1
Im Dienst des Grossen Königs …
The Shaping of von Steuben in the Service of Frederick the Great
By Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Nelson
Dean of Students, U.S. Army Inspector General School
Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben played a key role in the
American Revolution. When he arrived in the American Colonies in December of
1777, he brought a unique wealth of knowledge and experience gained during
his Army service under Frederick the Great of Prussia. The knowledge he
gained in Prussian service was tempered by the variety of duties he performed.
His duties and assignments ranged from a regular officer in a line infantry
regiment, service with irregular light units, staff experience at various echelons,
and diplomatic service at the Court of Saint Petersburg, Russia. Unlike some of
the other European soldiers who volunteered to serve with the Continental Army,
General Thomas Conway for example, von Steuben possessed the character
and interpersonal skills to develop a solid working relationship with General
Washington and the other American officers through his demonstrated
proficiency and, most importantly, his tact. While proficiency in drill and manual
of arms might be expected of most European officers, the ability to understand
and accept the differences between service in a European army and the fledgling
Continental Army was not a universal skill. The path to success as drillmaster
and the first effective Inspector General of the United States Army had its
beginning in the traditions and experience he gained in the Prussian Army of
Frederick the Great.
At the time of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben’s birth in 1730, Brandenburg-
Prussia was a rapidly growing power in north central Europe. Brandenburg
began its inexorable rise to prominence starting in the late 1640s when Frederick
William I, known as the Great Elector, succeeded his father as Markgrave of
Brandenburg. At the time, the head of state was a Markgrave, roughly equivalent
to a duke or prince, and Elector in the Holy Roman Empire. Brandenburg was a
poor state without natural borders and thus lay open to invasion from any
direction. Indeed, the countryside was thoroughly devastated during the Thirty
Years War by various warring parties who routinely marched through the
countryside. This weakness and resulting devastation precipitated the eventual
rise of Brandenburg as the Kingdom of Prussia and the most dominant state in
Germany. Since the time of the Great Elector, Brandenburg-Prussia had
carefully built the most efficient Army in northern Europe. The rise in military
power first became apparent at the Battle of Fehrbellin in 1675 where
Brandenburg defeated the then-powerful Swedes. The Holy Roman Emperor
granted the title of King in Prussia to the Elector of Brandenburg for supporting
the Empire against the French. By the time of Frederick the Great, the subtle
distinction of “King in Prussia” which lay outside of the Holy Roman Empire,
disappeared. The title Markgrave and Elector of Brandenburg had entirely given
way to the title King of Prussia.
1
2
Whether known as the Electorate of Brandenburg or Kingdom of Prussia,
the lack of defensible boundaries and numerous potential enemies demanded
constant vigilance. To establish and maintain the independence of Brandenburg,
the Electors fought the Swedes, a major military power at the time, the Russians,
Austrians, and French at various times over the previous 100 years. In Prussia
itself, which geographically lies in modern Poland, there was an ancient tradition
of military service going back to the days of the Teutonic Knights who first
colonized the region. This tradition of service, coupled with the reforms first
implemented by the Great Elector and continuing through to Frederick the Great,
produced the most efficient, well trained, and administered army of the age.
At the time von Steuben joined the Prussian Army in 1747, the Kingdom of Prussia consisted of
Brandenburg, East Pomerania, the Duchy of Prussia, Silesia, and the smaller principalities in western
Germany. West, New East, and South Prussia were later acquisitions.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prussia)
In an era where the concept of uniformity of clothing, equipping, and drill
were relatively new, Prussian soldiers could count on regular pay; annual uniform
issue; and a dependable supply of weapons, food, and commissary goods.
There was a systematic program of training and education at the individual and
collective level as well. The Prussian Guard Regiments not only served as the
monarch’s bodyguards and ceremonial parade units but also as a testing and
demonstration unit for drill and tactics for the army. Indeed, both Frederick the
Great and his father induced many foreign observers to believe that the strength
of the army lay in the intricate parade ground steps of the guard in their
ceremonial capacity instead of the practical drills necessary to employ soldiers in
battle.
2
Although discipline could be fierce, regulations were codified and
3
consistent. The King himself took interest that discipline was applied fairly, and
this function became an area of interest for his inspectors general.
3
Another
significant difference between the Prussian Army and most other European
Armies was the concept of promotion based on merit, although admission to the
officer corps was primarily reserved for members of the nobility. Companies and
regiments were still the property of their “Chef”, but efficient officers could rise to
higher rank based on performance as well. The army was essential to the
survival of the kingdom, and no detail was too small for the sovereign’s attention.
Frederick the Great’s father advised him:
Fritz, pay close attention to what I am going to say to you. Always keep up a
good strong army – you won’t have a better friend and you can’t survive without
it. Our neighbors want nothing more than to bring about our ruin – I am aware of
their intentions, and you will come to know them as well. Believe me, don’t let
wishful thinking run away with you – stick to what is real. Always put your faith in
a good army and in hard cash – they are things which keep rulers in peace and
security.
4
Frederick took the advice to heart. The army was, and would remain, the primary
guarantor of the state of Prussia. A trained and ready force was non-negotiable.
Frederick the Great leads an attack at the Battle of Zorndorf by Carl Rochling.
The Kings of Prussia were truly the first servants of the state. They
personally involved themselves with, and directed all aspects of, the state,
including education, economy, agriculture, and security. Frederick’s peacetime
routine began at 4:00 AM in the summer and 5:00 AM in the winter, and he
usually worked until 6:00 PM. In an effort to get an immediate start and
accomplish more in a day, Frederick the Great added mustard to his coffee to
enhance its effects.
5
This was an era when many monarchs were little involved
in the daily functions of government let alone experiencing the rigors of leading
an army in the field. The Prussian Army was the major recipient of the King’s
4
attention. The monarch took personal care and interest in manning, training,
equipping, and employing his army. Things that would have impressed von
Steuben include the system of inspections, reviews, and maneuvers instituted by
the King; the cadet and war academies; and Frederick’s Instructions for My
Generals personally drafted by the King.
6
These and many other examples
illustrate the expected work ethic and commitment deemed appropriate for
Prussian Officers and later reflected in von Steuben’s actions in training,
educating, and inspecting what he implemented in the Continental Army at Valley
Forge.
Born in 1699, Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben’s father, Wilhelm Augustin
von Steuben, was an engineer who attended the university in Halle. He entered
the Prussian Army in 1715 at the age of sixteen and served initially in an infantry
regiment but later spent most of his career as a military engineer. Wilhelm
Augustin von Steuben achieved some success as an army officer (he was
awarded the Prussian order Pour le Merite) although the family never enjoyed
any degree of wealth.
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben was born in 1730 in the fortress city of
Magdeburg southwest of Berlin. As a young boy, Friedrich Wilhelm traveled to
Russia with his family. His father was seconded to the Russian Army in order to
gain experience on campaign in the War of Polish Succession from 1733 through
1734 and later in the Crimea against the Turks from 1736 to 1739. Surprisingly,
the German Field Marshal Meunnich commanded the Russian Army at that time.
Although Friedrich Wilhelm’s father appears to have served honorably under a
difficult taskmaster, family fortunes were not enhanced; several siblings were
born and died while the family lived in Russia. The von Steuben family returned
to Prussia upon the death of King Friedrich Wilhelm I and the ascension of King
Frederick II, known to posterity as Frederick the Great. In the spring of 1740,
Frederick the Great seized the Austrian province of Silesia, precipitating the First
Silesian War (also called the War of Austrian Succession). At the age of 14, the
young Friedrich Wilhelm accompanied his father during the siege of Prague in
the latter part of that war.
Friedrich Wilhelm entered the Prussian Army in 1746 as a Freikorporal or
Fahnenjunker, roughly equivalent to an officer-cadet normally entrusted to carry
the regimental colors. His unit, identified as Infantry Regiment von Lestwitz for
its commander or Chef (Infantry Regiment 31), was stationed in Breslau, Silesia.
The province of Silesia was captured from the Austrians in the War of Austrian
Succession. The young officer was fortunate to serve under von Lestwitz, who
was noted for his interest in the education of his officers. Frederick the Great
described von Lestwitz as a very capable officer.
7
In turn, General von Lestwitz
branded the young von Steuben “no good as a manager, but clever.” This
description, one in which von Steuben’s aides in the Continental Army would
agree upon years later, is the first characterization of von Steuben’s ability to
manage his personal affairs and an assessment of his professional abilities.
8
5
Breslau was also home to a university. Aside from military subjects, von
Steuben continued to learn French and Russian, both of which would prove
useful in later life. He was promoted to Fahnrich in 1749 and served in the
position of Premier Leutnant, or the senior lieutenant position in a company. In
1752 he was promoted Seconde-Leutnant, or 2
nd
Lieutenant.
9
With the outbreak
of war in 1756, Leutnant von Steuben marched into Bohemia with his regiment
but did not participate in any battles that year.
An officer of Infantry Regiment von Lestwitz
In 1757, once again in Bohemia, von Steuben served with his regiment at
the Battle of Prague -- his first major combat experience. On 6 May 1757, an
Austrian Army sought to prevent the Prussians from capturing the city. Typically,
Frederick of Prussia did not wait for his enemy but marched to attack the
Austrians. Frederick planned to march past the main enemy position and turn
the Austrian flank. Poor reconnaissance and muddled orders resulted in a frontal
attack over marshy ground instead of on the Austrian flank. As a result, the
Prussians suffered heavily and nearly lost the engagement. Only through timely
personal intervention by Prussian General Schwerin did the attack eventually
succeed. But success came at great cost, and the Prussians subsequently failed
to capture the city. Aside from difficulties in coordinating an effective attack,
flawed doctrine contributed to the massive casualties. During the years of peace
between the end of the War of Austrian Succession and the outbreak of the
Seven Year’s War, Frederick the Great had come to believe he could
successfully attack an enemy with infantry using shouldered muskets. His intent
was to increase the momentum and shock value of the attack and avoid the loss
6
of momentum that usually occurred when infantry opened fire. The Prussian
regiments resolutely marched into Austrian cannons and musketry and lost
soldiers by the score. Frederick recognized the effect of Austrian firepower in
battering his magnificently trained regiments. He modified his methods to
increase the number of guns and tactical flexibility of his artillery; he also
abandoned the flawed doctrine of attacking with shouldered muskets and
returned to the employment of infantry musket fire. Indeed, by the end of the
war, Frederick came to rely increasingly on his artillery to preserve his army.
Even though the Austrians were forced from their positions, the Prussians
suffered the heavier losses. Among the many wounded that day was Lieutenant
von Steuben. In retrospect, he may have been fortunate. While he was
recovering from his wounds, the Prussians again fought the Austrians in June at
Kolin near Prague. This time their attack foundered with even worse casualties
and the Prussians were forced to withdraw from Bohemia. While the Prussian
Army struggled back to Silesia, Leutnant von Steuben continued his
convalescence. Although his first battle at Prague was a only a limited success
for the Prussians, von Steuben experienced first hand the ability of the highly
trained and disciplined Prussian Infantry to recover from their initial setback,
return to the attack, and prevail over the Austrians -- a difficult feat beyond the
ability of many armies of the day.
After his recovery, Leutnant von Steuben was re-assigned. Although the
exact date is not exactly clear, he was probably seconded to Freikorps von Mayr
in early November 1757 where he served as an adjutant and staff officer. A
Freikorps in the Prussian Army of that era was a semi-independent unit, raised
by its commander-proprietor as opposed to one of the standing regiments of the
Prussian Army. These units, some of which were organized as combined-arms
task forces, included infantry, Jägers, light artillery, and hussars. They usually
did not serve in the regular line of battle but operated ahead of the army on the
march and on the flanks in battle. They were characterized by a greater degree
of independence and less discipline than the regular soldiers. They were also
frequently detached for special missions. The greater degree of independence
and character of the troops required more from junior officers than service in a
line regiment. Von Steuben considered his participation in the famous Battle of
Rossbach on 5 November 1757 as one of the high points of his service under
Frederick the Great.
10
The Battle of Rossbach is considered one of Frederick the Great’s tactical
masterpieces. In the autumn of 1757, Frederick’s armies faced the Russians in
the east, the Austrians in Silesia, and a combined French and German Army
approaching from Thüringen in the west. In a masterstroke, Frederick swiftly
marched the main army west against the French and Germans while screening
the Austrians and Russians in the south and east. Frederick attacked the
Franco-Germans though outnumbered nearly 2 to 1 (22,000 Prussians against
42,000 French and Germans). In the opening stages of the battle, Prussian
7
Cavalry attacked the combined French and German cavalry, routed them past
and through their supporting infantry, and drove the French Cavalry from the
field. Frederick’s highly drilled infantry and artillery deployed in battle order and
attacked the Franco-German infantry while still in march columns. The French
and German infantry staggered from the initial artillery and infantry volleys.
Cavalry General von Seydlitz recognized their confusion. On von Seydlitz’s
initiative, the Prussian cavalry delivered a second decisive blow that shattered
the French and German infantry and swept the field of Franco-German forces.
Combined Franco-German casualties exceeded 10,000 while the Prussian
casualties numbered about 550. The Prussians followed up the battlefield victory
with a vigorous pursuit led by Freikorps von Mayr and a regiment each of
hussars and dragoons. The defeat was so complete that the mere approach of
this small force was sufficient for French survivors to resume their panicked flight
west past Weimar and through the Thüringen Forest. The combined army was
unable to reform; the defeat was complete both physically and morally. Indeed,
the French never again challenged the Prussians in central Germany during the
Seven Year’s War.
11
Leutnant von Steuben’s role in this battle was most likely confined to the
pursuit following the main battle. Freikorps von Mayr, along with two regiments
of Prussian cavalry, constituted a combined-arms task force, vigorously led, in
independent action pursuing the French. The soldiers of the Freikorps were not
as rigidly trained and generally contained a high percentage of foreigners
compared to regular regiments. When used in a suitable role along with light
cavalry, they could be highly effective. But, if incorrectly employed, they usually
did not stand up as well as regulars in battle. In the decisive Prussian cavalry
charges at Rossbach, led by von Seydlitz, Lieutenant von Steuben witnessed the
importance of well-trained leaders who take decisive action within the
commander’s intent. He observed the value of training and discipline as
demonstrated by the Prussian Army, which rapidly transitioned from camp to
movement and then to combat formation. In contrast to his experience at
Prague, the leading Prussian Infantry regiments delivered a crushing volley of fire
effectively supported by artillery. In the pursuit after the battle, von Steuben
learned how effective well led combined-arms units, even lightly equipped forces,
could be when given a task within their ability. Finally, he would see the decisive
importance of strong central leadership, embodied in the King as the tactical
commander, in focusing the efforts of an entire army to achieve an objective.
In his service with Freikorps von Mayr, Leutenant von Steuben possibly
caught the attention of Prince Henry of Prussia, the King’s younger brother.
Freikorps von Mayr served primarily under Prince Henry throughout 1758 and
was present at the Battle of Hochkirch and in later operations around Dresden.
This period of service, away from the strict drill and discipline of the regular army,
would have been formative for von Steuben because service away from the line
infantry placed greater demands on junior leaders. The Freikorps frequently
engaged in the skirmishing of the pickets, small actions near outposts, and raids
8
as opposed to the more formal regiments that formed the line of battle. Service
in this unit provided a different perspective and required different skills -- skills
and attributes that would later prove useful in training the Continental Army. Von
Steuben’s service in the Freikorps ended with the death of von Mayr in January
of 1759. The unit reorganized, and von Steuben was subsequently re-assigned.
A contemporary commenting on von Mayr’s unit after his death noted, “His
adjutant was Lieutenant von Steuben of the Lestwitz Regiment, an able and
pleasant officer.” The combination of professional ability and affability was a
description with which von Steuben’s future colleagues in America would agree.
12
Leutenant von Steuben next served as staff officer in the brigade of
Generalleutnant von Hülson. Frederick described von Hülson as an exceptional
trainer during the Seven Year’s War.
13
This brigade served primarily as part of
Prince Henry’s Army and at times operated independently. Prince Henry, while
not as famous as his older brother, King Frederick, enjoyed a reputation as one
of the best commanders in the Prussian Army. Frederick commented that Prince
Henry was the only commander who made no strategic or tactical blunders
during the war, himself included.
14
While it is not apparent exactly when von
Steuben and Prince Henry became acquainted, clearly they developed a
friendship that lasted the rest of von Steuben’s life. Baron von Steuben received
correspondence from the Prince long after he arrived in America and through the
end of his days.
15
While serving in the brigade of von Hülson, von Steuben
9
participated in several engagements and minor battles under Prince Henry and
Generalleutnant Graf zu Dohna and then rejoined the main army under the King
for the disastrous Battle of Kunersdorf on 12 August 1759.
The Prussians, worn down from forced marching and thirst, attacked on a
particularly hot August day. Kunersdorf is a small village near Frankfurt on the
Oder. The combined Austrian–Russian Army of 59,500 men sat entrenched on
several hills outside the village. Frederick, though outnumbered by almost
10,000 soldiers, chose to attack. After initial success, Frederick sought a
complete victory by pushing his exhausted soldiers to continue the attack against
the enemy’s positions. The attack quickly bogged down. Key Prussian leaders
were wounded. Casualties mounted among the troops. At a critical moment, the
Austrian cavalry charged the wavering Prussian Infantry. The Prussians,
exhausted from heat, forced marching, and close quarters combat, broke and
fled the field. The demands of the day had been too much for them. The King
attempted to rally his soldiers but to no avail. After the battle, the Prussians
could only count 3,000 soldiers of the original 50,900.
16
Regiment von Lestwitz
was one of the few combat effective units at the end of the day and covered the
withdrawal.
17
In the aftermath of defeat, the indecisiveness of the victorious Austrians
and Russians gave the Prussian Army a chance to re-assemble. Unlike the
French at Rossbach who continued their flight at the first threat, Prussian
commanders reformed their Regiments and the crisis passed. Records indicate
that von Steuben was one of the many wounded at Kunersdorf along with his
brigade commander, General von Hülson. The King did not survive the battle
unscathed; two horses were shot from under him, and his uniform was pierced by
several musket balls. The Prussians lost 18,500, men including 530 officers, 178
guns, and 28 colors and standards compared to 15,500 casualties suffered by
the combined Austrian and Russian armies. In the evening following the battle,
the scattered Prussian Army no longer existed. The Austrians and Russians
mounted no effective pursuit to consummate the victory as the Prussians had
done after Rossbach. The survival of the army, and hence the state, depended
on the training and discipline of the army to re-organize and be prepared to
continue the fight. The ingrained habits of hard training in peacetime and
soldiering under dynamic leadership kept the army alive and thus preserved the
kingdom. Within four days, approximately 30,000 soldiers had reassembled and
were prepared to defend the approaches to Berlin. The opportunity for the
Austrians and Russians to seize the Prussian Capital passed.
18
While the
lessons of victories were important in the development of von Steuben, the hard
lessons of defeat were certainly of equal importance.
In 1761, after serving in the headquarters of the King as a Quartiermeister
Leutnant (operations officer) for a brief period, the now Kapitän von Steuben was
assigned as a general staff officer with the army in East Prussia. In this position,
he was captured when the detachment in which he served surrendered to the
10
Russians at Treptow on the Riga. Von Steuben was one of 80 officers held by
the Russians and sent to St. Petersburg. While he originally went to Russia as a
prisoner of war, his ability to speak Russian and knowledge of Russian culture
became useful to the King of Prussia. Von Steuben’s status changed from
prisoner to emissary on behalf of Frederick the Great because of former’s
abilities and interpersonal skills. Following the death of Czarina Elisabeth, von
Steuben remained in Russia for several months as an attaché of the Prussian
Embassy to the new Czar Peter III in St. Petersburg. The peace treaty between
Frederick the Great and Czar Peter was signed while von Steuben was serving
with the Prussian Embassy although there is no evidence of his direct
involvement. The fact that Frederick held von Steuben in high regard is true.
They corresponded directly with each other during von Steuben’s short service
as an attaché. He returned to service with the Prussian Army at Breslau in
Silesia in May of 1762.
19
On his return from Russia, von Steuben returned to the King’s
headquarters. He served as one of the adjutants to Frederick the Great and was
selected to attend the War Academy (Spezialklasse der Kriegskunst), one of 13
officers selected to attend. This school was the first of its kind, developed and
principally taught by King Frederick himself. The junior adjutant von Steuben
graduated at the top of the class. However, in the wake of attending the class,
von Steuben was implicated in some intrigue by his superior, General Heinrich
Wilhelm von Anhalt. Coincidentally, General von Anhalt also attended the War
Academy. He was reputed to be a brutal man with a reputation of damaging the
careers and reputations of many officers.
20
Frederick even opined that von
Anhalt was a man with no friends in the army.
21
Shortly after the completion of
the course in early 1763, the Seven Year’s War came to a conclusion. The
Prussian Army was reduced to its peacetime establishment. Friedrich Wilhelm
von Steuben left Prussian service within several months of the end of the war.
His last known duty position was as company commander or Kompanie Chef in
the Regiment von Salmuth, but it is unclear whether he assumed those duties.
His last confirmed service in the Prussian Army was as a captain on the staff of
King Frederick II.
With the assistance of Prince Henry of Prussia, von Steuben found
employment with Prince (Furst) Joseph Wilhelm of Hohenzollern-Hechingen as
the High Marshal and Chamberlain (Erzieher). He served the Prince of
Hohenzollern for 12 years followed by service with the Archduke (Markgraf) Carl
Friedrich von Baden-Durlach. It was in the service of Archduke Carl that von
Steuben was awarded the honorary title of Baron (Freiherr).
22
Through various
intermediaries, including some of his old Prussian comrades and French officers,
Baron von Steuben made the acquaintance of the French War Minister, the
Comte (Count) de Saint Germaine. In 1777, Saint Germaine recommended von
Steuben to Benjamin Franklin, who was in Paris on a diplomatic and recruiting
mission on behalf of the American Continental Congress. Benjamin Franklin
was favorably impressed with the former Prussian officer and recommended him
11
to Congress for service with the Continental Army. He went on to become the
first effective Inspector General, and the true organizer and trainer of the soon-to-
be victorious Continental Army.
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben as a Major General and Inspector General of the
Continental Army by Ralph Earl
The wide variety of experiences and the dexterity von Steuben developed
to meet each different challenge gave him a unique set of skills, level of
understanding, and the flexibility needed to serve effectively as drillmaster and
inspector general in the fledgling Continental Army under the leadership of
George Washington. Unlike some of his contemporaries, von Steuben
understood the difference between American soldiers and their European
counterparts, in the same way he learned the difference between leadership in a
line infantry regiment and a Freikorps. He personally conducted training and
wrote a tactical manual appropriate for the Continental soldiers following the
example of the King of Prussia.
23
But perhaps most importantly, he possessed
the tact and interpersonal skills to work with General George Washington, the
existing American commanders, and their soldiers. His legacy is best illustrated
12
in the vast difference in combat efficiency displayed by the Continental Army at
Monmouth, New Jersey on 28 June 1778 from previous engagements. Under
the firm hand of Washington, the Continental Army maneuvered steadily under
fire as effectively as any European soldiers. The Americans had truly become
professionals under the tutelage of Major General Baron von Steuben.
Ultimately, his legacy of service; dedication; and most importantly technical
proficiency resides in today’s IG system; thanks to the experiences von Steuben
gained in the Prussian Army.
End Notes:
1. Weigley, Russell F. The Age of Battles, The Quest for Decisive Warfare from
Breitenfeld to Waterloo, (Bloomington and Indianapolis Indiana, Indiana
University Press, 1991), 121-129.
2. Duffy, Christopher. The Military Life of Frederick the Great, (New York,
Atheneum, 1986), 247.
3. Luvaas, Jay. ed. Frederick the Great on the Art of War, (New York, The Free
Press, 1966), 79-80, 83.
4. Duffy, The Military Life of Frederick the Great, 4.
5. Ibid, 255.
6. Luvaas, 2, 19, 79-81.
7. Guddat, Martin. Grenadiere, Musketiere, Fusiliere, Die Infantrie Friedrich des
Grossen, (Hamburg, Germany, Nikol Verlagsvertretungen Gmbh, 1996), 109.
8. Palmer, John MacAuley. General Von Steuben, (New Haven Connecticut,
Yale University Press, 1937), 34.
9. Familienverbandes von Steuben Web Page
http://www.steuben.de/persoenlichkeiten01.htm
10. Palmer, 36.
11. Duffy, Christopher. Prussia’s Glory, Rossbach and Leuthen 1757, (Chicago
Illinois, The Emperor’s Press, 2003), 74-82, 89-91.
12. Palmer, 36.
13. Guddat, 109.
14. Ibid, 108.
13
15. Palmer, 37.
16. Duffy, The Military Life of Frederick the Great, 183 -189.
17. Palmer, 37.
18. Duffy, The Military Life of Frederick the Great, 191.
19. Palmer, 39-45.
20. Ibid, 47, 49-52.
21. Guddat, 110.
22. Familienverbandes von Steuben.
23. Wright, Robert K., The Continental Army, The Army Lineage Series,
(Washington D.C., Center of Military History, 1983), 142.
Bibliography:
Bergen County Historical Society Web Page
http://www.bergencountyhistory.org/Pages/gnsteuben.html
Clary, David A. and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. The Inspectors General of the
United States Army 1777-1903. Washington D.C.: Office of the Inspector
General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987.
Duffy, Christopher. The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. New York:
Atheneum, 1988.
The Military Life of Frederick the Great. New York: Atheneum, 1986.
Prussia’s Glory, Rossbach and Leuthen 1757. Chicago Illinois: The Emperor’s
Press, 2003.
Familienverbandes von Steuben Web page
http://www.steuben.de/persoenlichkeiten01.htm
Guddat, Martin. Grenadiere, Musketiere, Fusiliere, Die Infantrie Friedrich des
Grossen. Hamburg, Germany: Nikol Verlagsvertretungen, Gmbh, 1996.
Luvaas, Jay. Frederick the Great on the Art of War. New York: The Free Press,
1966.
14
Palmer, John MacAuley. General Von Steuben. New Haven Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1937.
Preussen Web page http://www.preussenweb.de/preussen.htm
Stewart, Richard W. Editor. The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation
1775 – 1917. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2004.
Weigley, Russell F. The Age of Battles, The Quest for Decisive Warfare from
Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1991.
Wright, Robert K. The Continental Army, The Army Lineage Series. Washington
D.C.: Center of Military History, 1983.
