Introduction
e rapid growth of the crypto ecosystem pres-
ents new opportunities. Technological innovation is
ushering in a new era that makes payments and other
financial services cheaper, faster, more accessible, and
allows them to flow across borders swiftly. Crypto asset
technologies have potential as a tool for faster and
cheaper cross-border payments. Bank deposits can be
transformed to stablecoins that allow instant access to
a vast array of financial products from digital platforms
and allow instant currency conversion. Decentralized
finance could become a platform for more innovative,
inclusive, and transparent financial services.
Despite potential gains, the rapid growth and
increasing adoption
1
2
of crypto assets also pose financial
1,
e authors of this chapter are Parma Bains, Mohamed Diaby,
Dimitris Drakopoulos (co-lead), Julia Faltermeier, Federico Grinberg,
Evan Papageorgiou (co-lead), Dmitri Petrov, Patrick Schneider, and
Nobu Sugimoto. e chapter was written under the supervision of
Tobias Adrian, Fabio Natalucci, Dong He, and Aditya Narain.
2,
1
“Adoption” refers to the degree of use of crypto assets by users for
transferring and storing value.
stability challenges. is chapter discusses the impli-
cations of the expansion of the crypto ecosystem and
provides an assessment of their associated financial
stability risks. For emerging market and developing
economies, greater use of crypto assets presents some
benefits, but also macro-financial risks, especially with
respect to asset and currency substitution—referred to
in this chapter as cryptoization. e chapter concludes
with a set of eight actionable policy recommenda-
tions. For readers less familiar with the terminology
and developments, Online Annex 2.1 provides a brief
description of the taxonomy of crypto assets as well
as a brief primer on the crypto ecosystem.
2
3
e IMF
has discussed many critical issues relating to regulatory
frameworks with respect to crypto assets and digital
money. Some topics that are not covered in detail in
this chapter can be found in IMF (2020a) and IMF
(2021) along with analysis of financial integrity issues,
3,
2
A stablecoin is a type of crypto asset that aims to maintain a
stable value relative to a specified asset or a pool of assets. Online
Annex 2.1 offers more information on definitions. All online annexes
are available at www .imf .org/ en/ Publications/ GFSR.
Chapter 2 at a Glance
• The crypto ecosystem continues its rapid growth, presenting both opportunities and challenges. This chapter
discusses the latest developments and financial stability challenges posed by the crypto ecosystem, with a
focus on emerging market and developing economies.
• Crypto assets come in different flavors and have evolved to meet varying needs for speculative investment,
store of value, currency conversion, and payments. Decentralized finance (DeFi) is gaining momentum by
offering new services to users.
• Financial stability risks are not yet systemic, but risks should be closely monitored given the global
implications and the inadequate operational and regulatory frameworks in most jurisdictions.
• Challenges posed by the crypto ecosystem include operational and financial integrity risks from crypto
asset providers, investor protection risks for crypto assets and DeFi, and inadequate reserves and disclosure
for some stablecoins.
• In emerging markets, the advent of crypto assets has benefits but can accelerate cryptoization and circumvent
exchange and capital control restrictions. Increased trading of crypto assets in these economies could lead to
destabilizing capital flows.
• Policymakers should implement global standards for crypto assets and enhance their ability to monitor the
crypto ecosystem by addressing data gaps. As the role of stablecoins grows, regulations should correspond to
the risks they pose and the economic functions they perform. Emerging markets faced with cryptoization risks
should strengthen macroeconomic policies and consider the benefits of issuing central bank digital currencies.
THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
2
CHAPTER
International Monetary Fund | October 2021 41
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
42 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
such as anti–money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) (IMF 2020a; IMF
2020b); central bank digital currencies (CBDCs);
and more (He and others 2016; Mancini-Griffoli and
others 2018; IMF 2019).
Crypto Assets Continue to Grow through Ups
and Downs
e market capitalization of crypto assets has grown
significantly amid large bouts of price volatility. rough
early May, the market capitalization almost tripled in
2021 to an all-time high of $2.5 trillion (Figure 2.1,
panel 1). is was followed by a 40 percent fall in May
as concerns from institutional holders about the envi-
ronmental impact of crypto assets grew and global reg-
ulatory scrutiny of the crypto ecosystem escalated. e
sharp declines during May were likely exacerbated by
high use of leverage (Figure 2.1, panel 2), which led to
automatic liquidations
3
4
of margin and futures positions
by exchanges. Since then, the market value of crypto
assets has increased again to more than $2 trillion—a
170 percent increase year to date at the time of writing.
Despite significant price appreciation, the returns of
non-stablecoin crypto assets are less impressive when
adjusted for volatility. For example, the risk-adjusted
returns of Bitcoin over the past year are similar to the
performance of broader technology equities or the
S&P 500 (Figure 2.1, panel 3). However, investors are
exposed to larger drawdowns. e relative attractive-
ness of these crypto asset returns can be higher when
compared with other asset classes that also experience
large drawdowns, such as local currency bonds and
equities in some emerging market and developing
economies with weak fundamentals. Another argument
often put forward in favor of non-stablecoin crypto
assets is their low correlation with other assets, offering
diversification benefits to investor portfolios (see the
April 2018 Global Financial Stability Report). Although
this is true to some extent, the correlation between
these crypto assets and some key asset classes increased
significantly during recent episodes of market stress
(for example the COVID-19 sell-off in 2020). e
diversification benefit could also decline over time if
there is continued involvement of institutional holders
that are affected by common factors.
4,
3
Liquidations happen when investors do not meet margin require-
ments and exchanges automatically close the positions.
A key component of the rise in market capitalization
is increasing investor interest in stablecoins; newer
technologies, such as Ethereum; other “smart contract”
blockchains; and decentralized finance.
• Stablecoins: Their market capitalization has quadru-
pled in 2021 to more than $120 billion (Figure 2.1,
panel 4). Tether is the largest stablecoin, but its market
share has declined sharply as major centralized crypto
exchanges have introduced their own versions (for
example, USD Coin by Coinbase and Binance USD
by Binance). Stablecoin trading volumes outpace
those of all other crypto assets (Figure 2.1, panel 5)
primarily because they are highly usable for settlement
of spot and derivatives trades on exchanges. The price
stability for the top stablecoins continues to improve,
as can be seen in the declining price deviations from
the targeted 1:1 peg with the dollar and other curren-
cies in 2021.
4
5
Their relative price stability has shielded
users from the volatility of other crypto assets, which
means they do not have to move their funds outside
the crypto ecosystem.
• Ethereum and other “smart contract” blockchains:
Bitcoin remains the dominant crypto asset, but its
market share has declined sharply in 2021 from
more than 70 percent to less than 45 percent.
Market interest has grown for newer blockchains
that use smart contracts and aim to solve the
challenges of earlier blockchains by introducing
features to ensure scalability, interoperability, and
sustainability.
5
6
The most prominent is Ether, which
surpassed Bitcoin trading volumes earlier in 2021
(Figure 2.1, panel 5).
• Decentralized finance (DeFi): The size
6
7
of DeFi
grew from $15 billion at the end of 2020 to about
$110 billion as of September 2021 (Figure 2.1,
panel 6) largely due to the rapid growth of
(1) decentralized exchanges that allow users to
5,
4
e pricing dynamics of stablecoins have been examined in
several studies (see discussion in Lyons and Viswanath-Natraj 2020)
that generally identify stablecoins as safe havens during periods of
crypto asset turbulence.
6,
5
Scalability refers to the ability to handle large transaction vol-
umes. Interoperability is the ability to connect with other blockchains
as well as off-chain data. Sustainability is the ability to scale in an
environmentally sustainable way while retaining a robust gover-
nance structure.
7,
6
Size refers to the total value locked, or the total dollar value of
all collateral deposited in DeFi platforms. e term “locked” is mis-
leading, given that this collateral can be removed quickly by users.
Moreover, collateral can be reused between platforms, inflating the
overall total value locked.
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
43International Monetary Fund | October 2021
Liquidations of short positions
Liquidations of long positions
Open interest on Bitcoin/Ether futures, right scale
Tether
DAI (crypto backed)
Pax Dollar
Gemini USD
sUSD (crypto backed)
Huobi USD
USD coin
Binance USD
Tether market share %, right scale
Bitcoin
Ether
Smart contracts excluding Ether
Stablecoins
Past three yearsPast one year
Credit
Decentralized exchanges
Other
Other
Smart contract excluding Ether
Ether
Bitcoin
Stablecoins
Total
1. Market Capitalization for Crypto Assets
(Billions of US dollars)
2. Liquidations of Futures and Open Interest
(Billions of US dollars)
5. Daily Trading Volumes on Exchanges
(Billions of US dollars, 30-day rolling average)
6. Total Value Locked in Decentralized Finance
(Billions of US dollars)
Trading volumes of stablecoins, Ether, and other smart contracts rose
rapidly in 2021.
The collateral “locked” in decentralized finance has risen sharply, led
by decentralized exchanges and credit platforms.
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Bybt; CoinGecko; CryptoCompare; DeBank; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Liquidation data are provided by Bybt. Post–April 27 liquidations are likely to be underestimated, given changes in Binance’s application programming interface
that stopped real-time data feeds. In panel 3, Sharpe ratios are calculated on a rolling 12-month basis and annualized. EM = emerging market; FX = foreign
exchange; USD = US dollar.
Figure 2.1. Crypto Ecosystem Market Developments
EM FX
Crypto assets (top 10)
EM equities
EM USD credit
US real estate
Bitcoin
S&P 500
US leveraged loans
US tech
–0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
–3
0
3
5
8
10
13
15
18
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
40
80
120
20
60
100
140
3. Risk-Adjusted Returns
(Sharpe ratio)
4. Stablecoin Market Capitalization
(Billions of US dollars and percent share)
Risk-adjusted returns of non-stablecoin crypto assets are comparable
to other mainstream benchmarks.
The market value of the ecosystem increased dramatically in 2021 and
expanded beyond Bitcoin.
The April/May 2021 sell-off was accompanied by a sharp unwinding of
leveraged positions from all-time highs.
The market cap of stablecoins has quadrupled in 2021 while Tether’s
dominance has declined.
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
Jan. 2020 Apr. 20 July 20 Oct. 20 Jan. 21 Apr. 21 July 21
Tesla stops accepting
Bitcoin payments
China regulatory
crackdown
Automatic liquidations of
leveraged positions
40%
decline in
May
3× year-to-date
increase until
early May
Dec.
2020
Jan.
21
Feb.
21
Apr.
21
June
21
Mar.
21
May
21
July
21
Aug.
21
Sep.
21
40
50
70
90
60
80
100
0
10
20
30
5
15
25
35
40
June
2019
Sep.
19
Dec.
19
Mar.
20
June
20
June
21
Sep.
20
Dec.
20
Mar.
21
Sep.
21
Jan.
2018
May
18
May
19
Sep.
18
Jan.
19
Sep.
19
Jan.
20
May
20
Sep.
21
Sep.
20
Jan.
21
May
21
June
2020
Sep.
20
Dec.
20
Mar.
21
June
21
Sep.
21
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
44 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
trade crypto assets without an intermediary and
(2) credit platforms that match borrowers and
lenders without the need for a credit risk evalua-
tion of the customer (Figure 2.1, panel 6). These
services operate directly on blockchains (usually)
without customer identification requirements.
Most of DeFi is built on the Ethereum block-
chain and uses Ethereum-based tokens, including
stablecoins. DeFi is also one of the main drivers
of the rapid growth of stablecoins and warrants
close attention. Chainalysis (2021b) highlights
that DeFi users for now are primarily institutional
players from advanced economies, whereas adop-
tion among retail users and emerging market and
developing economies in general is lagging.
What Are the Financial Stability Implications of
Crypto Assets?
In October 2018 the Financial Stability Board
concluded that crypto assets did not pose a mate-
rial risk to global financial stability (FSB 2018)
but identified several transmission channels that
could change its assessment. ese channels include
risks from the size of market capitalization, inves-
tor confidence effects, risks arising from direct and
indirect exposures of financial institutions, and
risks from the use of crypto assets for payments and
settlements.
Since then, some of these channels have grown nota-
bly, and new sources of risk have emerged.
• Market capitalization has grown by a factor
of 10 and is now comparable to some estab-
lished asset classes (for example US high-yield
bonds). It is still small, however, compared with
government bond and stock markets in major
advanced economies.
• Episodes of loss of confidence in crypto assets so far
have had limited spillovers to broader markets
despite large fluctuations in crypto asset valua-
tions. Confidence effects from failures of crypto
asset providers have also been limited so far.
However, their importance is rising as trading vol-
umes in some countries’ exchanges have increased
dramatically and, in some cases, are compara-
ble to the volumes of their respective domestic
stock exchanges.
• Exposures to crypto assets in the banking system are
growing, albeit from a low base. Exposures appear
to be growing faster among some nonbank
institutions, most notably hedge funds,
7
8
which
can lead to increased indirect exposures of the
banking system.
• The use of crypto assets for payments and settle-
ments is still limited, with some exceptions (see
the “Cryptoization” section). This channel can
accelerate rapidly, given that several global payment
companies have only recently started to integrate
with the crypto ecosystem, in particular with
stablecoins.
Finally, new sources of risk are emerging, such as
stablecoins and DeFi, which did not exist on a large
scale in 2018. In the future, a widely used stablecoin
or DeFi service with a reach and use across multiple
jurisdictions could scale up quickly and become
systemically important.
Innovations that have given rise to the crypto
ecosystem are significant and can create tangible
benefits for countries, but the risks should be kept
in check. At a global level, financial stability risks
appear contained for now,
8
9
but the macro-criticality
of crypto assets, and in particular stablecoins, can be
significantly higher for some emerging market and
developing economies where adoption has pro-
gressed fast. e next sections focus on the follow-
ing issues (Table 2.1): (1) challenges from the crypto
ecosystem arising from operational risks, market
integrity, data availability, and cross-border activ-
ities; (2) stablecoin-specific issues linked to their
design, use, and regulation and supervision at the
domestic and global levels; and (3) macro-financial
stability issues such as cryptoization, which are
more prominent in emerging market and develop-
ing economies.
Challenges Posed by the Crypto Ecosystem
e rapid growth of the ecosystem has been accom-
panied by the entrance of new entities, some of which
8,
7
ese are some examples: Coinbase reported that 10 percent
of the 100 largest hedge funds were using their platform as of
2021:Q2; a Goldman Sachs (2021) survey shows that 15 percent of
family offices have exposures to crypto assets, and close to half are
potentially interested in initiating exposures.
9,
8
e April 2018 Global Financial Stability Report reached a
similar conclusion about the macro-criticality of crypto assets
at that time.
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
45International Monetary Fund | October 2021
have poor operational, cyber risk management, and
governance frameworks.
9
10
• Operational risks can result in significant downtime
when failures and disruptions prevent the use of services
and even result in large losses of customer funds. Such
risks have coincided with periods of high transaction
activity and can result from poorly designed systems
and controls. For example, on May 19, when liquida-
tions of leveraged positions peaked, major exchanges
reported outages, citing “network congestion.”
• Cyber risks include high-profile cases of
hacking-related thefts of customer funds. Such
attacks take place on centralized elements of the eco-
system (for example, wallets and exchanges) but can
also arise on the consensus algorithms that underpin
the operation of blockchains.
• Governance risks involve the lack of transparency
around issuance and distribution of crypto assets
and have resulted in investor losses.
So far, losses as a result of such risks have not had a sig-
nificant impact on financial stability, globally or domesti-
cally. However, as crypto assets grow, the macro-criticality
of such risks is likely to increase. In addition, the crypto
ecosystem remains exposed to concentration risks, given
10,
9
Some notable examples include hacking thefts in Japan
(Coincheck in 2018) and Singapore (KuCoin in 2019); the tem-
porary closure of the Philippines Digital Asset Exchange in 2021,
reportedly due to large unfunded transactions; the outright collapse
of exchanges in Turkey in 2021 (odex, Vebitcoin), with claims
of billions in stolen assets; and the sudden price collapse and rapid
outflows amid flawed collateral management at Bitmex in 2020.
its large reliance on a few entities (for example, Binance
handles more than half of trading volumes, and Tether
has issued more than half the supply of stablecoins).
With limited or inadequate disclosure and over-
sight, the crypto ecosystem is exposed to consumer
fraud and market integrity risks. Most crypto assets
are highly volatile, speculative assets. One notable
recent example was the increased investor interest in
“meme tokens” (Figure 2.2, panel 1). Some of these
tokens were created for speculation purposes, and their
price was highly influenced by social media trends.
Relatedly, investors are also likely to face losses from
tokens ceasing to exist—something that is less com-
mon in regulated securities markets. For example,
more than 16,000 tokens have been listed on various
exchanges over time, but around 9,000 exist today.
10
11
Risks can be further amplified by the use of leverage
offered in crypto exchanges, which has been as high as
125 times the initial investment. In response to such
risks, many jurisdictions have taken action or issued
public warnings over the past few months, such as
the central banks of Argentina (BCRA 2021), Mexico
(Banxico 2021), and ailand (ai SEC 2021), which
prohibited exchanges from offering tokens with certain
characteristics; others imposed regulatory limits or
banned derivative products across several exchanges
(for example, Japan FSA 2021; UK FCA 2020).
DeFi products can expose users to even larger risks.
Products can be more complex and less transparent,
11,
10
is statistic is based on the number of tokens listed on
www .CoinGecko .com.
Source: IMF staff.
Note: AML/CFT = anti–money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism.
Table 2.1. Financial Stability Challenges
Crypto Ecosystem
Stablecoins
Macro-Financial
• Operational, cyber, and governance risks
• Integrity (market and AML/CFT)
• Data availability/reliability
• Challenges from cross-border activities
• How stable are stablecoins?
• Domestic and global regulatory and supervisory approaches
• Cryptoization, capital flows, and restrictions
• Monetary policy transmission
• Bank disintermediation
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
46 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
with large technological and governance risks arising
from faulty computer code. e lack of central interme-
diaries complicates authorities’ efforts to monitor and
regulate these products. As a result, many DeFi products
contain risk disclosures that do not adequately warn
against their large and volatile returns
11
12
(Figure 2.2,
panel 2). In addition, DeFi has been the victim of
12,
11
e volatility and lack of disclosure are more prominent in complex
products, such as “liquidity mining” (which is offered by decentralized
exchanges and compensates users who provide liquidity to automated
market makers) and “yield farming” (which aims to optimize returns for
liquidity and collateral provision across DeFi services).
hacking, such as the record $0.6 billion hack of Poly-
chain in August, and scams, such as rug pulls, in which
developers abandon projects but keep investors’ funds.
e anonymity of crypto assets and limited global
standards create significant data gaps for regulators.
Although authorities may be able to trace transactions
that are executed on blockchains,
12
13
they may not be
able to identify the parties to a transaction. In addi-
tion, the crypto ecosystem falls under varied regulatory
13,
12
One exception is “privacy tokens,” which also conceal transac-
tion data (for example, addresses, amounts).
Meme tokens market cap
Volatility of Dogecoin (right scale)
Volatility of Bitcoin (right scale)
EU
Latin America
Offshore financial center
North America EMEA
Asia
1
2
3 4 5 6 7
Compound Aave
AaveV2
1. Market Capitalization and Realized Volatility
(Billions of US dollars and percent)
2. Borrowing Rates of USD Coin Stablecoin
(Percent)
3. Estimated Share of P2P Bitcoin Transactions, Based on Various Data
Providers
(Percent share)
4. Trading Activity of Exchanges, by Registration
(Percent share)
Data gaps can be significant when estimating on-chain activity.
Highly speculative investments, such as meme tokens, experienced
large volatility in 2021, even when compared with Bitcoin.
Decentralized finance platforms have been offering attractive but
volatile interest rates to users.
Crypto exchange trading activity occurs primarily through entities in
offshore financial centers.
Sources: CoinGecko; CryptoCompare; Debank; Financial Action Tas
k Force; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Panel 1 market capitalization is based on 10 meme tokens
from CoinGecko. Panel 3 data come from the Financial Action Task Force (2021) report; the series
represent different data providers. The offshore financial cente
r definitions follow IMF (2000). EMEA = Europe, Middle East, and Africa; EU = European Union;
P2P = peer to peer; USD = US dollar.
Figure 2.2. Crypto Ecosystem Challenges
May
2020
Aug.
20
Nov.
20
Feb.
21
Nov.
2020
Jan.
21
Mar.
21
May
21
July
21
Sep.
21
May
21
Aug.
21
Jan.
2020
Apr.
20
Apr.
21
July
20
July
21
Oct.
20
Jan.
21
0
40
20
60
80
100
0
40
20
60
80
100
0
300
150
450
600
750
900
1,050
0
40
20
60
80
100
2016 17 18 19 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
47International Monetary Fund | October 2021
frameworks across countries, which results in little or
no monitoring and information sharing across jurisdic-
tions. Despite some progress through the AML/CFT
obligations for crypto asset providers set out by the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), their implementa-
tion is still at an early stage (FATF 2021), with notable
delays in key areas such as the “travel rule.”
13
14
Monitoring the activity of crypto asset service
providers is complicated by limited, fragmented, and,
in some cases, unreliable data. Public data sharing by
crypto asset providers is currently mostly voluntary
and lacking standardization. For example, while most
major crypto exchanges report their trading activity,
the information content varies widely, ranging from
minimal information to full real-time order books. In
addition, given that data are self-reported, there are
incentives to manipulate the reporting of higher vol-
umes so as to rank higher on exchange rankings.
Analyzing on-chain
14
15
activity is also challenging,
given that data analysis techniques are at an early stage.
On-chain data analytics companies have so far focused
on detecting illicit activities, as opposed to providing
reliable macro-relevant metrics regarding on-chain
activity. e FATF recently published a survey (FATF
2021) on the peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions of seven
data companies in an attempt to detect the possibility
that illicit P2P transfers are growing, given that such
transfers are not explicitly subject to FATF standards.
e survey shows large variation: one company esti-
mated that 80 percent of the dollar value of Bitcoin
transactions in 2020 occurred without a crypto asset
provider, while another estimated it at only 3 percent
(Figure 2.2, panel 3). e data also show large uncer-
tainty regarding the illicit use of crypto assets, with no
clear indication whether activities are moving toward
P2P transactions—making it difficult to ascertain the
full degree of illicit crypto asset use.
Crypto asset providers offer and market their
services in many jurisdictions, which makes their
regulation and supervision more challenging. ey are
often headquartered in jurisdictions with favorable
regulatory, tax, and legal frameworks. For example,
most transactions on crypto exchanges take place
through entities that operate primarily in offshore
14,
13
Under the “travel rule,” crypto asset providers must obtain, hold,
and exchange information about the originators and beneficiaries of
crypto asset transfers.
15,
14
On-chain transactions are recorded and verified on a blockchain.
Off-chain transactions take place on a specific platform (for example,
a crypto exchange) and not on the blockchain.
financial centers (Figure 2.2, panel 4). In addition,
many countries do not have conduct or prudential
regulations in place that encompass the activities of
crypto asset service providers. And even though some
jurisdictions require some type of registration or
authorization process, the scope of such regulations in
many cases is limited to AML/CFT.
e absence of effective supervision and regulatory
frameworks can create regulatory arbitrage and curtail
enforcement. For example, users can access crypto
assets through global crypto exchanges or wallets,
even though these providers lack domestic banking
relationships. e use of sovereign currencies on these
platforms can occur through third-party payment
processing companies taking advantage of regula-
tory loopholes. Some jurisdictions, such as Malaysia,
Nigeria, and Turkey, recently imposed restrictions on
payments and/or transactions through global exchanges,
such as Binance. However, such actions cannot prevent
on-chain transactions—for example, P2P transfers
through online chat rooms or the use of decentralized
exchanges (see the “Cryptoization” section).
Issues Specific to Stablecoins
e term “stablecoin” captures a very diverse set of
crypto assets and can be misleading.
15
16
While all aim to
anchor their value to a specific asset (typically the US
dollar) or a group of assets, stablecoins can be classified
across a spectrum, depending on the type and credit
quality of their collateral backing as well as their price
stabilization mechanisms (see Figure 2.3, panel 1,
for the collateral composition of the four largest
stablecoins):
• Cash-based: Fully backed by cash or liquid and safe
assets (such as bank deposits and US government
bills). These stablecoins are redeemable by the issuer
at face value. Their reserves are normally maintained
by regulated entities, such as onshore US banks, and
they may also provide a higher level of transparency,
such as detailed disclosure of reserve assets and clear
documentation of redemption rights, including full
segregation from other corporate assets.
15
For example, the latest consultation of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2021) proposes that the capital requirements
for stablecoin exposures be based on a set of conditions that include
(1) the regulatory and supervisory status of the entities performing
key functions and (2) the effectiveness of the price stabilization
mechanism. e so-called stablecoins backed by other crypto assets
and algorithms are not deemed to meet the stabilization condition.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
48 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
• Asset-based: Fully backed by noncash equivalent assets
(for example, corporate bonds, commercial paper, or
commodities) and cash. These stablecoins are akin
to money market funds prior to the reforms that fol-
lowed the global financial crisis. Issuers and exchanges
may market these stablecoins as immediately redeem-
able at face value, but in some cases—especially
during periods of market stress—some issuers may be
able to defer redemption, offer in-kind redemption,
or impose higher redemption fees.
• Crypto-asset-based: Backed by other crypto assets. For
example, DAI is (over-) collateralized by a portfolio
of crypto assets, such as Ether, Bitcoin, and USD
Coin. These stablecoins are usually structured on a
decentralized, noncustodial basis and are considered
part of DeFi. A further category comprises “algo-
rithmic” stablecoins (also referred to as “noncol-
lateralized”) that aim to maintain their peg using
algorithms that increase or decrease the supply of
tokens according to market conditions.
e regulation of stablecoins varies substantially
across jurisdictions, inviting concerns about regulatory
gaps, inconsistent regulatory treatment, and regula-
tory arbitrage.
16
17
e following are three categories
of regulation:
• Comprehensively regulated: Currently, no stablecoin
arrangement fully meets this status.
17
18
An example of
such a stablecoin would be one issued by a com-
mercial bank, subject to comprehensive prudential,
conduct, and governance requirements.
• Partially regulated by existing regimes: Elements of sta-
blecoin arrangements (for example, for reserve manag-
ers) are regulated for conduct and prudential purposes
or for limited purposes (for example, AML/CFT).
17,
16
It is also worth noting that some widely adopted stablecoins can
also become a vehicle for money laundering and terrorism financing
(FATF 2020).
18,
17
“Arrangement” refers to all functions behind the stablecoin,
including its governance body, reserves manager, exchange selling it
to clients, and so on. See FSB (2020) for a full definition.
IRON TITAN token (right scale)
1. Reserves of Top Stablecoins
(Percent and billions of US dollars)
$6 bn$12 bn$27 bn$63 bn
2. IRON Stablecoin and TITAN Price
(US dollars, 2021)
Stablecoins vary considerably with respect to their reserve
composition.
An algorithmic stablecoin experienced a “bank run” in June as part of
its collateral collapsed in value.
Sources: CoinGecko; and company websites.
Note: Panel 1 reserves data are as of June 2021 for Tether, August 2021 for USD Coin, July 2021 for Binance USD, and August 2021 for DAI. At the time, DAI
collateralization was more than 200 percent, while the other stablecoins had assets whose value was at least equal to their outstanding issuance. USD Coin
consolidates cash and cash equivalents in its disclosure (accounting for about 60 percent of reserves), with cash equivalents defined as securities with an original
maturity less than or equal to 90 days, in line with US generally accepted accounting principles. Circle announced that, as of September 2021, 100 percent of USD
Coin reserves would be moved to cash and cash equivalents. Binance USD is issued in collaboration with Paxos, with 4 percent of its reserves in Pax Dollar (USDP), a
separate native stablecoin of Paxos with under $1 billion in outstanding supply, itself secured by Treasury securities and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation–
insured bank deposits. bn = billion; CB = corporate bonds; CDs = certificate of deposits; CP = commercial paper; SL = secured loans; USD = US dollar;
WB = wrapped bitcoin.
Figure 2.3. Stablecoins
0
30
20
10
40
50
60
70
80
0.70
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
June 2 June 9 June 16 June 23 June 30
0
20
40
60
80
100
Tether USD Coin Binance USD DAI
Cash/bank
deposits/
Treasury bills
Cash/bank
deposits/
Treasury bills
Cash/bank
deposits/
Treasury bills
Yankee CDs
CP
CP
CB
CB
SL
Other
USD coin
Ethereum
WB
Other crypto assets
Pax Dollar
25 percent of collateral
involved native token
TITAN. The algorithm
failed to stabilize
TITAN’s price and it
collapsed to 0.
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
49International Monetary Fund | October 2021
Some stablecoin issuers, such as trust companies and
money transmitters, have been licensed and regulated
by the existing regulatory frameworks in the United
States. Regulators may be able to access information,
but regulatory tools may be limited and unable to
address all the risks of stablecoin issuers. Furthermore,
some exchanges and wallet providers that support sta-
blecoins may fall only under AML/CFT requirements,
while some reserve managers and custodians may be
regulated entities.
• Nonregulated: No prudential or conduct regulation
of stablecoin arrangements. Many regulators are still
in the process of developing applicable regulations,
as many stablecoins currently fall into this category.
Some US dollar stablecoin issuers that have chosen
to be headquartered offshore and operate through
offshore banks are nonregulated.
Currently, many stablecoins suffer from poor disclo-
sure. Although stablecoin issuers are improving in this
regard, there is a need for substantial upgrades to meet
the same level of disclosure standards as commercial
banks and money market funds. For example, Tether,
the world’s largest stablecoin by market capitalization,
has disclosed the composition of its reserve assets.
However, such disclosure is not yet audited by inde-
pendent accountants, and some important information
is still missing, including domicile, denomination of
currencies, and sector of commercial paper holdings.
Moreover, the recent disclosure by Tether reveals
a higher degree of liquidity mismatch than for other
major stablecoins. Even though Tether allows direct
and “immediate” 1:1 redemption for US dollars for
a small fee, only one-third of its reserves are backed
by cash and Treasury bills; about half is invested in
commercial paper.
Some stablecoins can be subject to runs, with
repercussions for the financial system. is could be
driven by doubts about their redeemability at a 1:1 peg
due to the value of their reserves or the speed at which
reserves can be liquidated to meet potential redemp-
tions. In June 2021 a small algorithmic stablecoin
(IRON) experienced a run (Figure 2.3, panel 2) as
one-quarter of its reserves were backed by another
token (TITAN) whose market value went to zero. Even
if stablecoins are, for the time being, not large enough
to be deemed “systemic,” there are financial stability
implications for large banks in the event of fire sales of
the assets that back stablecoins. An investor run in one
country can also lead to cross-border spillovers if large
global crypto exchanges are involved. e concentrated
ownership of stablecoins by market makers could also
trigger wider contagion.
Run risks could also trigger a fire sale of commercial
paper. In many jurisdictions, including the United
States, the liquidity of commercial paper is worse than
that of other short-term assets, such as government
bills, especially during periods of market stress (as seen
during the COVID-19 sell-off in 2020). e conta-
gion risk can be much higher where reserve assets are
concentrated in particular issuers or sectors. Although
this risk might be Tether-specific for now, given its
size and types of holdings, this kind of contagion risk
could evolve for other stablecoins in the future.
Cryptoization
Crypto adoption in some emerging market and
developing economies has outpaced that of advanced
economies. According to a recent survey, the top five
countries using or owning crypto assets in 2020 were
emerging market and developing economies, whereas
the lowest adopters were generally advanced economies
(Statista 2021).
18
19
Another recent survey (Finder 2021),
with a more limited set of countries, also reaches similar
conclusions, placing emerging market economies in
Asia among the top and advanced economies, such as
the United Kingdom and the United States, among the
bottom. Some emerging market country-specific surveys
also show a large jump in adoption over the past year.
19
20
Beyond surveys, tracking country-specific adoption
can be challenging. So far, there is no reliable way to
estimate the stock or flow of crypto assets based on
country residency. A commonly used proxy is resi-
dency estimates based on internet visits to websites of
crypto asset providers. ese confirm the survey data to
show the popularity of several global crypto exchanges
among emerging market and developing economies
(Figure 2.4, panel 1), but they cannot measure the
actual use of crypto assets. Another metric is the size
19,
18
e Statista survey is based on a relatively limited sample of
1,000–4,000 respondents a country among a group of 74 countries.
20,
19
e Finder survey is based on 42,000 people across a sample
of 27 countries that excludes many emerging markets. Exam-
ples include local surveys in Turkey (CoinTelegraph 2021) and
Indonesia (Tokenomy 2021), as well as estimates of volumes
in crypto exchanges in Brazil (CoinDesk 2021) and ailand
(Bloomberg 2021).
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
50 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
China United States Russia Malaysia
Iran Kazakhstan Other
EM Asia
EM Europe
Latin America
MENA
SSA
Median
Average
Top three average
Average
Average of top three
Median
Maximum
Latest
90% range
3. Value Received On-Chain among 50 EMDEs
(Percent of GDP)
4. Volumes of EMDE FX on Crypto Exchanges
(Share of interbank FX volumes)
5. Bitcoin Premiums in Local Currency Markets
(Percent deviation since 2018)
6. Bitcoin Mining Activity by Country
(Share of global hashrate)
Demand and supply imbalances and capital flow management
measures can lead to large market segmentation.
The amount of value received on-chain has grown rapidly by some
estimates.
Off-chain trading volumes against some EMDE FX pairs have shown
large volatility in 2021.
The migration of crypto mining can lead to higher electricity usage and
on-chain revenues in EMDEs.
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Cambridge Centre of Alternativ
e Finance; Chainalysis; Cryptocompare; Kaiko; Similarweb; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Samples for panels 2 and 4 comprise 10 countries. Panel 3 is based on residency estimates from Chainalysis. In panel 5, t
he Bitcoin premium is calculated as
(Bitcoin/LCL
× LCL/USD) / (Bitcoin/USD) − 1, in which LCL is the local currency on the x-axis. For Nigeria and Argentina, a parallel FX-rate estimate is used. Data
labels use International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
currency codes. Hashrate measures the computing power used in crypto mining. EMDE = emerging
market and developing economy; FX = foreign exchange; MENA = Mi
ddle East and North Africa; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; USD = US dollar.
Figure 2.4. Cryptoization Risks
0
500
400
300
200
100
Apr. 2020 July 20 Oct. 20 Jan. 21
Apr. 21
–10
0
20
10
30
40
50
0
40
20
60
80
100
Sep.
2019
Mar.
21
Dec.
19
Mar.
20
June
20
Sep.
20
Dec.
20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1. Geographic Breakdown of Internet Visitors
(Unique visitors, October 2020–June 2021)
2. Volumes of EMDE Registered Crypto Exchanges
(Percent share of local equity exchange volumes)
EMDE residents are among the top visitors of major crypto exchange
websites.
Volumes in local exchanges have grown rapidly and are comparable to
some equity markets.
Jan.
2020
Apr.
20
Apr.
21
July
20
July
21
Oct.
20
Jan.
21
Jan.
2020
Apr.
20
Apr.
21
July
20
July
21
Oct.
20
Jan.
21
Exchange
Economies
0
20
40
60
80
100
Top
economy 1
Top
economy 2
Top
economy 3
Top
economy 4
Top
economy 5
BINANCE HUOBI COINBASE KRAKEN FTX BITHUMB BITFINEX
NGN KRW ARS ZAR PEN THB IDR RUB BRL UAH TRY MXN
Russia Ukraine
United
Kingdom
Germany Korea Russia
Taiwan
Province
of China
United
Kingdom
Vietnam Spain France China Turkey Germany
Brazil
United
States
Germany
United
Kingdom
Taiwan
Province
of China
United
States
Ukraine
Argentina Russia France
Hong
Kong
SAR
The
Netherlands
Poland Brazil
Turkey China
United
States
United
States
Turkey Korea Russia
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
51International Monetary Fund | October 2021
of trading volumes of crypto exchanges that operate
only in specific countries rather than globally. Among
a sample of such exchanges in emerging market and
developing economies, the reported traded volume in
2021 rose sharply and, in some cases, volumes have
become comparable to the activity on the local stock
exchange (Figure 2.4, panel 2).
20
21
Finally, some block-
chain analytics companies (for example Chainalysis
2020; Chainalysis 2021a) attempt to infer the residency
of on-chain crypto asset flows. Similar to surveys,
their data show that adoption in emerging market and
developing economies is rising and has outpaced that in
advanced economies, but the interpretation of the data
poses significant challenges (Figure 2.4, panel 3).
21
22
ere are several driving forces for cryptoization.
Unsound macroeconomic policies combined with
inefficient payment systems in some emerging market
and developing economies boost crypto adoption.
Some potential pull factors for crypto adoption, such
as speculative retail investing, may be common across
countries (Table 2.2), but some of the recent drivers
are likely more specific to a subset of emerging market
and developing economies. For example,
• Weak central bank credibility and a vulnerable bank-
ing system can trigger asset substitution as domestic
residents seek a safer store of value. Dollarization
22
23
pressures are a persistent risk for several emerging
market and developing economies.
23
24
The crypto
ecosystem can help domestic residents convert some
of the headwinds of traditional dollarization—such
as exchange rate restrictions and challenges in
accessing and storing foreign assets—into tailwinds.
For example, global crypto exchanges or other less
secure methods, such as P2P transfers, can be used
21,
20
e presence of multiple exchanges quoting the same trading
pairs could lead to double counting, as a buyer on one exchange can
be a seller on another.
22,
21
For example, large volumes might result from on-chain transfers
between wallets of crypto asset providers rather than increased use of
crypto assets by retail users. In addition, residency-based estimates usu-
ally rely on web traffic data, which can be compromised by the use of
technologies that mask online activity, hence reducing their accuracy.
23,
22
Dollarization here refers to the de facto adoption of a foreign
currency (not necessarily the dollar) or asset that displaces the
domestic currency, driven by the preferences of the economy’s
residents. e primary driver of the adoption can be a new means of
payment and unit of account (currency substitution) or a safer store
of value (asset substitution).
24,
23
For example, among a sample of 65 emerging market and devel-
oping economies that are not de jure dollarized, 2020 data showed
that about one-third have foreign currency exceeding 30 percent of
both total loans and deposits.
to bypass capital flow management measures; private
wallets can act as a form of offshore bank account to
store wealth.
• Inefficiencies in payment systems and limited access
to financial services can also be a driver of dollar-
ization. One prominent example of inefficiencies is
the lack of interoperability among various domes-
tic payment systems, which can be a problem for
remittances as well as trade.
24
25
Given the large share
of unbanked people in some emerging market and
developing economies, remittances often take place
through cumbersome cash-based methods, such as
those of post offices and other transfer operators.
The payment rails of crypto assets can make some of
these services faster and cheaper, especially through
the integration of stablecoins, which allow for a
stable unit of account. Of course, such gains rely on
access to the internet and other technologies, which
are scarce in many countries.
Macro-financial challenges depend critically on the
degree of adoption.
• A limited degree of adoption—for example,
small-scale use of crypto assets for remittances—will
pose some of the challenges discussed earlier (see the
“Challenges Posed by the Crypto Ecosystem” sec-
tion) but will have a marginal impact on monetary
policy or capital flows. Even when crypto payment
rails are used, the underlying crypto assets will likely
25,
24
See the discussion in IMF and BIS (2021) for some well-known
issues with international remittances. Chainalysis (2020) discusses
the increasing use of crypto assets for remittances and trade.
Source: IMF staff.
Note: AML/CFT = anti–money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism;
FX = foreign exchange.
Table 2.2. Pull and Push Factors Related to Crypto Adoption
Potential Adoption Drivers for Emerging Market Users
Pull Factors
Returns from speculative investment
Relative transaction costs and speed
Competitive financial products
Reduced AML/CFT standards
Convenience of “on-chain” custody
Push Factors
Unsound domestic macro policies
FX restrictions
Vulnerable banking sector
Exclusion from other financial services
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
52 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
be held for only a short time (for example, the dura-
tion of the remittance) before users exchange them
for local currency to make purchases domestically.
• More extensive degrees of adoption
25
26
—such as the adop-
tion of stablecoins
26
27
as means of payment and store
of value—can pose more significant challenges by
reinforcing dollarization forces in the economy. Dol-
larization can impede central banks’ effective imple-
mentation of monetary policy and lead to financial
stability risks through currency mismatches on the bal-
ance sheets of banks, firms, and households. This can
be further amplified by liquidity risks, as central banks
are not able to provide liquidity backstops in foreign
units of account (IMF 2020a). Cryptoization could
moreover pose a threat to fiscal policy: crypto assets
can facilitate tax evasion, and seigniorage revenue may
also decline due to the shrinking role of central bank
money in the economy.
e adoption of a crypto asset as the main national
currency carries significant risks and is an inadvisable
shortcut. Adrian and Weeks-Brown (2021) discuss
such risks to macro-financial stability, financial integ-
rity, consumer protection, and the environment. For
now, the probability of such a scenario occurring due
to a choice of households and businesses is low for
most countries, given that the value of non-stablecoin
crypto assets is too volatile and unrelated to the real
economy to become the main unit of account. Such a
scenario, however, could arise in countries with weak
monetary and exchange rate policies where the risks
associated with the use of volatile crypto assets is still a
relative improvement over existing policies.
Increased demand for crypto assets could facili-
tate capital outflows that affect the foreign exchange
market. Crypto exchanges play the crucial role of
facilitating the conversion of local currency to crypto
assets and vice versa. e natural
27
28
demand and
supply for conversions can easily become unbalanced
26,
25
A challenge that is not covered in this chapter is the capacity of
blockchains to process large amounts of payments in an economy,
given their scalability problems; more recently, some newer technol-
ogies (such as layer 2 networks) have made it more feasible to solve
such problems.
27,
26
Compared with other volatile crypto assets, stablecoins are likely
to be a more desirable store-of-value, given their link to a familiar
unit of account (usually the US dollar) and such features as anonym-
ity and access to DeFi.
28,
27
For example, natural sellers can be recipients of remittances,
while buyers can be speculators that want to position for a
rally in Bitcoin.
over the 24/7 trading period of crypto asset mar-
kets. For markets to clear, some market makers must
provide liquidity by trading more liquid pairs (such
as US dollar–Bitcoin and US dollar–local currency)
to determine the price of the less liquid pair (local
currency–Bitcoin). is type of triangular arbitrage
is usually facilitated by institutional participants that
have access to larger pools of liquidity in markets
that do not include domestic retail participants (for
example, offshore funding markets). In periods when
domestic demand for crypto assets rises substantially,
these institutional participants can act as gateways for
conversion of crypto asset demand to capital outflows
through the exchange rate market. e recent sharp
rise in trading volumes of crypto assets against some
emerging market and developing economy currencies
(Figure 2.4, panel 4) may have been the source of
spillovers in the exchange rate market that led to recent
restrictions imposed by authorities.
Policy measures can be somewhat effective at
ring-fencing the impact of rising crypto asset demand
in the foreign exchange market. Capital flow manage-
ment measures and other crypto-asset-specific measures
can have a notable impact in terms of creating market
segmentation (see Makarov and Schoar 2020). For
example, in Korea, Bitcoin purchases had premia as
high as 50 percent in 2018 due to strong domestic
demand and restrictions that kept arbitrage activities
at bay (Figure 2.4, panel 5).
28
29
However, such restric-
tions on crypto asset trading may trigger new leakages
as trading moves away from exchanges and over to
peer-to-peer
29
30
and other less formal or less visible
channels (such as chat rooms on the instant messaging
system Telegram).
A migration of “mining” activity to emerging mar-
ket and developing economies can also have serious
implications for capital flows as well as for energy con-
sumption. Validating on-chain transactions for many
crypto assets is done by so-called proof-of-work or
mining, whereby members of the network solve a com-
plex mathematical problem using computing power.
Following a crackdown on mining activity in China in
early 2021, mining activity started to migrate to other
emerging market and developing economies and to the
29,
28
Korea is classified as an advanced economy, but its relatively
large crypto ecosystem offers meaningful lessons.
30,
29
For example, Binance has increased its presence in P2P markets
in Africa, and other P2P platforms, such as Paxful, have seen a
notable increase in volumes there.
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
53International Monetary Fund | October 2021
United States (Figure 2.4, panel 6). is movement
can have important implications for
• Energy consumption: Miners use electricity to power
their hardware. By some estimates, mining in the
Bitcoin network consumes about 0.36 percent of the
world’s electricity—comparable
30
31
to the consump-
tion of Belgium or Chile. Large migration of mining
activity can lead to a significant rise in domestic
energy use, especially in countries that subsidize
energy costs. However, future generations of Ethe-
reum and other smart blockchains are expected to
consume much less energy than Bitcoin.
• Capital flows: Miners are rewarded for their activities
on-chain in the form of crypto assets. For example,
the value of mining revenues in 2021 has exceeded
$1 billion a month, on average, for each of the
Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains. Mining revenue
can potentially be used to circumvent capital flow
restrictions as well as international financial sanc-
tions, given that the main operating costs of miners
(for example, electricity) are normally paid domes-
tically in local currency, but their revenues are paid
on-chain in the form of crypto assets.
e banking sector can also come under pressure if
the crypto ecosystem becomes an alternative to domes-
tic bank deposits or even loans. Stronger competition
for bank deposits through stablecoins held on crypto
exchanges or private wallets may push local banks
toward less stable and more expensive funding sources
to maintain similar levels of loan growth. Beyond the
direct loss in net interest income, a loss of customer
relationships and data on transactions would also
undermine credit risk assessment for clients and their
ability to offer targeted products to clients.
Policies to Ensure Macro-Financial Stability
Fintech innovation, including the crypto ecosystem,
has the potential to improve fundamental aspects of
the macroeconomy with better financial services and
greater financial inclusion, especially in emerging mar-
ket and developing economies. Policymakers need to
balance enabling financial innovation and reinforcing
competition and the commitment to open, free, and
contestable markets, on one hand, against challenges to
31,
30
For a discussion of the merits of these types of comparisons of
energy usage, see https:// cbeci .org/ cbeci/ comparisons.
financial integrity, consumer protection, and financial
stability. As a first step, regulators and supervisors need
to be able to monitor rapid developments and the risks
they create. Depending on country circumstances, var-
ious forms of crypto assets may be adopted, and their
economic functions may vary. Different countries have
different policy priorities arising from the degree of
crypto adoption and their existing vulnerabilities. For
example, the risks connected with adoption for trans-
action purposes differ from those arising from wide-
spread use as a store of value or a new unit of account.
Risks to financial integrity are high from crypto assets
operating on anonymous platforms, but they may be
addressable for some stablecoins.
is chapter offers policy recommendations
relating to three main areas: (1) regulation, super-
vision, and monitoring of the crypto ecosystem;
(2) stablecoin-specific risks; and (3) managing the
macro-financial risks in emerging market and develop-
ing economies. Table 2.3 summarizes the policy advice
that builds on findings presented in this chapter and
other IMF work (IMF 2019; IMF 2020a; IMF 2021).
Table 2.3. Main Policy Recommendations
Standards,
Supervision, and
Data
• National regulators should prioritize
the implementation of global standards
applicable to crypto assets
• Regulators need to control the risks
of crypto assets, especially in areas of
systemic importance
• Coordination among national regulators
is key for effective enforcement and less
regulatory arbitrage
• Regulators should address data gaps and
monitor the crypto ecosystem for better
policy decisions
Stablecoins • Regulations should be proportionate to
the risk and in line with those of global
stablecoins
• Coordination is needed to implement
recommendations in areas of acute risk;
enhanced disclosure, independent audit of
reserves, fit and proper rules for network
administrators and issuers; and more
Managing
Macro-financial
Risks
• Enact de-dollarization policies, including
enhancing monetary policy credibility;
a sound fiscal position; effective legal
and regulatory measures; and the
implementation of central bank digital
currencies
• Capital flow restrictions need to be
reconsidered with respect to their
effectiveness, supervision, and enforcement
Source: IMF staff compilation.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
54 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
Standards, Supervision, and Data
National regulators should prioritize the imple-
mentation of complete global standards applicable to
crypto assets. Although standards applicable to crypto
assets are currently limited to AML/CFT (FATF)
and proposals on the exposure of banks to crypto
assets (BCBS), other standards—such as those of
the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) and the Committee on Payments
and Market Infrastructures’ Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures (CPMI/PFMI)—provide a
robust groundwork for regulation and supervision of
crypto assets.
31
32
For example, standards regarding the
powers and independence of supervisors, operational
resilience, disclosure, and governance have existed for
some time, but still lack adequate implementation. If
crypto exchanges deal with tokens that meet the defi-
nition of securities, those entities should be subject to
existing international standards for securities inter-
mediaries. All jurisdictions should implement such
standards. Globally, policymakers should prioritize
making cross-border payments faster, cheaper, more
transparent and inclusive through the G20 Cross
Border Payments Roadmap (G20 2020). e IMF
can support such efforts through Financial Sector
Assessment Programs and technical assistance.
Robust and globally consistent standards are needed
to mitigate financial stability risks. Where standards
have not yet been developed, regulators need to use
existing tools to control risk and implement a flexible
framework for crypto assets. e growing systemic
implications of crypto assets may indeed warrant
immediate regulatory action in some countries. Reg-
ulators must use existing measures and international
standards by focusing on areas of acute risk, such as
wallets, exchanges, and financial institutions’ exposures.
Authorities should ensure that the regulatory frame-
work is flexible enough to be adjusted in the future, in
line with forthcoming international standards. Interim
measures should be taken, including clear consumer
warnings and investor education programs, especially
where crypto adoption has been fast, such as in some
emerging market and developing economies.
National regulators should enhance cross-border
coordination of supervision and enforcement actions.
32,
31
e IMF has previously highlighted the relevance of existing
underlying principles of financial regulation that are applicable to
crypto assets (see Cuervo, Morozova, and Sugimoto 2020).
For example, because it is difficult to implement and
enforce an adequate regulatory framework, some
authorities have taken strong actions, such as ban-
ning unregulated crypto asset activities. Although
bans can have a direct impact on the business of
crypto exchanges, individuals are still likely to be able
to trade and exchange crypto assets by alternative
means. erefore, jurisdictions should actively coor-
dinate with the relevant authorities and international
standard-setting bodies to maximize the effectiveness
of their enforcement actions and minimize regula-
tory arbitrage. Greater cross-border collaboration can
enhance enforcement actions, but the resources needed
for such enforcement may present a greater challenge
for emerging market and developing economies.
Swiftly tackling data gaps is central to inform policy
decisions. Greater data standardization can lead to better
oversight of new developments and a more accurate
understanding of risks and can support proportionate
regulation of crypto asset markets. In that regard, an
international agreement on common minimum princi-
ples for data should be developed. A globally consistent
taxonomy can help data standardization and coopera-
tion. ere is also scope for international coordination
on compilation and sharing of data sources from private
companies for regulatory and public policy purposes.
Stablecoins
Stablecoins require regulations proportionate to
their risk and the economic functions they serve,
taking into account recommendations put forward by
the Financial Stability Board, which recently finalized
10 high-level recommendations comprehensively cov-
ering requirements—such as governance, risk manage-
ment, transparency, and redemption rights—with the
underlying principle of “same business, same risk, same
rules.” As a matter of priority, authorities should ensure
that widely used stablecoins have effective risk manage-
ment frameworks with regard to credit and liquidity
risks as well as operational, AML/CFT, and cyber risks,
among others. Regulation and supervision of stable-
coins could be enhanced through cooperation agree-
ments between country authorities that consider the
various types of risks stablecoins pose for each country.
Certain US dollar–linked stablecoins seek to base their
operations in chartered banks in the United States.
Meeting banking license requirements would resolve
many regulatory challenges.
CHAPTER 2 THE CRYPTO ECOSYSTEM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
55International Monetary Fund | October 2021
ere are areas of acute risk in stablecoin arrange-
ments that require more immediate attention. Various
functions, including reserves management, network
administration and governance, custody, and exchange
services, can generate risks to consumer protection,
financial stability, market and financial integrity, and
operational and cyber resilience. Authorities should
consider measures—such as enhanced disclosure
requirements, independent audit of reserves, fit and
proper rules for network administrators and issuers,
and rules around enhanced operational and cyber
resilience—to reflect the increased reliance on digi-
tal platforms and various types of distributed ledger
technology. Where stablecoins generate systemic risk,
their regulatory obligations should reflect this position,
with rules aligned with traditional entities that provide
similar products (for example, bank deposits, digital
payments, money market funds, and so on).
Managing Macro-Financial Risks
Reversing or averting dollarization requires strong
macroeconomic policies, but these may not by them-
selves be enough. Crypto assets on their own do not
change the economic forces that lead to the inter-
national use of currencies or increased dollarization.
Yet the technological advance of the crypto ecosystem,
and especially stablecoins, could reinforce the incen-
tives behind currency and asset substitution and ease
adoption. Hence, the tolerance for policy missteps is
greatly reduced (IMF 2020a). Countries that want to
fend off dollarization will need to strengthen monetary
policy credibility, safeguard the independence of central
banks, and maintain a sound fiscal position along with
effective legal and regulatory measures to disincentivize
foreign currency use. Similarly, although simply issuing
central bank digital currencies does not automatically
change the incentives to hold foreign currencies, central
bank digital currencies may help reduce dollarization if
they help satisfy a need for better payment technologies.
A number of countries have launched similar projects to
modernize their payment systems, taking advantage of
the latest developments in digital technology and using
the domestic currency for instant payments.
e design of capital flow restrictions in a digital
world needs to be reconsidered, including via stable-
coin regulations. Applying established regulatory tools
to manage capital flows may be more challenging when
value is transmitted on new platforms that are not
bound by existing capital flow management mea-
sures (IMF 2021). Because of the way private entities
organize or relocate their activities, the effectiveness
of regulation, supervision, oversight, and enforcement
of capital flow management measures faces challenges
at jurisdictional levels. erefore, there is a need for
cross-border collaboration and cooperation to address
the technological, legal, regulatory, and supervisory
challenges (IMF 2021; IMF and BIS 2021). In partic-
ular, the host authorities where stablecoins are more
widely used should be encouraged to establish a close
coordination mechanism with the home regulator
where stablecoin reserves are managed.
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: COVID-19, CRYPTO, AND CLIMATE: NAVIGATING CHALLENGING TRANSITIONS
56 International Monetary Fund | October 2021
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