for the recovery of housing affordable to the
lowest-income renters. Steps like these will ensure a
more equitable recovery for all individuals and families
impacted by disasters.
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NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 16
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
APPENDIX A: SELECTED NEW JERSEY HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAMS
Name of
program
Date
launched
Funding
allocated
to date
Funding
expended
to date
Purpose
Housing units
assisted or under
construction to
date
Reconstruction, Reha-
bilitation, Elevation,
and Mitigation (RREM)
Program
May 24,
2013
$1.35 billion
$1.27
billion
Grants of up to $150,000 to home-
owners for restoration of their
primary residences. 70% of funds
reserved for low-to-moderate in-
come (LMI) applicants (below 80%
of area median income (AMI))
7,266 participating
homeowners
• 6,459 completed
Homeowner Resettle-
ment Program
May 24,
2013
$203.1
million
$203.0
million
Grants of up to $10,000 to
homeowners for recovery costs to
encourage them to remain in the
community. 60% of group 1 funds
was reserved for LMI applicants.
Applications closed August 1,
2013.
18,500 households
LMI Homeowners
Rebuilding Program
January 5,
2015
$54.3 million
$44.1
million
Assistance of up to $150,000 for
LMI homeowners for restoration of
their residences, if they did not ap-
ply to RREM. Applications closed
March 21, 2015.
216 homes completed
Fund for Restoration
of Multifamily Housing
(FRM)
May 2013
$661.9
million
$570.8
million
Zero- or low-interest loans for the
construction or repair and reha-
bilitation of affordable multifamily
housing. Must be occupied by LMI
tenants. More deeply targeted af-
ter May 2014: 50% of units below
50% of AMI, including 10% below
30% of AMI.
72 projects, 5,299
rental units
• 66 projects,
4,900 rental units
completed
Landlord Rental Repair
Program (LRRP)
July 24,
2013
$54.1 million $53.4 million
Grant (forgivable loan) to repair
and elevate low- to moderate-in-
come rentals, up to $50,000 per
unit. Must rent to LMI for 1-5 years.
Applications closed November
15, 2013.
393 properties, 560
rental units
• 370 properties,
522 rental units
completed
Landlord Incentive
Program
May 2013 $17.2 million $17.2 million
Payments to landlords who rented
to LMI residents (priority to those
at 50% AMI and below, available
to those at 80% AMI), up to 2 years
available. Program closed on
August 31, 2017.
88 rental property
owners, 594 rental
units
Sandy Special Needs
Funding
May 13,
2013
$59.7 million $46.5 million
Capital subsidies for permanent
supportive rental housing and
community residences
49 projects awarded,
414 beds for individu-
als with special needs
• 362 beds
completed
Source: NJ DCA, 2019a & 2019b; NJ DCA Email Communication, 2019; Fair Share Housing Center Email Communication, 2019.
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 17
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
APPENDIX B: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF 20 MUNICIPALITIES WITH
HIGHEST RENTAL DAMAGE RANKED BY PERCENTAGE LOSS
OF LOW-COST RENTAL UNITS (2011 AND 2017)
Place
Damaged
Rental
Homes
Change in
All Rentals
(Absolute
Change)
Change in
Low-Cost
Rentals
(Absolute
Change)
2017
Ownership
Rate
Percentage
Point
Change in
Homeowner-
ship Rate
Change
in Median
Contract
Rent
(Absolute
Change)
Change in
Median
Household
Income
(Absolute
Change)
Poverty
Rate
2011
2017
Percent Black
Population
2011
2017
Percent
Hispanic
Population
2011
2017
Ocean Gate, OC 115
4.5%
(10)
-100.0%
(-82)
71.2 -1.5
63.7%
($516)
-4.3%
(- $2,812)
8.6
12.4
3.1
3.2
5.8
7.8
Beach Haven, OC 157
-47.7%
(-72)
-100.0%
(-27)
88.7 6.1
16.5%
($139)
20.4%
($14,674)
6.0
6.5
0.0
1.4
4.2
1.1
Seaside Park, OC 240
-46.8%
(-200)
-95.8%
(-46)
75.7 18.1
20.8%
($203)
69.6%
($29.291)
20.7
8.3
5.8
1.0
3.5
0.3
Long Beach, OC 107
-50.2%
(-145)
-81.0%
(-81)
92.7 0.4
27.3%
($249)
-5.4%
(- $4,720)
3.8
10.0
0.4
0.0
0.9
0.2
Little Egg Harbor,
OC
379
10.0%
(135)
-80.4%
(-168)
84.6 0.3
1.3%
($14)
5.3%
($3,210)
8.7
7.3
0.9
0.7
4.4
5.3
Margate City, AC 177
-25.6%
(-241)
-73.3%
(-195)
80.1 3.0
14.9%
($141)
-4.6%
(- $3,394)
10.2
7.7
0.3
2.2
3.8
1.7
Lavallette, OC 259
-36.9%
(-108)
-70.8%
(-27)
87.5 3.8
6.1%
($66)
11.4%
($6,987)
7.8
7.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.2
Brigantine, AC 257
-10.3%
(-140)
-55.6%
(-78)
73.3 2.8
4.5%
($45)
2.9%
($1,841)
8.4
10.7
1.0
1.9
9.8
7.4
Belmar, MC 239
-7.6%
(-119)
-53.6%
(-73)
49.5 3.1
14.6%
($167)
23.9%
($14,433)
11.6
11.8
2.0
2.4
21.9
14.6
Manasquan, MC 259
-28.1%
(-217)
-53.4%
(-50)
76.3 1.8
0.6%
($7)
19.3%
($17,224)
3.6
7.5
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.8
Point Pleasant
Beach, OC
276
-30.9%
(-319)
-21.0%
(-17)
69.5 13.6
24.5%
($285)
49.9%
($30,667)
11.0
5.2
0.7
0.2
6.2
7.3
Brick township,
OC
285
10.1%
(492)
-17.0%
(-148)
82.9 -2.1
16.2%
($164)
8.6%
($5,755)
5.1
6.4
2.0
2.0
6.8
9.8
Long Branch, MC 490
0.1%
(9)
-6.4%
(-73)
43.2 0.9
5.7%
($62)
4.1%
(- $2,132)
14.4
17.9
12.6
12.7
28.7
31.5
Atlantic City, AC 1,988
2.9%
(361)
-2.0%
(-121)
26.3 -7.4
5.0%
($36)
-8.8%
($2,520)
29.3
40.6
37.2
34.1
24.4
29.3
Pleasantville, AC 223
18.7%
(570)
4.7%
(43)
50.7 -7.3
10.8%
($95)
2.7%
($1,063)
19.0
22.9
41.9
36.1
34.8
45.6
Keansburg, MC 629
10.5%
(186)
5.3%
(31)
53.3 -2.5
0.9%
($8)
-0.4%
(- $208)
15.1
24.9
6.3
7.2
12.0
15.2
Toms River, OC 721
10.0%
(613)
7.8%
(63)
81.1 -2.6
12.2%
($132)
3.7%
($2,738)
6.2
6.6
1.8
2.9
7.9
8.3
Seaside Heights,
OC
1,032
-28.5%
(-338
14.3%
(19)
23.7 -14.1
13.1%
($128)
18.5%
($5,973)
20.8
24.3
0.3
2.6
19.9
33.5
Highlands, MC 487
45.5%
(327)
67.0%
(114)
63.2 -9.5
5.9%
($55)
-22.9%
(-$18,043)
14.1
7.2
0.5
1.0
5.6
6.6
Ventnor City, AC 521
-8.2%
(-155)
108.4%
(258)
61.6 -1.4
-4.2%
($-43)
-2.1%
(- $1,119)
11.3
12.8
3.6
3.5
18.4
23.0
Note: Low-cost rental units have monthly contract rents less than $750 (inflation-adjusted dollars by CPI less shelter costs). AC = Atlantic County,
MC = Monmouth County, OC = Ocean County. Source: 5-yr American Community Survey, 2007-2011 & 2012-2017; FEMA Housing assistance data
(archived).
NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 18
LONG-TERM RENTAL RECOVERY: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New Jersey
The authors thank the following individuals who participated in interviews with us. Any findings,
conclusions, or errors contained within this report are solely attributable to the authors.
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PARTCIPANTS
Christina Bailey
Director, AHA/JIS/PATH
Jewish Family Service of Atlantic & Cape May Counties
Donna Blaze
Chief Executive Officer
Affordable Housing Alliance
Erin Bowes
PATH Supervisor
Jewish Family Service of Atlantic & Cape May Counties
Joseph Del Duca
Partner and Director of Affordable Housing
The Walters Group
Lori Dibble
Policy Coordinator
Manufactured Homeowners Association of New Jersey
Rosa Farias
Deputy Executive Director & Policy Director
Atlantic City Initiatives Projects Office
Adam Gordon
Associate Director
Fair Share Housing Center
Ben Haygood
Environmental Health Policy Director
Isles, Inc.
Taiisa Kelly
Chief Executive Officer
Monarch Housing Associates
Diane Kinnane
Executive Director
Habitat for Humanity in Monmouth County
Charles Lewis
Senior Vice President
Conifer Realty
Susan Marticek
Founder and Executive Director
Compass 82
Tara Paxton
Township Planner/Affordable Housing Administrator
Township of Brick
Peter Reinhart
Director, Kislak Real Estate Institute
Monmouth University
Charles Richman
Executive Director
New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency
(NJHMFA)
David Roberts
Township Planner
Township of Toms River
Barbara K. Schoor
Vice President
Community Investment Strategies
Leslie Stivale
Executive Director
Triple C Housing
Barbara Woolley-Dillon,
Planning and Development Director
Atlantic City
Samuel Viavattine
Director, Sandy Recovery Division
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs
1000 Vermont Avenue, NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005
202-662-1530
www.nlihc.org
12/04/2019Sandy-Rental-Recovery-Report
