Department of Defense
MANUAL
NUMBER 5200.45
April 2, 2013
Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 15, 2020
USD(I&S)
SUBJECT: Instructions for Developing Security Classification Guides
References: See Enclosure 1
1. PURPOSE. This Manual reissues DoD 5200.1-H (Reference (a)) as a DoD Manual in
accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (b)) and DoD
Instruction (DoDI) 5200.01 (Reference (c)) to provide guidance for the development of security
classification guidance pursuant to section 2.2 of Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 (Reference (d)),
part 2001.15 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (Reference (e)), and DoD Manual
5200.01 (Reference (f)).
2. APPLICABILITY. This Manual applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office
of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field
Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to
collectively as the “DoD Components”).
3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)). The USD(I&S)
shall, in accordance with Reference (c), oversee the DoD Information Security Program, which
includes the development, distribution, maintenance, revision, and cancellation of security
classification guides.
b. Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). OCAs, as required by Reference (f), shall:
(1) Issue and disseminate security classification guidance for each system, plan,
program, project, or mission involving classified information under their jurisdiction.
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(2) Review security classification guidance issued under their authority once every
5 years to ensure currency and accuracy, or sooner when necessitated by significant changes in
policy or in the system, plan, program, project, or mission, and update the guides as required.
(3) Revise, whenever necessary for effective derivative classification, the security
classification guides issued under their authority.
(4) Provide copies of any security classification guides issued under their authority as
required by Enclosure 6 of Volume 1of Reference (f).
(5) Cancel security classification guides when all information the guide specified as
classified has been declassified, or when a new classification guide incorporates the classified
information covered by the old guide and there is no reasonable likelihood that any information
not incorporated by the new guide shall be the subject of derivative classification.
(6) Coordinate, pursuant to part 1045 of title 10, CFR (Reference (g)), with the
Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Classification, through the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Matters (DASD(NM)), whenever they develop or revise security
classification guides with Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) information.
5. PROCEDURES. See Enclosure 2.
6. RELEASABILITY. Cleared for public release. This manual is available on the Directives
Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
7. SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2. This administrative change updates:
a. The title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92 (Reference (h)).
b. Additional organizational changes reflecting direction in statute or Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense direction.
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8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Manual is effective April 2, 2013.
Michael G. Vickers
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Enclosures
1. References
2. Procedures
3. Classifying Specific Types of Information
4. Recommended Format for a Security Classification Guide
Glossary
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ENCLOSURE 1: REFERENCES ...................................................................................................7
ENCLOSURE 2: PROCEDURES ..................................................................................................8
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................8
CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION ...................................................................9
Classification Decisions .......................................................................................................9
When to Declassify ............................................................................................................11
Downgrading......................................................................................................................12
Exemptions ........................................................................................................................12
PLAN OF ACTION FOR WRITING CLASSIFICATION GUIDES .....................................12
Step 1 – Consider Related Current Guidance ....................................................................12
Step 2 – Determine the State-of-the-Art Status .................................................................13
Step 3 – Identify National Advantage ................................................................................13
Step 4 – Make Initial Classification Determination ...........................................................14
Step 5 – Identify Specific Items of Information That Require Classification ...................14
Step 6 – Determine the Duration of Classification ............................................................15
Step 7 – Write the Guide ....................................................................................................16
APPENDIXES
1: ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION PROCESS ...............................................................19
2: CLASSIFICATION FACTORS ...................................................................................20
3: CLASSIFYING DETAILS ...........................................................................................23
4: SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INFORMATION TO CONSIDER ..........................................28
ENCLOSURE 3: CLASSIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION .............................31
CLASSIFYING HARDWARE ITEMS ..................................................................................31
Basic Considerations ..........................................................................................................31
User Considerations ...........................................................................................................32
CLASSIFYING MILITARY OPERATIONS INFORMATION ............................................32
General ...............................................................................................................................32
Military Operations Classification Considerations ............................................................32
CLASSIFYING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION .............................................................33
Intelligence Classification Considerations .........................................................................33
Intelligence Declassification Considerations .....................................................................37
Classification Guide Illustrations .......................................................................................37
CLASSIFYING FOREIGN RELATIONS INFORMATION .................................................38
General ...............................................................................................................................38
Foreign Relations Classification Considerations ...............................................................38
Classification Guide Illustrations .......................................................................................40
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ENCLOSURE 4: RECOMMENDED FORMAT FOR A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
GUIDE .....................................................................................................................................42
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................42
COVER PAGE.........................................................................................................................42
CONTENT ...............................................................................................................................43
APPENDIX
FORMAT VARIATIONS .................................................................................................51
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................52
PART I: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................52
PART II: DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................53
TABLES
1. Performance and Capability Related Data ..........................................................................28
2. Specifications Related Data (Detailed, Basic) ....................................................................29
3. Vulnerability Related Data .................................................................................................29
4. Procurement, Production, and Logistics Related Data .......................................................29
5. Operations Related Data ....................................................................................................30
6. Testing Related Data ...........................................................................................................30
7. Examples of Information Related to Military Operations ..................................................33
8. HUMINT Classification Guidance Example ......................................................................38
9. Example of Classifying Foreign Government Information Involving Foreign Affairs ......41
10. Example of Classifying Foreign Government Information with Military Implications ...41
11. Example of Use of Remarks Column ...............................................................................47
12. Example of Specifications ................................................................................................48
13. Example Showing Classified Administrative Data...........................................................49
14. Example Showing Hardware Classification .....................................................................50
FIGURES
1. Original Classification Process Flow Chart ........................................................................19
2. Classification Factors Flow Chart .......................................................................................21
3. Security Classification Guide Cover Page Format .............................................................43
4. Sample Section 1 – General Instructions ............................................................................44
5. Sample Section 2 – Overall Effort ......................................................................................46
6. Sample Section 3 – Performance and Capabilities .............................................................46
7. Sample Section 4 – Specifications ......................................................................................48
8. Sample Section 5 – Critical Elements .................................................................................48
9. Sample Section 6 – Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses .........................................................49
10. Sample Section 7 – Administrative Data ..........................................................................49
11. Sample Section 8 – Hardware ...........................................................................................50
12. Format Variation 1 ............................................................................................................51
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13. Format Variation 2 ............................................................................................................51
14. Format Variation 3 ............................................................................................................51
15. Format Variation 4 ............................................................................................................51
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ENCLOSURE 1
REFERENCES
(a) DoD 5200.1-H, “Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification
Guidance,” November 1999 (hereby cancelled)
(b) DoD Directive 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
(USD(I&S)),” October 24, 2014, as amended
(c) DoD Instruction 5200.01, “DoD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI),” April 21, 2016, as amended
(d) Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009
(e) Part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations
(f) DoD Manual 5200.01, “DoD Information Security Program,” February 24, 2012, as
amended
(g) Part 1045 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations
(h) Public Law 116-92, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,”
December 20, 2019
(i) DoD Instruction 5230.09, “Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release,”
January 25, 2019
(j) DoD Instruction 8170.01, “Online Information Management and Electronic Messaging,”
January 2, 2019
(k) Sections 2014 and 2162, et seq., of title 42, United States Code (also known as “The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended”)
(l) DoD Instruction 5210.02, “Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data and Formerly
Restricted Data,” June 3, 2011, as amended
(m) DoD Instruction 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents,”
August 23, 2012, as amended
(n) National Security Decision Directive 189, “National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
Technical and Engineering Information,” September 21, 1985
(o) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum,
“Fundamental Research,” May 24, 2010
1
(p) DoD Instruction 5200.39, “Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection Within Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), May 28, 2015, as amended
1
Available from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
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ENCLOSURE 2
PROCEDURES
1. INTRODUCTION
a. Classification management procedures call for the timely issuance of comprehensive
guidance regarding classification of information concerning any system, plan, program, project,
or mission under the jurisdiction of the OCA, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably
could be expected to cause damage to national security. Precise classification guidance is
prerequisite to effective and efficient information security and assures that security resources are
expended to protect only that which truly warrants protection in the interests of national security.
Reference (d) and its implementing guidance, Reference (e), provide general requirements and
standards concerning the issuance of security classification guides while Reference (f) provides
DoD guidance on development, promulgation, distribution, maintenance, and cancellation of
security classification guides.
b. Information is classified, in accordance with guidance in References (d), (e), and (f), to
provide an appropriate level of protection. Therefore, it is essential that a classification guide
identify the specific items of information and the levels of protection required, as well as the
time periods for which protection must be provided.
c. A classification guide will be issued as early as practical in the life cycle of the classified
system, plan, program, project, or mission. The requirements of Reference (f) regarding
classification, declassification, downgrading, marking, and security classification guides should
be reviewed and understood in preparation for writing a security classification guide.
d. DoD information that does not, individually or in compilation, require classification, must
still be reviewed in accordance with DoDI 5230.09 (Reference (i)), prior to any release to the
public. In addition, such information must also be reviewed for compliance with the provisions
of DoDI 8170.01 (Reference (j)), prior to its placement on any publicly accessible Internet site.
Information that does not require classification may nevertheless be exempt from release to the
public or have other restrictions applied when released to other U.S. Government agencies.
e. RD and FRD are unique categories of classified information defined by section 2014 of
title 42, United States Code (U.S.C.) (also known and hereinafter referred to as “The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended” (Reference (k))) and for which program guidance is provided
in Reference (g). Guides containing RD or FRD topics must be coordinated with DOE, through
the DASD(NM); see part 1045.37(c) of Reference (g) and DoDI 5210.02 (Reference (l)) for
further guidance. Note also that RD and FRD are never automatically declassified and such
information must not include declassification instructions (however, see Reference (f) for further
guidance when RD or FRD and national security information (NSI) are co-mingled).
f. Where applicable, guides should be marked with the appropriate distribution statement
required by DoDI 5230.24 (Reference (m)). Additionally, as needed, guides should provide
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direction to users to ensure assignment of the appropriate distribution statement to documents
containing information addressed by the guide’s content. This direction can be provided in
Section 1 of the guide or in the remarks column of the classification table, as appropriate.
2. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION
a. Classification Decisions
(1) Information is classified either originally or derivatively. Original classification
occurs when information is developed that inherently meets the criteria for classification in
accordance with Reference (d), or for nuclear weapon information, in accordance with Reference
(g). Original classification cannot reasonably be derived from a previous classification decision
still in force involving, in substance, the same or closely related information. A security
classification guide is the written record of an original classification decision or series of
decisions regarding a system, plan, program, project, or mission. Derivative classification occurs
when the information already known to be classified is paraphrased, restated, or incorporated in a
new document or form and the newly developed material is marked consistent with the
classification markings that apply to the source information.
(2) Classification may be applied only to information that is owned by, produced by or
for, or is under the control of the U. S. Government. Unclassified information that has been
officially released may not be originally classified. Declassified information that has been
officially released may be reclassified only in very limited cases. For a complete review of those
exceptions see the guidance in References (d), (e), and (f).
(3) Information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the
national security and it pertains to one or more of the categories specified in subsections 1.4(a)
through 1.4(h) of Reference (d):
(a) Military plans, weapon systems, or operations (subsection 1.4(a));
(b) Foreign government information (subsection 1.4(b));
(c) Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods,
or cryptology (subsection 1.4(c));
(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources (subsection 1.4(d));
(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security
(subsection 1.4(e));
(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
(subsection 1.4(f));
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(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects,
plans, or protection services relating to the national security (subsection 1.4(g)); or
(h) The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction (subsection
1.4(h)).
(4) For classification and declassification of nuclear weapon information (i.e., RD and
FRD), see References (g) and (l).
(5) Pursuant to National Security Decision Directive 189 (Reference (n)), fundamental
research not clearly related to the national security shall, to the maximum extent possible, remain
unrestricted. However, when control is required for national security reasons, classification is
the appropriate mechanism. Refer to Reference (n) and Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum (Reference (o)) for additional guidance.
(6) Although information developed by contractors under an independent research and
development (IR&D) effort typically does not qualify for classification, it is possible for
classified information to be generated by IR&D efforts. This may occur when contractors use
properly classified information in their IR&D efforts to explore technological advancements and
state-of-the-art improvements. Information that is generated by or results from an IR&D effort
and is derived from properly classified information requires derivative classification in
accordance with Reference (d). Classification guides developed in accordance with this Manual
can be used by contractors as a source of up-to-date classification guidance for information used
in or generated by their IR&D efforts. Recognition of such use by developers of classification
guides, particularly those addressing leading edge or breakthrough technology, can help to
ensure that information related to national security is consistently protected.
(7) An OCA determines whether specific information should be classified, using the
steps shown in Appendix 1 to this enclosure. These steps may be laid out as a series of
questions, as identified in subparagraphs 2.a.(7)(a) through 2.a.(7)(e). OCAs should review the
following questions throughout the process:
(a) Is the information owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the U. S.
Government? If the answer to this question is no, the information cannot be classified.
(b) Does the information fall within one or more of the categories of information
identified in sections 1.4(a) through 1.4(h) of Reference (d) or, for nuclear information, meet the
criteria in Reference (g)? If the answer to this question is no, the information cannot be
classified. If the answer is yes, then the next question applies.
(c) Is there a reasonable possibility that the information can be protected from
unauthorized disclosure? If the answer is no, the information cannot be classified. If the answer
is yes, then the next question applies.
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(d) Can the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably be expected to
cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security? If the answer is no, the
information cannot be classified. If the answer is yes, then the question in subparagraph
2.a.(7)(e) applies.
(e) What is the level of damage (i.e., damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave
damage) to the national security expected in the event of an unauthorized disclosure of the
information? If the answer to this question is damage, classify the information “Confidential.”
If the answer is serious damage, classify it “Secret.” If the answer is exceptionally grave
damage, classify the information “Top Secret.”
(f) Where there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not
be classified. If there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, the
information shall be classified at the lower level.
b. When to Declassify. The declassification decision determines how long the information
will be protected (i.e., the duration of classification) and is as important as the original
classification determination. Information is to be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the
requirements for classification. When an item of information is originally classified, the OCA
shall establish a specific date or event for declassification of the information based upon its
national security sensitivity. The OCA must specify one of the following options, selecting,
whenever possible, the option that will result in the shortest duration of classification:
(1) A date or independently verifiable event less than 10 years from the date of original
classification.
(2) A date 10 years from the date of original classification.
(3) A date or independently verifiable event greater than 10 and less than 25 years from
the date of original classification.
(4) A date 25 years from the date of original classification.
(5) “50X1-HUM,” designating a duration of up to 75 years, when classifying
information that is clearly and demonstrably expected to reveal the identity of a confidential
human source or a human intelligence (HUMINT) source.
(6) “50X2-WMD,” designating a duration of up to 75 years, when classifying
information that is clearly and demonstrably expected to reveal key design concepts of weapons
of mass destruction.
(7) “25X_” (where “_” is a number 1 through 9) with a date or event, designating a
duration of up to 50 years when classifying information that clearly falls within an exemption
from automatic declassification at 25 years that has previously been approved by the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISACP). See Enclosure 5 of Volume 1 of Reference (f)
for further guidance on use of exemptions before citing this duration.
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c. Downgrading. References (d) and (e) allow OCAs to specify applicable downgrading
instructions at predetermined points in time or when specified events occur. OCAs are
encouraged to use these provisions to specify dates or events for downgrading when the lower
classification level will provide adequate protection.
d. Exemptions. Exemptions from automatic declassification approved in accordance with
References (d), (e), and (f) may be incorporated into classification guides provided the ISCAP is
notified in advance of the intent to take such action and the information remains in active use.
Consult Volume 1 of Reference (f) for further guidance on exemptions and the notification
process.
3. PLAN OF ACTION FOR WRITING CLASSIFICATION GUIDES
a. Step 1 - Consider Related Current Guidance
(1) Before writing a security classification guide, it is necessary to find out what, if any,
classification guidance exists that is applicable to items of information concerning the system,
plan, program, project, or mission for which the new classification guide is being constructed. In
addition to guides for specific efforts or missions, in some fields or subject areas guides that
apply to a broad spectrum of activities, sometimes referred to as “umbrella guides,” have been
issued. Any existing guidance should be considered carefully. Uniformity and consistency in
the exercise of classification authority, especially in the form of a security classification guide,
are essential. Beware of conflicts between the guide being developed and any previously
approved guide(s).
(2) Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) provides an on-line index of most of
the guides issued within DoD. Many of the listed guides are available from DTIC. Always
check the DTIC listing (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/registration/; registration required) but be aware
that some classification guides are deemed too sensitive to be included. In addition, there may
be other classification guides issued along functional lines by activities outside DoD that could
have a bearing on the effort. Seek the advice of those who have knowledge of classification in
the subject area under consideration or in closely related fields. The local information security
manager or information security specialist may also be a valuable source of advice and
assistance. DASD(NM) or the DOE Office of Classification can provide assistance in the
classification of nuclear weapon information. The DoD Special Access Program Central Office
may be able to provide assistance to special access programs. The Acquisition Security
Database (https://asdb.strikenet.navy.smil.mil) is another source that can be consulted for
information on related guidance. The database can be used to identify critical program
information for research, development, and acquisition programs, projects, or systems with
potentially similar technology and information. Additionally, USD(I&S)/Security Directorate
may be able to be of assistance in identifying sensitive classification guides when other sources
have be exhausted; forward requests through the security chain of command.
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(3) Once potentially similar information is identified, follow up as needed to understand
whether the information is the same or different and, if the same, to ensure consistent, horizontal
classification of the information. When there is a conflict in classification guidance between the
guide being developed and a previously approved guide, there is a risk of unauthorized
disclosure. Thus, it is important to understand and resolve such differences. Conflicts shall be
resolved and the resulting guidance approved by the responsible OCAs. In cases where the data
is similar but not the same, include an explanation of the differences in the data and their
classification levels in the guide so that the users can clearly understand those differences and
protect the information appropriately.
b. Step 2 - Determine the State-of-the-Art Status. Reasonable classification determinations
cannot be made in the scientific and technical field without analysis of what has been
accomplished, what is being attempted, and by whom. Use Appendix 3 to help with that
analysis. Make use of scientific and information services. Consult technical and intelligence
specialists. Obtain assistance available from any proper source. Learn about the state of the art,
the state of development, attainment in the field of work, and what is known and openly
published about it, including:
(1) The known or published status (foreign and domestic).
(2) The known but unpublished (possibly classified) status in the United States.
(3) The known but unpublished status in friendly and unfriendly countries.
(4) The extent of foreign knowledge of the unpublished status in the United States.
c. Step 3 - Identify National Advantage. The guide’s subject matter must be reviewed as a
totality. Appendix 2 can also help with that review. Decide what the system, plan, program,
project, or mission does or seeks to accomplish that will result in a net national advantage.
Cover all the benefits, direct and indirect, accruing or expected to accrue to the United States. In
the final analysis, the decision to classify will be related to one or more of the following factors
that produce, directly or indirectly, the actual or expected net national advantage:
(1) Fact of interest by the U.S. Government in the particular effort as a whole or in
specific parts that are being considered or emphasized.
(2) Fact of possession by the United States.
(3) Capabilities of the resulting product in terms of quality, quantity, and location.
(4) Performance, including operational performance, as it relates to capabilities.
(5) Vulnerabilities, weaknesses, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures.
(6) Uniqueness – exclusive U.S. knowledge.
(7) Lead time, related to state of the art.
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(8) Surprise, related to possession and capability to use.
(9) Specifications – may be indicative of goals, aims, or achievements.
(10) Manufacturing technology.
(11) Associations with other data or activities.
d. Step 4 - Make Initial Classification Determination. Conducting the analysis outlined in
paragraphs 3.b. and 3.c. of this section will help identify the net national advantage, and hence,
what requires classification to protect that advantage. Although at this stage of the guide’s
preparation the focus is primarily on information relating to the overall effort, consideration must
be given to some of the more specific information or data that covers performance capabilities
and possible vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Appendix 3 to this enclosure has been designed to
help in that consideration.
(1) Before trying to identify specific items of information that require classification,
some sense of what information about the system, plan, program, project, or mission needs
protection is required. Use an engineering approach or view of the effort to group information
about the effort into large categories and then consider each category in turn. One or more of the
large categories may be able to be eliminated from further consideration with relative ease (i.e.,
none of the information in the category qualifies for or requires classification). A work
breakdown structure or system architecture may help identify the categories. After the large
categories are identified, they can be repetitively broken into smaller and smaller pieces until
specific elements of information are identified.
(2) Additionally, be aware that the information that needs protection may change as a
system, plan, program, project or mission progresses through its life-cycle. What needs to be
classified in the early stages of a system, plan, program, project or mission (e.g., during research
and development) may differ from that which requires classification in other life-cycle phases
(e.g., system development, production, operations or execution). The effort must be regularly
reevaluated to determine which information requires classification and the classification
guidance updated as appropriate.
(3) Once the information that needs to be protected has been identified, do not forget to
look at all the related processes (e.g., manufacturing, logistics, budgeting) to ensure the
information is protected throughout execution of those processes (e.g., do the budget estimates
need to be classified? does shipment of the end-item to certain locations reveal classified data?).
e. Step 5 - Identify Specific Items of Information That Require Classification
(1) The core of a classification guide is the identification of the specific items or
elements of information warranting security protection. Regardless of the size or complexity of
the subject matter of the guide, or the level at which the classification guide is issued, there are
certain identifiable features of the information that create or contribute to actual or expected
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national security advantage. There also may be certain items of information that need to be
protected to prevent or make it more difficult for hostile forces to develop or apply timely and
effective countermeasures. The challenge is to identify and state those special features or critical
items of information and to decide how and why they are related to the net national advantage.
(a) Some additional questions and items of information relating to the identification
of classifiable details are laid out in Appendices 3 and 4 of this enclosure and in Enclosure 3.
(b) Statements or descriptions identifying the items of information to be classified
must be clear and specific so as to minimize the probability of error by those who will use the
classification guide.
(2) Research, development and acquisition projects and programs should consider
critical program information identified in accordance with DoDI 5200.39 (Reference (p)) when
writing the security classification guide to ensure that it is properly protected.
(3) It is also important that the level of classification to be applied to each item of
information identified in the guide be specified precisely and clearly. Broad guidance such as
“U-S,” meaning “Unclassified to Secret,” does not provide sufficient instruction to users of the
guide, unless the exact circumstances under which each level of classification should be applied
are delineated. The exact circumstances must be supplied in amplifying comments, for example,
“Unclassified (U) when X is not revealed; Confidential (C) when X is revealed; Secret (S) when
X and Y are revealed.” Failure to provide such guidance will result in users of the guide
(derivative classifiers) making their own interpretations that may, or may not, be consistent with
the intent. Additionally, failure to provide such guidance may lead to over or under
classification of information, which impacts information sharing and can add additional cost to
the security program or result in inadequate protection or unauthorized disclosure.
(4) Information that has been officially released to the public may not be classified or
reclassified, except in very limited cases; see Reference (f) for detailed guidance. This
restriction does not apply to unauthorized releases, such as “leaks”; such information does not
require reclassification because it remains classified until declassified by the OCA.
f. Step 6 - Determine the Duration of Classification
(1) Equally important to a determination to classify is the decision on how long the
classification should remain in effect. (Remember no determination is required for RD and FRD
as they are not subject to the automatic declassification provisions of Reference (d).) Factors
that may influence this decision include:
(a) At the conceptual stage of a new effort there may be good reason to classify more
information about the effort than will be necessary in later phases. Some information loses its
sensitivity and importance in terms of creating or contributing to the national advantage over
time. Information must continuously be evaluated to determine the need for continued
classification.
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(b) At certain stages in production or deployment, it may not be practical or possible
to protect certain items of information from disclosure. It is also possible that design
improvements may have eliminated exploitable vulnerabilities.
(c) Once a decision is made to release information to the public, it cannot remain
classified.
(2) With these factors in mind, and considering the provisions of paragraph 2.b. of this
enclosure, proceed with the determination of the appropriate declassification instructions for
each item of classified information.
(3) Always consider the possibility of providing for downgrading of the classification
that is assigned. Future downgrading is an option that is always open when information is
originally classified at the “S” or “TS” levels. Consider it carefully in every instance and
provide for downgrading at fixed future points in time or upon a specified event occurring when
the damage that is expected to result from an unauthorized disclosure will be reduced to a level
prescribed for lower classification.
g. Step 7 - Write the Guide. Once the specific items of information that warrant security
classification have been identified, it is finally time to start writing the security classification
guide. Use clear, precise language and statements to describe which items of information require
classification.
(1) While there is no mandatory DoD-wide format for security classification guides, first
consider using the format described in Enclosure 4 of this Manual.
(2) Security classification guides should be issued as documents within the OSD or DoD
Component policy or regulatory structure (e.g., instructions, manuals, regulations) only in
exceptional cases. Typically, the issuing office coordinates the guide with other subject matter
experts and potential users prior to approval by the OCA and promulgation by the issuing office.
This process facilitates timely update of the guide, as required by References (d) and (e).
(3) Comply with these administrative requirements:
(a) Place the most significant words of the guide’s title first, for example, “FA-5B
Aircraft Security Classification Guide.”
(b) Identify the OCA who personally approved the guide in writing and has program
or supervisory responsibility over the information addressed in the guide as well as the office of
primary responsibility (OPR) that can be contacted for clarification or additional information.
(c) Specify, clearly and concisely, the reason(s) for classification, the level of
classification, and a declassification instruction(s) for each item to be classified. A table format
is recommended for identifying this information as well as any downgrading instructions and
other needed comments and instructions. While the format used throughout this Manual is the
recommended format, the format can vary for clarity or to best suit the needs of the system, plan,
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program, project, or mission. The Appendix to Enclosure 4 of this Manual illustrates some
format variations.
(d) Classify the guide if required by its contents. If the guide does not require
classification, it must be marked and protected as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).
Security classification guides shall not be released to the public.
(4) Ensure that the security classification guide:
(a) Precisely states the specific information elements to be protected. Use clear,
precise language or statements to describe which items of information require classification. It is
also advisable to include items that are designated as controlled unclassified information (CUI)
(e.g., FOUO) or that are unclassified, when that will assure users of the guide that this
information is, in fact, CUI or unclassified and was not inadvertently omitted.
(b) Identifies the classification levels (“TS,” “S,” or “C”) and any additional
dissemination control marking or special handling caveats such as RD, FRD, Releasable To
(REL TO), or Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN), that may apply to each element
of information. When it will serve a useful purpose or reassure the user, specify that the
information is “U” (Unclassified) or cite the specific CUI control (such as FOUO).
(c) Identifies the reason for classification, using the number of the applicable
subsection of section 1.4 of Reference (d).
(d) Specifies the duration of classification for each element of information, except for
information that qualifies as RD or FRD. As RD and FRD are not subject to the automatic
declassification requirements of Reference (d), no declassification instruction should be entered
for RD or FRD information unless co-mingled with NSI. Alternatively, when not co-mingled
with NSI, “Excluded from automatic downgrading/declassification” may be cited in the
“Declassify On” column for clarity. When co-mingled, see Volume 2 of Reference (f) for further
guidance.
(e) States any downgrading action that is to occur, and when such action is to take
place (date or event).
(f) Includes amplifying comments whenever appropriate to explain the exact
application of classification.
(5) Provide any additional guidance required for effective use of the guide. Use the general
instructions in section 1 of the guide to address general topics (e.g., foreign disclosure
considerations, public affairs guidance, dissemination, and reproduction information) that
provide overall guidance for the users.
Appendixes
1. Original Classification Process
2. Classification Factors
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3. Classifying Details
4. Specific Items of Information to Consider
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APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE 2
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
Figure 1. Original Classification Process Flow Chart
Questions to Answer:
NO
YES
Is there a reasonable
disclosure?
possibility that the information can
be protected from unauthorized
YES
NO
fall within one or more of the
categories in Section 1.4 of
E.O. 13526?
Does the information
YES
cause damage to the national
information reasonably be expected to
Can the
unauthorized disclosure of the
security?
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
Is the information
owned by, produced
by or for, or under the control of,
the U.S. Government?
guidance already exist for the
Does applicable classification
subject area of interest?
The information does not
qualify for classification.
Actions to Take:
already
Use existing classification guidance.
Describe the damage that would be
caused by unauthorized disclosure.
already
Use existing classification guidance.
Assign a level of classification
based on the degree of damage.
already
Use
existing classification guidance.
Determine the duration of
classification, including
downgrading instructions.
already
Use existing classification guidance.
The OCA resolves classification
conflicts as needed, and documents
and communicates the decision in
written classification guidance.
YES
jurisdiction over the information?
Classification Authority and
you have Original
Do
Use existing classification
guidance.
You are not authorized to
classify the information.
Identify and contact the
OCA with jurisdiction over
the information.
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APPENDIX 2 TO ENCLOSURE 2
CLASSIFICATION FACTORS
The questions, answers, and follow-up actions shown in Figure 2 are provided to assist in
systematically determining whether certain broad aspects of an effort warrant security
classification. Users are cautioned that the outcomes specified in the flow chart are not absolute;
judgment must be applied in all cases. Additionally, when using Figure 2 it may be necessary to
consider the questions for both the overall effort and, at a high level, for the individual
technologies used. For example, the fact that a new weapon system (the overall effort) is being
developed may be public knowledge and therefore not classifiable, but aspects of specific
technologies used in the weapon system may warrant protection and, therefore, be classifiable.
If the resulting determination is that the information is classifiable, see Appendix 3 to Enclosure
2 for guidance on determining which specific details of the effort warrant classification.
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Figure 2. Classification Factors Flow Chart
Probably not classifiable unless
effort represents a significant
breakthrough.
Determine whether the name or title, standing alone, reveals
information that would damage national security, and if so the
degree of damage.
NO
YES
1. Is the effort a new generation, a development,
or a modification of an existing unclassified
program, plan, project, system or item?
NO
YES
Determine what information would reveal the degree of
attainment by the United States in the particular field, and how
that would be of value to a foreign interest in planning actions
detrimental to national security.
Probably not classifiable.
YES
3. Is the exact extent of U.S. interest or activity
publicly known or reasonably surmised from
openly available information?
NO
Determine what information would reveal or confirm the fact of U.S.
Government interest or activity in the effort, and how and at what
level unauthorized disclosure would damage national security.
Probably not classifiable.
2. Is it known publicly or reasonably presumed
known that the United States is interested or
involved in this kind of effort
?
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Figure 2. Classification Factors Flow Chart, Continued
Classifiable. The level of
classification would be based on
the degree of damage to national
security.
7. Would the fact of U.S. interest or
accomplishment in the area:
7.a. Spur foreign interests in a similar effort that
would be detrimental to the United States?
7.b. Spur foreign interests to develop counter-
measures which could diminish U.S. advantage?
7. c. Spur foreign interests in or political action
against the United States or an ally?
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
7.d. Provide foreign interests with propaganda
capable of damaging U.S. national security?
Not Classifiable.
7.f. Indicate to foreign interests a lag or failure by
the United States to pursue or attain a necessary or
expected competence in a particular field related to
national security?
YES
NO
6. Would unauthorized knowledge of the overall
effort, or of its magnitude or mere fact, have
detrimental effect on U.S. national security?
Classifiable. The level of
classification would be based on
the degree of damage to national
security.
NO
Not Classifiable.
YES
NO
7.e. Eliminate or significantly diminish required
lead time or a valuable element of surprise related to
national security?
YES
Determine what information would reveal the purpose, goal, or
mission of the effort that would cause actual damage.
NO
Probably not classifiable.
4. Is the reason for U.S. interest known publicly
or reasonably surmised from openly available
information?
YES
5. Would unauthorized knowledge of U.S. interest or
activity in this effort or confirmation of openly
available information cause or worsen foreign
political, economic, or military activities or degrade
national security capabilities?
Classifiable. The level of
classification would be based on
the degree of damage to national
security.
Not Classifiable.
NO
YES
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APPENDIX 3 TO ENCLOSURE 2
CLASSIFYING DETAILS
1. OVERVIEW. Having considered the factors involved in making classification
determinations concerning the overall effort, the next step is to consider the classification of
certain specific details of the effort. While the questions in sections 2 – 11 of this appendix are
not presented in any order of priority, providing answers to them will help to systematically
bound and refine the scope of the analysis needed to determine which items warrant protection
through security classification. When doing the analysis, also consider the items listed in Tables
1 – 5 in Appendix 4 to Enclosure 2; they may help to identify specific details that should be
addressed.
2. PERFORMANCE OR CAPABILITY
a. What will this do (actual or planned) that is better, faster, or cheaper (in terms of all types
of resources) than anything like it?
b. How does this degree or kind of performance contribute to or create a national security
advantage? How much of an advantage?
c. How long can this data be protected? What is the advantage?
d. How would knowledge of these performance details help an enemy or damage the success
of the effort?
e. Would statement of a particular degree of attained performance or capability be of value
to hostile intelligence in assessing U.S. capabilities? Would such a statement spur a foreign
nation to similar effort, or to develop or plan countermeasures?
f. What, if any, counterintelligence implication does system performance have? Is the
performance measure of a system something that should be made known as a show of force or
should it be protected so as to not reveal system weaknesses?
3. UNIQUENESS
a. What information pertaining to this effort is known or believed to be the exclusive
knowledge of the United States?
b. Is it known or reasonable to believe that other nations have achieved a comparable degree
of success or attainment?
c. What information, if disclosed, would result in or assist other nations in developing a
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similar item or arriving at a similar level of achievement?
d. In what way or ways does the uniqueness of this item contribute to a national security
advantage?
e. In what way or ways has the end product of this effort or any of its parts been modified,
developed, or applied so as to be unique to this kind of effort? How unique is this?
f. Is the method of adaptation or application of the end product or any of its parts the source
of the uniqueness and a national security advantage? In what way or ways? Is it in itself a
unique adaptation of application in this kind of effort?
4. TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD TIME
a. How long did it take to reach this level of performance or achievement?
b. How much time and effort have been expended? Was this a special concerted effort or
only a gradual developmental type of activity?
c. If all or some of the details involved in reaching this stage of development or achievement
were known, how much sooner could this goal have been reached? Which details would
contribute materially to a shortening of the time for reaching this goal? Can these details be
protected? For how long?
d. Have other nations reached this level of development or achievement?
e. Do other nations know how far the United States has advanced in this kind of effort?
f. Would knowledge of this degree of development or achievement spur a foreign nation to
accelerate its efforts to diminish our lead in this field? What details of knowledge would be
likely to cause such acceleration?
g. How important, in terms of anticipated results, is the lead-time gained?
h. What national security advantage actually results from this lead-time?
i. How long is it practical to believe that this lead-time will represent an actual advantage?
j. How long is it practical to expect to be able to protect this lead-time?
5. SURPRISE
a. Do other nations know about this level of development or achievement?
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b. Will operational use of the end item of this effort give the U.S. an immediate advantage
that would be less or lost if the achievement of this particular goal were known?
c. What is the nature of the advantage resulting from surprise use of this end item?
d. When will this element of surprise be lost?
6. VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES
a. What are the weak spots in this effort that make it vulnerable to failure? What is the rate
or effect of this failure?
b. How will the failure of the effort in whole or in part affect the national security advantage
expected upon completion of this effort, or use of the resulting end item?
c. What elements of this effort are subject to countermeasures?
d. How would knowledge of these vulnerable elements assist in planning or carrying out
countermeasures?
e. Can information concerning these weak or vulnerable elements be protected from
unauthorized disclosure or are they inherent in the system?
f. Can these weaknesses or vulnerabilities be exploited to reduce or defeat the success of
this effort? How could this be done?
g. Are the counter-countermeasures obvious, special, unique, unknown to outsiders or other
nations?
h. How would knowledge of these counter-countermeasures assist in carrying out or
planning new countering efforts?
i. Would knowledge of specific performance capabilities assist in developing or applying
specific countermeasures? How? What would be the effect on the expected national security
advantage?
7. SPECIFICATIONS
a. What would details of specification reveal?
(1) A special or unusual interest that contributes to the resulting or expected national
security advantage?
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(2) Special or unique compositions that contribute to the resulting or expected national
security advantage?
(3) Special or unique levels of performance that are indicative of a classifiable level of
achievement or goal?
(4) Special or unique use of certain materials that reveals or suggests the source of a
national security advantage?
(5) Special or unique size, weight, or shape that contributes to the resulting or expected
national security advantage?
b. Are any specification details contributory to the resulting or expected national security
advantage? How?
c. Can details of specifications be protected? For how long?
8. CRITICAL ELEMENTS
a. What are the things that really make this effort work?
b. Which of these critical elements contribute to the resulting or expected national security
advantage? How? To what extent?
c. Are these critical elements the source of weakness or vulnerability to countermeasures?
d. What details of information pertaining to these critical elements disclose or reveal the
national security advantage, weakness or vulnerability?
e. Can details of information pertaining to these critical elements be protected by
classification? For how long?
9. MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY
a. What manufacturing methods, techniques, or modes of operation were developed to meet
the requirements of this effort?
b. Which of these manufacturing innovations are unique to this effort or this product? Are
they generally known or suspected?
c. Are these manufacturing innovations essential to successful production of the product?
d. What kind of lead-time results from these innovations?
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10. ASSOCIATIONS
a. Are there any associations between this effort and others that raise classification
questions?
b. Are there associations between information in this effort and already publicly available
(unclassified) information that raise classification problems?
c. Are there associations with specific personnel, commands, companies, or other programs
that are sensitive and should be protected or that may reveal classified information?
d. Is it necessary or possible to classify items of information in this effort because their
association with other unclassified or classified information would diminish or result in the loss
of a national security advantage?
11. PROTECTABILITY
a. Is it possible to effectively protect the information from unauthorized disclosure by
classifying it? For how long?
b. What alternative means can be used to ensure protection from unauthorized disclosure?
Are they as effective as classification?
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APPENDIX 4 TO ENCLOSURE 2
SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INFORMATION TO CONSIDER
Tables 1 through 6 present categories of data and lists of items of information that could disclose
present or future strategic or tactical capabilities and vulnerabilities and that should be
considered when preparing classification guidance. The items are listed alphabetically within
each table and are intended to help the user identify specific items of information that qualify for
and warrant protection by classification.
Table 1. Performance and Capability Related Data
Accuracy
Alert time
Altitude
Maximum
Optimum
Ballistics
Initial
Terminal
Con
trol
Countermeasures (proven,
unproven)
Counter-countermeasures
Decoys
Electronic
Penetration aids
Shield materials
Depth/height (also of burst)
Maximum
Opt
imum
Duration (flight)
Effectiveness
Frequencies (bands, specific,
command, operating, infrared,
microwave, radio,
communications security
(COMSEC))
Heating
Impulse
Intercept
Lethality/critical effects
Lift
Limitations
Maneuverability
Military strength
Actual
Pl
anned, predicted,
anticipated
Miss distance
Noise figure
Operational readiness time cycle
Payload
Penetration
Range (range scales)
Rate of fire
Reaction time
Reliability/failure rate data
Resolution
Sensitivity
Sequence of events
Signature characteristics
Acceptance
Ana
lysis
Distinguishment
Identification
Speed/velocity
Acceleration/deceleration
Cruise
Intercept
Landing
Maximum
Minimum
Optimum
Stability
Target data
Details
Identification
Illumination
Impact predicted
Preliminary
Priority
Range determination
Thresholds
Thrust
Toxicity
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Table 2. Specifications Related Data (Detailed, Basic)
Balance
Burn rate
Capacity (system)
Center of gravity
Codes
Composition
Configuration/contour
Consumption
Energy requirements
Specific
Total
Filter
Fineness
Grain configuration
Hardness, degree
Input data
Loading/loads
Mass factor (propellant)
Moment of inertia
On-station time
Output data
Payload
Power requirements
Purity
Size, weight, shape
Stability (static, dynamic)
Strength of members, frames
Stress
Thickness
Type
Table 3. Vulnerability Related Data
Countermeasures/counter-
countermeasures
Dynamic pressure (supersonic)
Electromagnetic pulse (radiation)
Ground or air shock
Jamming
Signature characteristics
Ac
oustic
Electrical
Infrared
Magnetic
Pressure
Radar
Static overpressure
Table 4. Procurement, Production, and Logistics Related Data
Completion date or dates
Numbers
Dispersion (numbers per unit of force)
On-hand stockpile
Planned or programmed (total
scheduled)
Rate of delivery or production
Requirements
Spares
Progress/schedules (milestones)
Stock density
Supply plans and status
Tactical deployment
Timelines
Logistical resupply
Maintenance and repair cycle
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Table 5. Operations Related Data
Countdown time
Deployment data
Environment
Location
Numbers available
Objectives
Mission or program
Specific or general
Test, broad or detailed
Plans
Command and control
(including reaction time)
Results
Analysis, conclusions,
reports
Sequence of events
Staging techniques
Statement/concept
Tactical
Build-up
Units per force
Activation and capability dates
Personnel
Table 6. Testing Related Data
Dates
Location
Objectives
General
Specific
Output (raw; analyzed)
Plans
Required equipment or
personnel
Results
Analysis, conclusions,
reports
Schedule
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ENCLOSURE 3
CLASSIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION
1. CLASSIFYING HARDWARE ITEMS
a. Basic Considerations. An item of hardware may convey information that is as sensitive as
the words printed upon a piece of paper. Hardware items may be classified if they reveal
information or information can be obtained from them. Some basic considerations are:
(1) An item of hardware does not necessarily need to be classified simply because it is
part of a classified product or effort.
(2) Unclassified off-the-shelf items, unless modified in some particular way to make
them perform differently, can never be classified even though they constitute a critical element,
become an integral part of a classified end product, or produce a properly classified effect.
However, the association of otherwise unclassified hardware with a particular effort or product
may reveal something classified about that effort or product. Common integrated circuits that
control frequencies are notable examples. In such cases, it is the association with the effort or
product that reveals the classified information, not the circuits themselves. Decisions regarding
what aspect of the system to classify may be difficult but are necessary to delineate for users of
the guide what information requires protection.
(3) Frequently, classified information pertaining to a hardware item can be restricted to
the documentation associated with the item.
(4) Unusual, unique, or peculiar uses or modifications of ordinarily available unclassified
materials or hardware may create a classifiable item of information. In another instance, just
using a particular material in a particular effort might reveal a classifiable research or
development interest. In such cases, it is especially important to accurately identify the classified
information to determine whether it is the hardware or material that reveals classified
information or the association of uses of the hardware with a particular effort that reveals such
information.
(5) At some stage in a production effort, production and engineering plans are drawn.
Usually a family-tree type diagram is prepared to assist in determining what components, parts,
and materials will be required. This diagram provides a good basis for determining where and
when classified information will be involved in the production effort.
(6) Another usual step in production engineering is the development of drawings for all
the individual elements that go into the final product. These drawings show design data,
functions, and specifications, all of which are closely tied with items of information that may be
classified. From these drawings it is possible to determine exactly which elements of the final
product will reveal classified information. It is also possible to determine associations that may
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reveal classified information. This is a prime opportunity to identify and isolate classification
requirements.
b. User Considerations. Pay attention to who will be using the classification guide.
(1) Usually management and staff supervisory personnel need to have a fairly broad
knowledge of classification requirements. Farther down the line, however, foremen and workers
usually need to know only which hardware items are classified, the appropriate levels of
classification, and which items are unclassified. Therefore, as soon as possible in the production
planning process, make a listing of all classified hardware items according to part number or
other identifier, and when necessary for understanding, a listing of unclassified items. Such a
listing will be valuable to procurement and logistics (e.g., shipping, handling, and storage)
personnel. The listing should preferably be unclassified and should be reviewed carefully to
ensure that the listing itself does not reveal classified information.
(2) When planning a production line, careful attention is needed to delay as long as
possible the insertion of classified hardware items.
(3) Test equipment rarely embodies classified information. When such equipment is
used to test tolerances, specifications, performance, and other details that are classified, the
equipment would still be unclassified unless it was calibrated or set in such a way as to reveal the
classified information pertaining to the item being tested. This is one example of a situation
where it may be possible to limit the classified information to the documentation involved and to
the test operator’s personal knowledge, precluding the necessity for classifying the test
equipment itself.
2. CLASSIFYING MILITARY OPERATIONS INFORMATION
a. General. The security classification of military operations information (defined in the
Glossary) is subject to the considerations described in Enclosure 2 and its appendices. While
there are no hard and fast rules for the classification of military operations information and while
each Military Service and Combatant Command may require a unique approach to operations
security (OPSEC), there are basic concepts that can be applied.
b. Military Operations Classification Considerations
(1) Successful military operations depend largely upon the DoD’s ability to assess
correctly the capability and intention of enemy forces at each stage of the operation while
concealing its own capabilities and intentions, and to communicate effective battle plans and
orders throughout our forces. Classifiable information may include:
(a) The number, type, location, and strengths of opposing units.
(b) The capabilities and vulnerabilities of weapons in enemy hands, and how the
enemy normally applies the weapons.
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(c) The morale and physical condition of the enemy force.
(2) In considering classification guidance for military operations, there may be good
reason to classify more information about the operations in the beginning than will be necessary
later. Certain elements of information such as troop movements may no longer require the same
level of protection after a certain date or event. When this point is reached, downgrading or
declassification should be pursued.
(3) Table 7 provides examples of information relating to military operations that may
warrant classification. Actual durations must be specified as required by Reference (f) and
summarized in paragraph 2.b of Enclosure 2 of this Manual.
Table 7. Examples of Information Related to Military Operations
DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Overall operational plans 1.4(a) Date or event within 25
years
2. System operational deployment or
employment
1.4(a) Declassify upon
completion of deployment
or employment
3. Initial operational capability (IOC)
date
1.4(a) Declassify upon
attainment of IOC date
4. Planned location of operational units 1.4(a) Declassify upon arrival on
site
5. Equipage dates, readiness dates,
operational employment dates
1.4(a) Declassify upon
attainment of the
milestone events
6. Total manpower or personnel
requirements for total operational force
1.4(a) Declassify upon
completion of operation
7. Coordinates of selected operational
sites
1.4(a) Declassify upon site
termination
Downgrade to “C”
after site
activation
8. Specific operational performance
data that relates to the effectiveness of
the control of forces and data on
specific vulnerabilities and weaknesses
1.4(a) Date or event within 25
years
9. Existing OPSEC and COMSEC
measures
1.4(a) Date or event within 25
years
10. Target characteristics 1.4(a) Date or event within 25
years
3. CLASSIFYING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
a. Intelligence Classification Considerations. Producers of intelligence must avoid over
classification and be wary of applying so much security that they are unable to provide a useful
product to their consumers. An intelligence product should be classified only when its disclosure
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could reasonably be expected to cause some degree of damage to national security.
Subparagraphs 3.a.(1) through 3.a.(10) lists some basic considerations, but they are not all-
inclusive.
(1) In general, resource information should not be classified unless it reveals some aspect
of the intelligence mission, and its revelation would jeopardize the effectiveness of a particular
function. An example of classifiable resource information is the intelligence contingency fund.
(2) Intelligence concerning foreign weapons systems is typically classified based on
what is generally known about a particular system or its components. Normally, the less that is
known publicly about a particular system or component the higher its level of classification.
(3) Intelligence identifying a sensitive source or method should always be classified, as
should be the evaluation of the particular source or method.
(4) Intelligence that does not identify or reveal a sensitive source or method is usually
not classified unless the information contains other classified information such as intelligence
activities including intelligence plans, policies, or operations.
(5) Intelligence that reveals the identity of a conventional source or method normally
does not require classification. However, if the information is communicated to the DoD by a
foreign government, whether under a formal government-to-government agreement or simply
with the understanding that the information is provided in confidence, the information must be
protected at the level and for the length of time agreed to by the U.S. Government and the
foreign government. If the information is obtained from a foreign government without any
agreement or restrictions, the classification, if any, should be based solely on the content of the
information provided.
(6) Intelligence that reveals known and possible enemy capabilities to collect and exploit
information from a given or similar operation should be classified. This would include enemy
intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, efforts, and successes.
(7) An intelligence estimate is normally classified since it is likely to contain sensitive
sources or methods, and/or raw or evaluated intelligence.
(8) An intelligence requirement should be classified when it reveals what is not known,
what is necessary to know, and why. Moreover, the requirement may recommend a sensitive
source or method, other military intelligence required, or contain technical and operational
characteristics of classified weapons systems.
(9) The classification of relationships with foreign intelligence organizations is related to
the considerations in subparagraphs 3.a.(9)(a) through 3.a.(9)(d):
(a) Normally, the fact of broad, U.S. general intelligence cooperation with foreign
countries or groups of countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances
or agreements (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) is not classified.
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(b) The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific
governmental component in an allied country or general description of the nature of intelligence
cooperation between the United States and any allied country may be classified. The fact of
ongoing intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically named countries or
their governmental components with which the United States is not allied should always be
classified. Such classification is applied to U. S. intelligence activities pursuant to subsections
1.4(c) and (d) of Reference (d) to preclude the harm to national security that would clearly result
should the cooperation be revealed through unauthorized disclosure.
(c) Details of any intelligence exchange agreements should also be classified.
Additionally, the fact of the mere existence of such an agreement should be classified in
accordance with paragraph 3.a.(9)(b), as the agreement is evidence of on-going intelligence
cooperation.
(d) The identities of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide
intelligence under such agreements or liaison relationships may be classified in accordance with
the instructions of the foreign government or in the national security interest of the United States.
(10) Defense users must respect security classification assigned to intelligence received
from non-Defense sources. Original classification authorities within the Intelligence Community
normally consider information in the categories listed in subparagraphs 3.a.(10)(a) through
3.a.(10)(ae) to be classified. The level of classification depends upon the degree of identifiable
harm to national security that would reasonably be expected to occur from unauthorized
disclosure.
(a) Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods),
cryptographic information, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, electronics intelligence,
telemetry intelligence, and electronic warfare.
(b) Counterintelligence. Information that reveals counterintelligence activities,
investigations, or operations, identities of undercover personnel or units, methods of operations,
and analytical techniques for the interpretation of intelligence data is classified.
(c) Intelligence special access programs.
(d) Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources, or methods.
(e) Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover, or revelation of a
cover arrangement.
(f) Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information that would
divulge intelligence sources or methods.
(g) Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence
activities.
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(h) Intelligence organizational structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and
budget.
(i) Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent of
knowledge on a subject.
(j) Training provided to or by an intelligence organization that would indicate its
capability or identify personnel.
(k) Intelligence personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation
policies.
(l) Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action
against the United States or its allies.
(m) Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign policy.
(n) Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or international
security negotiations.
(o) Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting
national security.
(p) Non-attributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.
(q) U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect relations with
the country.
(r) Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign governments.
(s) Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign country
threatening American lives and installations.
(t) Information divulging U.S. intelligence and assessment capabilities.
(u) Defense plans and capabilities of the United States and its allies that could enable
a foreign entity to develop countermeasures.
(v) Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment.
(w) Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the United
States to achieve or maintain a significant national advantage in the area of national security.
(x) Information on technical systems for collection and production of intelligence.
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(y) U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
(z) Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.
(aa) Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and expertise of an
intelligence organization.
(ab) Information that could place an individual in jeopardy.
(ac) Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals, reagents,
developing, microdots, or steganography.
(ad) U.S. military space programs.
(ae) U.S. cyber capabilities.
(af) Information on weapons of mass destruction, whether U.S. or foreign.
b. Intelligence Declassification Considerations. Normally intelligence will remain classified
for a longer duration than other types of classified information, but still only as long as is
necessary to protect a certain source or method. The guidance for determining the duration of
classification in paragraphs 2.b and 3.f of Enclosure 2 is applicable to all information, including
intelligence.
c. Classification Guide Illustrations. The considerations for classifying details (see
Appendixes 3 and 4 to Enclosure 2) and recommended format for a security classification guide
(see Enclosure 4) are applicable to the development of an intelligence security classification
guide. In addition, Table 8 is provided as an example of security classification guidance that
might be applied to a HUMINT effort. Notice that the conditions upon which each classification
within a range of classification applies must be differentiated as discussed in Enclosure 2,
paragraph 3.e.(2). Care should also be taken to differentiate between a range of classification
(e.g., “C - TS” meaning Confidential through Top Secret) and alternative classifications (e.g.,
“C, TS” meaning Confidential or Top Secret). In every case, it is imperative that criteria for
each of the differing levels be included in the Remarks column. For example, “C if xxx,” “S
when yyy.”
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Table 8. HUMINT Classification Guidance Example
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Biographic information taken
exclusively from open source, where
no intelligence connection is shown
U not
applicable
(N/A)
N/A
2. Positive identification of an
individual as source to a U.S.
intelligence agency
S – TS 1.4(c) 50X1-HUM “S” if identified as a
potential source
“TS” if identified as an
actual source
3. Identity of a target installation C, TS 1.4(c) 25 years from
origination
“C” when not linked to
a specific collection
operation
“TS” when linked to a
specific collection
operation
4. Identity of a target personality S – TS 1.4(c) 50X1-HUM “S” when not linked to
a specific collection
operation
“TS” when linked to an
actual source or specific
collection operation
5. Interest in specific events for
collection exploitation, including
specific areas of technology
S 1.4(c) 25 years from
origination
6. Names of collection agency case
officers in conjunction with a specific
collection operation
C 1.4(c) 25 years from
origination
7. Information on collection agency
HUMINT policy plans, plans,
methods, or accomplishments
S 1.4(c) 25 years from
origination
50X1-HUM if
information can clearly
and demonstrably be
expected to reveal
identity of confidential
human source or
HUMINT source
4. CLASSIFYING FOREIGN RELATIONS INFORMATION
a. General. The Department of State is the agency primarily responsible for the
development and execution of the foreign policy of the United States, and thus is also the
primary agency responsible for the security classification of foreign relations information. Most
DoD classification determinations in the area of foreign relations will be derivative in nature.
However, there will be instances where DoD projects and programs involve foreign relations
information for which security classification guidance must be developed.
b. Foreign Relations Classification Considerations. Examples of the types of information or
material involving foreign relations that warrant classification consideration include:
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(1) All information or material recommending or revealing U.S. Government positions
or options in a negotiation with a foreign government or group of governments, or comments on
the merits of foreign government positions in such negotiations.
(2) All information or material that comments on the quality, character, or attitude of a
serving foreign government official, whether elected or appointed, and regardless of whether the
comment is favorable or critical. Illustrations of the types of information covered in this
category are records revealing:
(a) A foreign official speaking in a highly critical manner of his own government’s
policy.
(b) A foreign official suggesting how pressure might effectively be brought to bear
on another part of his own government.
(c) A foreign official acting in unusually close concert with U.S. officials where
public knowledge of this might be harmful to that foreign official.
(d) A foreign official whose professional advancement would be beneficial to U.S.
interest, especially if any implication has been made of U.S. efforts to further his advancement,
or if public knowledge of this might place the person or his career in jeopardy.
(3) All unpublished adverse comments by U.S. officials on the competence, character,
attitudes, or activities of a serving foreign government official.
(4) All material that constitutes or reveals unpublished correspondence between heads of
state or heads of government.
(5) Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not defend, identifiable areas, in any foreign
country or region.
(6) Statements of U.S. intent to militarily attack identifiable areas in any foreign country
or region.
(7) Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations such
as NATO.
(8) Agreements with foreign countries to use, or have access to, military facilities.
(9) Contingency plans as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory,
or airspace; or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(10) DoD surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or using in contingencies.
(11) Statements relating to any use of foreign bases not authorized under bilateral
agreements.
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(12) Information concerning relationships with foreign intelligence organizations or
related to foreign collection activities (see also section 3 of this enclosure which addresses
intelligence classification considerations).
c. Classification Guide Illustrations. The discussion on classifying details in Appendix 3 to
Enclosure 2 and the recommended format for a security classification guide in Enclosure 4 of
this Manual are applicable to DoD development of a foreign relations security classification
guide. Subparagraphs 4.c.(1) through 4.c.(3) provide examples of the impact that foreign
government information might have on the development of classification guidance.
(1) A DoD Component is involved in negotiating an arrangement with country “X.” In
the process of the negotiations, the foreign counterpart states that his country does not want
discussion on the subject to become public knowledge. At the same time, the foreign official
makes it clear that his country has announced publicly its intention to seek U.S. views on the
subject of the discussions. The nature of business being discussed is such that the United States
would not require the fact of the discussions be protected from public disclosure. Moreover, the
subject matter is one that would not ordinarily be classified. The DoD Component, however,
does classify the notes and transcripts pertaining to the discussion because of the expressed
wishes of the foreign government. The information fits the description of foreign government
information. Thus, a classification guide on the subject might contain topics as shown in Table 8
of this enclosure. Remember that use of an exemption (25X1 through 25X9) for the duration of
classification as shown in this example requires ISCAP approval prior to use and citation of a
declassification date or event (see Enclosure 2, paragraph 2.b for further guidance).
(2) The scenario in paragraph 4.c.(1) and in Table 9 illustrates a brief classification guide
involving the foreign relations of the United States as well as foreign government information.
The guide could not have been written before negotiations were underway because the foreign
official only made the two critical elements of information known during the negotiations. A
classification guide such as this one, brief as it is, can serve a very useful purpose when, for
example, it is anticipated that the negotiations will involve a large number of personnel from
several U.S. agencies and will last several years.
(3) Note that, when previously approved by the ISCAP, exemption 25X9 with a
declassification date or event could also be cited for the duration if declassification would violate
a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit the automatic or unilateral
declassification of information at 25 years. Identify the specific statute, treaty or international
agreement in the declassification instructions.
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Table 9. Example of Classifying Foreign Government Information Involving Foreign Affairs
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Apple orchard negotiations
with country “X”
U N/A N/A Mere fact of
negotiations only;
elaboration may be
classified, see next
topic
2. Transcripts of apple orchard
negotiations and substantive notes
pertaining to them
C 1.4(b),
1.4(d)
25X6, upon receipt of
official approval by
country “X” and Dept
of State
Requires consultation
with foreign
government
(4) To illustrate a scenario with military implications, presume that two countries in
Europe have secretly granted the United States permission to fly over their territory, but only at
high (equal or greater than 50,000 feet) altitudes. One of the countries (“Y”) indicated that
serious damage would occur to relations if the information became public while the other (“Z”)
indicated that it did not want the information to be in the public domain. Classification guide
topics might read as shown in Table 10. In this example, the guide itself would have to be
classified SECRET as it reveals the information that country “Y” has determined would result in
serious damage. As in the previous example, exemption 25X9 may also be used if
declassification would violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement that does not permit
the automatic or unilateral declassification of information at 25 years; specify a declassification
date or event, identify the specific statute, treaty or international agreement in the
declassification instructions and obtain ISCAP approval prior to using the exemption.
Table 10. Example of Classifying Foreign Government Information with Military Implications
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Fact of U.S over flights –
Europe
1.1 (S) Country “Y”
1.2 (C) Country “Z”
1.3 (U) Other European
S
C
U
1.4(d) 25X6, upon receipt of
official approval by
country “X” and Dept
of State
(S) Must be at least
50,000 feet altitude;
lower flights not
permitted in “Y” and
“Z”
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ENCLOSURE 4
RECOMMENDED FORMAT FOR A SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
1. INTRODUCTION
a. This enclosure discusses and illustrates a general format for a security classification guide.
Within the illustrated format, guidance included in brackets (“[ ]”) should be replaced with
information appropriate for the classification guide under development. Information in
parentheses (“( )”) provides amplifying information or guidance. Identified sections should be
included as appropriate for the needs of the system, plan, program, project, or mission covered
by the guide and additional paragraphs or sections may be added if needed to address topics or
requirements not covered by the example (e.g., release of information to contractors).
b. Where classification guidance is issued in a form other than a security classification guide
(e.g., in a memorandum, plan, order or letter), the document must have enough detail to address
all elements of information required by derivative classifiers. The guidance must be approved, in
writing, by the OCA.
c. The first interior page of the classification guide may be used as a foreword or
introduction, to provide a short synopsis of the technology, system, plan, program, project, or
mission covered in the guide. Such information can help potential users quickly understand the
content or subjects covered in the security classification guide in more detail than is apparent
from the title.
2. COVER PAGE. The recommended cover page format for a security classification guide
includes all of the information shown in Figure 3. If necessary, use an acronym, short title or
project number in order to keep title unclassified; place the most significant words of the guide’s
title first. Mark it “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” or, if classified, with the appropriate
classification markings (including classification authority block, portion marks, and any special
handling caveats and distribution controls).
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Figure 3. Security Classification Guide Cover Page Format
[CLASSIFICATION]
[NAME OF THE SYSTEM, PLAN, PROGRAM, OR PROJECT]
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
[Date]
ISSUED BY: [Name and address of issuing office.]
APPROVED BY: [OCA name and title, or personal identifier.]
[Statement of supersession of previous guides, if any.]
[Distribution Statement for DTIC pursuant to DoDI 5230.24, when required.]
[“FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” or CLASSIFICATION]
3. CONTENT
a. The actual content of the guide begins with general instructions in section 1 and is
followed by specific information on what is to be classified, at what level, and for how long, in
sections 2 through 8. Sections 2 through 8 are typically in chart format. Content (interior) pages
of the guide must carry the appropriate markings (classification or CUI designation) on each
page; see Reference (f) for marking guidance. Insert a page break at the end of each section in
the guide. Place the title of the classification guide in capital letter at the top of the first interior
page followed by general instructions as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Sample Section 1 – General Instructions
[CLASSIFICATION]
[SYSTEM, PLAN, PROGRAM, PROJECT OR MISSION] SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
SECTION 1 – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. P
urpose. To provide instructions and guidance on the classification of information involved in
[name of the system, plan, program, project, or mission] using an unclassified identification of the
effort. (If it is necessary to classify the guide, modify this paragraph as necessary to acknowledge the
classified content.)
2. Authority. This guide is issued under authority of [state any applicable departmental or agency
regulations authorizing or controlling the issuance of guides, such as DoD Manual 5200.01].
Classification of information involved in [identify the effort] is governed by, and is in accordance with,
[cite any applicable classification guidance or guides under which this guide is issued]. This guide
constitutes authority and may be cited as the basis for classification, regrading, or declassification of
information and material involved in [identify the effort]. Changes in classification required by
application of this guide shall be made immediately. Information identified in this guide for protection
as classified information is classified by [complete title or position of classifying authority].
3. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR): This guide is issued by, and all inquiries concerning
content and interpretation, as well as any recommendations for changes, should be addressed to:
[Name, code, mailing address of issuing office.] (An administrative or security office in the
issuing activity may be used. Inclusion of the action officer’s name and phone number/fax and e-
mail is recommended.)
4. Classification Challenges. If at any time, any of the security classification guidance contained
herein is challenged, the items of information involved shall continue to be protected at the level
prescribed by this guide until such time as a final decision is made on the challenge by appropriate
authority. Classification challenges should be addressed to the OPR.
5. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination. Authorized recipients of this guide may reproduce,
extract, and disseminate the contents of this guide, as necessary, for application by specified groups
involved in [identification of the effort], including industrial activities. Copies of separate guides
issued to operating activities in application of this guide shall be sent to the OPR. (If it is necessary to
classify the guide, modify this paragraph as necessary to express any required limitations.)
[FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY or CLASSIFICATION]
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Figure 4. Sample Section 1 – General Instructions, Continued
[CLASSIFICATION]
6. Public Release. The fact that this guide shows certain details of information to be unclassified,
including controlled unclassified information, does not allow automatic public release of this
information. DoD information requested by the media or members of the public or proposed for release
to the public by DoD civilians or military personnel or their contractors shall be processed in
accordance with DoD Manual 5200.01, DoD Directive 5230.09, DoD Instruction 5230.29, and DoD
5400.7-R, as applicable. Proposed public disclosures of unclassified information regarding
[identification of effort] shall be processed through [identify office to which requests for public
disclosure are to be sent and provide contact information (where the specific office cannot be identified,
state that requests should be processed through “appropriate channels for approval”)].
7. Foreign Disclosure. Any disclosure to foreign officials of information classified by this guide shall
be in accordance with the procedures set forth in [identify applicable issuances implementing DoD
foreign disclosure policy, e.g., DoD Directive 5230.11]. If a country with which the DoD has entered
into a reciprocal procurement memorandum of understanding or offset arrangement, expresses an
interest in this effort, a foreign disclosure review should be conducted prior to issuance of a solicitation.
(If it is known that foreign participation cannot be permitted because of the sensitivity of the effort, this
fact should be stated. Add other guidance as appropriate.)
8. Definitions. (Include in this paragraph the definitions of any items for which there may be various
meanings to ensure common understanding of the details of information that are covered by the guide.)
[FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY or CLASSIFICATION]
b. Specific information on what is to be classified, at what level, and for how long, is placed
in sections 2 through 8, which are typically in table format. Figures 5 through 11 provide
descriptions of those sections and Tables 11 through 14 are example charts showing presentation
of specific types of information.
(1) The format shown in Tables 11 through 14 is the preferred format, but variations may
be used when more appropriate. See the Appendix to this enclosure.
(2) Each table must provide sufficient information to enable the user to fully understand
what information is to be protected, at what level, and for how long, so that each derivative
document can be properly marked and safeguarded. Use the Remarks column to provide
additional information as needed – for example, to provide additional clarification about the
information to be classified, to describe the conditions or criteria for each classification within a
range of classifications or for alternative classifications, to identify dissemination control
markings or special handling caveats, to specify downgrading instructions, to identify another
security classification guide that should be consulted for classification guidance for that element
of information, or to identify another guide as the original source for the guidance provided.
(3) If data in the table is itself classified, mark the data and table as required by
Reference (f).
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Figure 5. Sample Section 2 – Overall Effort
SECTION 2 – OVERALL EFFORT
1. I
dentification. (Include in this paragraph any necessary statements explaining the classifications, if
any, to be assigned to various statements identifying the effort. These statements should be consistent
with other program documentation.)
2. Goal, Mission, Purpose. (Include in this paragraph any necessary statements identifying information
concerning the purpose of the effort that can be released as unclassified and that which must be
classified. Take care to ensure that unclassified statements do not reveal classified information.)
3. End Item. (Include in this paragraph statements of the classification to be assigned to the end
products of the effort, whether paperwork or hardware. In this connection it is important to distinguish
between classification required to protect the fact of the existence of a completed end item, and
classification required because of what the end item contains or reveals. In some instances classified
information pertaining to performance, manufacture, or composition of incorporated parts or materials
is not ascertainable from mere use of or access to the end item. In others, the classifiable information is
that which concerns total performance, capabilities, vulnerabilities, or weaknesses of the end item itself,
rather than any of the parts or materials.)
Figure 6. Sample Section 3 – Performance and Capabilities
Table 10. Example of Use of Remarks Column
(Table entries, including classifications and durations, are for example only.)
SECTION 3 – PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES
(This section includes characteristics of performance and capability of an end item, or an end item’s
components, parts, or materials, the performance or capabilities of which require classification. In this
section also provide, in sequentially numbered items, statements that express details of performance and
capabilities planned and actual. Include both those elements that warrant classification and those that
are unclassified. These statements normally would not set forth the numeric values that indicate degree
of performance or capability, planned or attained, but merely should identify the specific elements of
performance or capability that are covered. When it is necessary to state certain limiting figures above
or below which classification is required, the statement itself may warrant classification. For clarity,
continuity, or ease of reference it may be desirable to include performance classification data in the
sections dealing with the end item or the components or parts to which the performance data apply.
Use a “Remarks” column for explanations, limitations, special conditions, associations, etc., as shown
in Table 10.)
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Table 11. Example of Use of Remarks Column
TOPIC CLASSIFCATION REASON
DECLASSIFY
ON
REMARKS
1. Range
a. Actual S 1.4(a) 20200615
b. Predicted U N/A N/A
2. Accuracy/range rate
a. Predicted C 1.4(a) 20200130
b. Measured C 1.4(a) 20200130
3. Altitude
a. Operational C 1.4(a) 20200130
b. Maximum U or C 1.4(a) 20210130 The general statement “in
excess of 50,000 feet” is
“U.”
Otherwise, “C.”
4. Commercial Receiver
Model No. xxx
a. Receiver sensitivity,
selectivity, and
frequency coverage
U N/A N/A Standard commercial
receiver characteristics are
“U.”
b. Fact of application or
use in this effort
S 1.4(a) 20250415
5. Resolution, Thermal
a. Maximum attainable U or S 1.4(a) 20210415 Planned or actual attained
thermal resolutions above
0.25 degrees C are “U.”
Otherwise, “S.”
b. Operational optimum U or S 1.4(a) 20210415 Planned or actual attained
thermal resolutions above
0.25 degrees C are “U.”
Otherwise, “S//REL TO
USA, GBR”
c. Operational attainment U or S 1.4(a) 20210415 Planned or actual attained
thermal resolutions above
0.25 degrees C are “U.”
Otherwise, “S//REL TO
USA, GBR”
6. Speed Generic reference to
“supersonic” speed is “U.”
a. Maximum S 1.4(a) 20210115 Downgrade to “C” upon
IOC.
b. Rate of climb S 1.4(a) 20210115 Downgrade to “C” upon
IOC.
c. Intercept S 1.4(a) 20210115 Downgrade to “C” upon
IOC.
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
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Figure 7. Sample Section 4 – Specifications
SECTION 4 – SPECIFICATIONS
Th
is section includes items of information describing standards for [qualities of materials and parts;
methods or modes or construction, manufacture or assembly; and specific dimensions in size, form,
shape, and weight, that require classification]. Inclusion in this section is required because the items
require classification because they contribute to the national security advantage resulting from this
effort, or because they frequently require classification but are unclassified in [identification of this
effort]. Classification of specifications pertaining to performance and capability are covered in section
3 of the guide. (Actual figures do not need to be given, merely statements identifying clearly the
specific items of information involved. If figures are necessary to establish classification levels, it may
be necessary to classify the statements themselves. When necessary for clarity, continuity or ease of
reference, specification classification data may be included in sections on the end product or
components or parts to which the data apply. Use a “Remarks” column for explanations, limitations,
special conditions, associations, etc.)
Table 12. Example of Specifications
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Burn rate C 1.4(a) 20210917
2. Power requirement U or S 1.4(a) 20210917 “S” when associated with
Model No. #.
Otherwise “U.”
3. Chemical composition U N/A N/A Composition is FOUO
Figure 8. Sample Section 5 – Critical Elements
SECTION 5 – CRITICAL ELEMENTS
(Th
is section is used only if there are specific elements that are both critical to the successful operation
of the end item of this effort and unique enough to warrant classification of some data concerning them.
Provide in sequentially numbered paragraphs each significant items of information peculiar to these
critical elements and the classification applicable. Also include in this section the classification to be
assigned to information pertaining to components, parts, and materials that are peculiar and critical to
the successful operation of the end item in this effort when such items of information are the reason for
or contribute to the national security advantage resulting from this effort. Performance data pertaining
to such critical elements can be included in this section instead of section 3 of the guide.)
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Figure 9. Sample Section 6 – Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses
SECTION 6 – VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES
(Th
is section is used to specify classification to be assigned to details of information that disclose
inherent weaknesses that could be exploited to defeat or minimize the effectiveness of the end product
of this effort. Classification assigned to details of information on countermeasures and counter-
countermeasures should also be included in this section. )
Figure 10. Sample Section 7 – Administrative Data
SECTION 7 – ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
(Thi
s section is used only if particular elements of administrative data, such as program information,
procurement schedules, production quantities, schedules, programs, or status of the effort, and data on
shipments, deployment, or transportation and manuals (field, training, etc.), warrant classification.
Table 12 provides examples of possible classified administrative data.)
Table 13. Example Showing Classified Administrative Data
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. Budget data
a. FY budget total U N/A N/A
b. Budget estimate data,
including total
U N/A N/A “FOUO” prior to White House
/OMB release to Congress.
2. Programmed end item
production rate
U N/A N/A “FOUO” prior to contract
award.
3. Planned delivery mode U N/A N/A
4. Planned equipment
delivery rate
C 1.4(a) 20300313
5. Actual routing of
delivery of end items
C 1.4(a) See remarks, but not
later than (NLT)
20300313
Classify upon selection of route,
and declassify upon completion
of last delivery to site.
6. Scheduled shipping
dates and times
C 1.4(a) See remarks, but
NLT 20300313
Classify upon decision to ship,
and declassify upon off-load at
destination.
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Figure 11. Sample Section 8 – Hardware
Table 13. Example Showing Hardware Classification
(Table entries, including classifications and durations, are for example only.)
SECTION 8 – HARDWARE
(Ta
ble 13 provides an example of classification of hardware items. The degree of specificity to be
included in this section will depend largely upon:
a. The level from which issued. When issued from a headquarters level, the classification is most
likely to be applied to the hardware end item itself, rather than its individual components.
b. The channels or hands through which the guidance will travel to the ultimate user. The closer
the issuer is to the user, the more detailed the guidance may become. When the issuer is removed from
the user, intermediate levels of guidance may be required to expand or elaborate on the guidance
provided by the basic classification guide and to cover more details concerning materials, parts,
components, assemblies, and subassemblies, and the classification, if any, to be assigned. Any such
expansion or elaboration should be fully coordinated with the headquarters issuing the basic guide.
c. The ease of determining when classified information could be revealed by a particular hardware
item. Obscure connections and associations that could reveal classified information may require the
issuer of the guide to state classification for certain hardware items. In such cases it probably would be
advisable to explain why classification is necessary.
d. Whether there are factors that require consideration and action at a headquarters level. National
or DoD policy, intelligence data, broad operational requirements, extraneous factors, or other matters
not ordinarily available below headquarters, or that require high level consideration may result in
decisions to classify certain hardware items.)
Table 14. Example Showing Hardware Classification
CLASSIFICATION LEVELS AND DURATIONS ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY
TOPIC CLASS REASON DECLASSIFY ON REMARKS
1. End item hardware:
a. AN/APR-999 C 1.4(a) 20200820 External views of the
assembled AN/APR-999
are “U.”
(1) Analyzer unit C 1.4(a) 20200820
(2) Threat display unit U N/A N/A Display specifications
are FOUO.
(3) Preamplifier U N/A N/A
b. AN/APR-0000 U N/A N/A
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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE 4
FORMAT VARIATIONS
Use of the standard format as described and illustrated in the other enclosures of this Manual is
strongly recommended as it provides a consistent Department-wide structure and facilitates
understanding and use of other security classification guides when looking for information.
However, in some instances other headers and formats are more advantageous and efficient for
the users. Figures 12 through 15 illustrate column headers and arrangements that are different
from those used in Enclosure 4. These headers and arrangements may be employed in the
construction of a classification guide and may additionally be modified to suit the needs of the
specific effort. For example, a column for downgrading action could be added if most items of
information have downgrading instructions assigned, but such a column would not be necessary
if the guide did not provide downgrading instructions or if only one or two items of information
are to be downgraded. In the later case, the downgrading instruction could be placed in the
“Remarks” column.
Figure 12. Format Variation 1
TOPIC CLASSIFICATION REASON DURATION REMARKS
Figure 13. Format Variation 2
DESCRIPTION CLASSIFICATION REASON DECLASSIFY
UPON
DISSEMINATION/
SPECIALHANDLING
REMARKS
Figure 14. Format Variation 3
INFORMATION
REVEALING
CLASSIFICATION/
DECLASSIFICATION
REASON REMARKS
Figure 15. Format Variation 4
REASON: All information in this section is classified per section 1.4(_) of E.O. 13526
TOPIC CLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFY ON
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GLOSSARY
PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
C Confidential
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
COMSEC communications security
CUI controlled unclassified information
DASD(NM) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters
DoDD DoD directive
DoDI DoD instruction
DOE Department of Energy
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center
E.O. Executive Order
FOUO For Official Use Only
FRD Formerly Restricted Data
HUMINT human intelligence
IOC initial operational capability
IR&D independent research and development
ISCAP Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
N/A not applicable
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLT not later than
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NSI national security information
OCA original classification authority
OPR office of primary responsibility
OPSEC operations security
RD Restricted Data
REL TO Releasable To
S Secret
TS Top Secret
U Unclassified
U.S.C. United States Code
USD(I&S) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
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PART II. DEFINITIONS
Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Manual.
downgrading. A determination by an OCA or declassification authority that information
classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower
level.
FRD. Information removed from the RD category upon a joint determination by DOE (or
antecedent agencies) and DoD that such information relates primarily to the military utilization
of atomic weapons and that such information can be safeguarded adequately as classified defense
information. FRD is treated the same as RD for purposes of foreign dissemination.
fundamental research. Basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of
which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as
distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production,
and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national
security reasons.
horizontal classification. Classification of information associated with more than one system,
plan, program, project, or mission at the same level by all involved activities and organizations.
IR&D. Research and development effort that is neither sponsored by a grant, nor required in
performing a contract, and which falls under any of the following four areas:
Applied research.
Basic research.
Development.
Systems and other concept formulation studies.
military operations information. Information pertaining to a strategic or tactical military action,
including training, movement of troops and equipment, supplies, and other information vital to
the success of any battle or campaign.
NSI. Information that has been determined, pursuant to Reference (d), or any predecessor order,
to require protection against unauthorized disclosure.
OCA. An individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President, or by
agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to originally classify information
(i.e., to classify information in the first instance). Reference (f) provides guidance on
designation of OCAs.
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RD. All data concerning design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; the production
of special nuclear material; or the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but
not data declassified or removed from the RD category pursuant to section 2162 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
