formed into groups, wings, or commands, but operated independently as
squadrons, attached to higher echelons such as the IX Tactical Air Com-
mand. Only 666 night fighter crews served overseas. They fought in Eu-
rope, North Africa, Italy, Sicily, Corsica, France, Germany, Burma, China,
the Philippines, and any number of exotic locations, some well known,
others not: La Senia, Elmas, Ghisonaccia, Borgo, Pontedera, La Banca,
Pomigliano, Honiley, Bristol, Istres, Strassfeld, Giebelstadt, Maupertus,
Chateaudun, Coulommiers, Madhaiganj, Chengtu, Hsian, Pandaveswar,
Myitkyina, Lingayen, Puerto Princesa, Guadalcanal, Dobodura, Cape
Croisilles, Karkar, Hollandia, Morotai, Milne Bay, Saidor, Saipan, Iwo
Jima, Nadzab, Peleliu, Okinawa, Middelburg, Palawan, Mindoro, Zam-
boango, Tarakan, Sanga Sanga, Owi, Palawan, and Ie Shima.
Larger numbers and higher priorities probably would not have boost-
ed their contribution. Night fighters were solitary hunters; they could not
enter combat in formations. Doubling or tripling their numbers would not
have brought greater success, especially with so few targets. What suc-
cesses they had, 158 officially recognized night kills, can be attributed to
the quality of their weapons, the commitment and quality of their crews,
and luck. On the other hand, their failures were caused by the limitations
of their aircraft and weapons and inadequate training. Members of the
422d NFS were convinced that if night fighters and their crews were “as-
sisted by certain mechanical aids” and properly trained and employed,
“then sortie for sortie they will prove as deadly if not more so than their
day counterparts.”
Obviously, night work was dangerous. On intruder missions crews
normally had to make two passes, the first to see and identify the target
and the second to bomb or strafe it. With flak batteries alerted, second
passes often meant death or a trip to a POW camp. The 419th NFS spent
639 days in combat from its arrival on Guadalcanal on November 15,
1943, to its last mission from Palawan Island on August 14, 1945. In
1,972 combat missions, the squadron claimed five Japanese aircraft de-
stroyed at night—at a cost of twelve pilots and eight R/Os and thirty-one
aircraft lost to enemy action or crashes. Night interception missions were
always fought alone, though with the comforting thought that within
range a ground controller watched every move on a radar screen. Retired
Maj. Gen. Oris B. Johnson, wartime commander of the Europe-based
422d NFS, never felt lonely on night missions. He was “too damn busy,”
except the one time in December 1944 when solitude might have been
preferred. His ground controller vectored him onto eight FW 190s flying
in formation. Eight were too many to mess with, even though on a previ-
ous night Johnson had willingly attacked a flight of three because he
knew he had radar “eyes” and the Focke-Wulf pilots did not.
Ironically, the enemy aloft was not the only source of danger. Crews in
the Pacific flying at twenty thousand feet amid air temperatures of ten de-
grees below zero complained of a headquarters decision to withhold heat-
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