Who Wears the MAGA Hat? Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump

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Who Wears the MAGA Hat? Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump Who Wears the MAGA Hat? Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump

Amanda Graham

Georgia Southern University

Francis T. Cullen

University of Cincinnati

Leah C. Butler

University of Nebraska at Omaha

, [email protected]

Alexander L. Burton

University of Cincinnati

Velmer S. Burton Jr.

University of Arkansas at Little Rock

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation

Graham, A., Cullen, F. T., Butler, L. C., Burton, A. L., & Burton, V. S., Jr. (2021). Who wears the MAGA hat?

White nationalism and faith in Trump. Socius, 7, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023121992600

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Original Article

The scene is familiar. Donald Trump stands at the podium

leading a political rally. In a theatrical performance, he holds

court for an hour or two. Hands waving and his rhetoric pep-

pered with terms such as “many people say,” “huge,” “fake,”

and “vicious” (always toward him!), he excoriates his liberal

enemies and incites the crowd. They applaud wildly and, at

times, break out into chants such as “Lock her up” and “Send

them back.” After his defeat in the 2020 presidential election,

the slogans now include “Stop the steal” (AP Reporter 2020).

The backdrop behind him is instructive. No, there is no

set of American flags or a Trump-Pence banner arranged

from one side of the stage to the other. Rather, a slice of the

audience has been strategically selected to sit behind the

president—happily cheering at every opportunity. They

send a message. First, they are all white—with the possible

exception of the single onlooker holding up a “Blacks for

Trump” sign. This anomalous image only makes the white-

ness of the occasion more poignant (Givhan 2019). The

president’s expressions of racial and ethnic animus are regu-

larly featured and applauded (Fording and Schram 2020;

Kulig et al. forthcoming; O’Connor and Marans 2018).

Second, the members of the backdrop crowd are almost

all wearing bright red MAGA (Make America Great Again)

hats—as Trump, dressed in an expensive suit and tie, often

does himself (Herrman 2020). Hats are a sign of intense loy-

alty, whether it is a Yankees hat, a university hat, or a Trump

hat. They are a public expression of identity—a proud

announcement of allegiance (Crane 2012; see also Givhan

2019). For supporters, donning a MAGA hat expresses spe-

cial affection for the president—a form of identity fusion

(see Kunst, Dovidio, and Thomsen 2019). For critics, the hat

has become a “provocation”: “a symbol of us vs. them, of

exclusion and suspicion, of garrulous narcissism, of white

male privilege, of violence and hate” (Givhan 2019; see also

Barlow 2019). Indeed, then president-elect Joe Biden felt the

need to respond to “a half-decade of domed messaging to

troll Trump with a hat of his own” (Wolf 2020). In a rejoinder

to “Make America Great Again,” Biden’s hat carried the

rebuttal slogan “We Just Did” (Wolf 2020). At least a million

customers have purchased an official MAGA hat (Brennan

2019), available for $30 on the Trump Web site (https://shop.

donaldjtrump.com/collections/headwear). At a reduced

price, thousands more unauthorized MAGA hats have been

sold on Amazon and on Chinese e-commerce portals (Chen

2020; Herrman 2020). Who are these people who put on the

MAGA hats? Who are these people who have intense faith in

Donald Trump and believe that he will “make American

992600

SRDXXX10.1177/2378023121992600SociusGraham et al.

research-article2021

Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA, USA

University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

University of Nebraska, Omaha, NE, USA

University of Arkansas, Little Rock, AR, USA

Corresponding Author:

Amanda Graham, Georgia Southern University, Department of Criminal

Justice, PO Box 8105, Statesboro, GA 30460, USA

Email: [email protected]

Who Wears the MAGA Hat? Racial

Beliefs and Faith in Trump

Amanda Graham

, Francis T. Cullen

, Leah C. Butler

Alexander L. Burton

, and Velmer S. Burton, Jr.

Abstract

On the basis of a 2019 YouGov survey of white respondents (n = 734), the impact of racial beliefs on support for

Donald Trump was explored. The analysis revealed that in addition to racial resentment, white nationalism—a desire

to keep the United States white demographically and culturally—was strongly related to faith in Trump. Analyses based

on a 2019 Amazon Mechanical Turk survey yielded similar results and also showed that white nationalism increased

willingness to wear a MAGA hat. Future research on the political consequences of racial beliefs should focus on what

whites think not only of blacks but also of themselves.

Keywords

white nationalism, Trump, MAGA, racial resentment, racial sympathy

2 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

great again”? In this article, we seek to address this

question.

Trump communicates a unique message: he is strong; his

opponents are weak. He understands and has a special capac-

ity to protect his flock against the threats they face. He alone

can make American great again, restoring the nation to a

place where good, patriotic citizens are valued and not called

a “basket of deplorables” (Reilly 2016). Those embracing

this message have a deep allegiance to the man, not necessar-

ily a specific ideology (Barber and Pope 2019). Their faith in

Trump is consequential. The Republican Party platform

should be anything Trump says it is. More than this, such

faith inoculates Trump against any criticism: impeachments,

repeated lies, accusations of sexual misconduct, corruption

in his administration and pardoning criminal associates,

attacks on previously treasured institutions such as the

Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the embrace of Vladimir Putin and other

authoritarian rulers, knowingly misleading the public about

wearing masks and the dangers of a pandemic whose death

toll exceeds 430,000, false claims about the 2020 election

being stolen, and best-selling exposés alleging that he is unfit

for the presidency (see, e.g., Cohen 2020; Rucker and

Leonnig 2020; Woodward 2020). Although a touch hyper-

bolic, Trump captured the loyalty of his audience at an Iowa

campaign rally when he stated, “I could stand in the middle

of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any

voters, OK? It’s, like, incredible” (Dwyer 2016).

Various explanations have been offered for this expres-

sion of faith in Trump. Given the whiteness of his support-

ers—whether in crowds or in the voting booth—and his

frequent anti–minority group rhetoric, a common view is that

Trump draws his support from those harboring racial animus.

Like other Republicans before him, he is portrayed simply as

“playing the race card” (Maxwell and Shields 2019). An

alternative perspective is that the president’s unique appeal

rests on his affirmation of whites’ in-group racial identity and

legitimation of the desire to keep the nation culturally and

demographically white (see, e.g., Jardina 2019b; Kaufmann

2019). The reference is to widespread attitudes in society and

not to membership in a white supremacy group (Jardina

2019a, 2019b; Kaufmann 2019). Out-group racial animus

and in-group racial solidarity are thus seen as analytically, if

not substantively, distinct. As Kaufmann (2019) noted, “the

common view that white identity leads to dislike of minori-

ties is misplaced” (p. 128).

In this context, in the present project, we explore the rela-

tionship between racial beliefs and support for President

Trump. Specifically, the focus is on the connection between

belief in white nationalism and faith in Trump, controlling

for a standard measure of racial resentment (Kinder and

Sanders 1996) and a new measure of racial sympathy

(Chudy 2017, 2021). Controls also are introduced for other

explanations that might account for Trump’s appeal: mem-

bership in his base electorate, political allegiance

(Republican, conservative ideology), and fear (of crime and

of a chaotic world).

Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump

Unpacking Racial Beliefs

Research surrounding racial beliefs has transitioned from

traditional, overt racism in which blacks are seen as biologi-

cally and socially inferior, to “symbolic” or “laissez-faire”

racism, in which blacks’ disadvantaged state is attributed to

individual failings, and their receipt of government assis-

tance is judged as special treatment (Bobo, Kluegel, and

Smith 1997; Henry and Sears 2002). Kinder and Sanders

(1996) defined this construct as “racial resentment” and

developed a scale that is now the field’s standard measure.

Extensive research shows that racial resentment is a robust

predictor of a range of social policy preferences (Cramer

2020; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). In fact, the failure

to include racial resentment in policy analyses would risk

omitted variable bias.

Recently, however, attempts have been made to unpack

racial beliefs into different components and to explore their

consequences. Two important advances merit attention.

First, “defined as white distress over black suffering,”

Chudy (2021:123) showed that “racial sympathy” differs

from racial resentment and is related significantly to public

policy preferences, such as government support for blacks,

increased federal spending on welfare programs, and gov-

ernment subsidies for black businesses. She contended that

positive racial attitudes can lead whites to endorse policies

beneficial to African Americans. At issue is whether those

with racial sympathy are less likely to look favorably upon

Donald Trump.

Second, in light of the trends in growing demographic

diversity creating a number of majority-minority states

(Jardina 2019b, Jones 2016), scholars are focusing on what

whites think not only about blacks but also about themselves,

with attention paid to the influence of constructs such as

white identity and consciousness (Jardina 2019b). Our inter-

est is on what Kaufmann (2019) termed white “ethno-tradi-

tional nationalism,” also known as “white nationalism.” This

is the “desire to limit change to the ethnic composition of the

nation” (Kaufmann 2019:515), that is, to keep America a

majority white nation. The essential point is that although

modestly correlated, white nationalism is distinct conceptu-

ally and empirically from racial animus (Jardina 2019a,

Kaufmann 2019), a relationship we show ahead. When

nationalism and animus merge—and include views of black

inferiority and racial hierarchy—they foster white suprem-

acy. Still, the independent effects of white nationalism and

racial resentment should be assessed. As noted later, both of

these factors matter in expressions of faith in Trump.

Five key characteristics define white nationalism and

the goal to keep the United States a white nation

Graham et al. 3

demographically and culturally. First, those holding white

nationalistic beliefs view being white as part of their social

identity, much in the same way being black or Hispanic is

part of an individual’s social identity (Jardina 2019a;

Kaufmann 2019). Second, they wish to maintain “the ethnic

majority as an important component of the nation alongside

other groups” (Kaufmann 2019:11; Swain 2001). This iden-

tity as part of the white ethnic majority and its symbols are

highly valued. Third, they favor slower immigration, as

opposed to outright rejection of immigration, to “permit

enough immigrants to voluntarily assimilate into the ethnic

majority,” which is critical to maintaining white ethno-tradi-

tionalism (Kaufmann 2019:11). Fourth, related to immigra-

tion, they are concerned about “the potential [immigration

has] to transform societies,” which places their ethnic major-

ity at risk (Kaufmann 2019:515). Fifth, those holding white

nationalistic views do not inherently also hold views of racial

animus or prejudice (i.e., white supremacy) (Taub 2016).

They deeply resent this stigmatization (Hochschild 2016;

Kaufmann 2019; Scott 2019). Again, they wish to “secure

their multi-generational group attachments and identity ref-

erence points for posterity” (Kaufmann 2019:69).

Just to be clear, we decided to use the term white national-

ism only after much deliberation. Our initial reluctance was

because this phrase is at times used interchangeably in public

and academic discourse with white supremacy. We have

been careful to distinguish between the two constructs. We

settled on white nationalism, however, because it captures

the essence of the belief being measured: a preference for a

nation that is culturally and demographically white (see

Kulig et al. 2020). (Note that this is similar to “white

Christian nationalism”; see Davis and Perry forthcoming;

Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018.) Terms such as in-group

solidarity–out-group hostility and ethno-traditional nation-

alism have merit and arguably could be used as alternatives

(see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020; Kaufmann 2019). Still,

this language fails to convey descriptively the core theme

being investigated: how whites think about the racial status

of their nation at this historical juncture. White nationalism

succeeds in this regard.

Consequences of Racial Beliefs

According to Jardina (forthcoming), the dominant paradigm

in the study of electoral politics has been to “dismiss the

study of in-group attitudes and identities among white

Americans, focusing instead on whites’ out-group attitudes

in the form of racial prejudice or racial resentment” (p. 3).

Her work on white identity politics challenges this view as

overly narrow. Beyond racial animus, observed Jardina

(forthcoming), “some whites may also be swayed by their

desire to protect the interests of their in-group and to main-

taining their group’s power and privileges” (p. 3). As a

result, “political candidates may be able to appeal to or acti-

vate two distinct, but arguably equally insidious, racial

forces in contemporary electoral politics” (p. 3). Jardina

(forthcoming) called these “in-group love and out-group

hate” (p. 1). We argue that this revised perspective has

implications for understanding whites’ allegiance to

President Trump.

From the very start of his 2016 campaign, Donald Trump

made race and ethnicity a key policy initiative, starting by

accusing Mexican immigrants of “bringing drugs . . . bring-

ing crime . . . [and being] rapists” (Enns 2018; Washington

Post Staff 2015). Furthermore, he proposed banning immi-

grants from Muslim-majority nations and constructing a

wall across the southern U.S. border to “stop the drugs . . .

shore up the border . . . [and] to get all of the drug lords”

(Garfield 2016). Aside from his policy positions, Trump has

used racially infused comments to describe cities such as

Chicago and Baltimore, to support Confederate monuments

and actors on all sides in Charlottesville, to attack athlete-

activists such as Colin Kaepernick, and to attack activist

groups such as Black Lives Matter (BLM). Furthermore,

Trump has promoted his appeal to whiteness by appointing

alleged white nationalists Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon

to key positions within his White House staff (Davis and

Shear 2019). Ultimately, at issue is whether support for

Trump is primarily rooted in racial resentment or in his

appeal to white nationalism.

Although the size of the effect is in dispute (Enns 2018),

there is a wealth of research showing that racial animus

increased favorable ratings of and voting for Donald Trump.

The extant studies also reveal, however, that another factor

played a role in his primary and presidential elections: anti-

immigrant sentiments (see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020;

Griffin and Teixeira 2017; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018;

Kaufmann 2019; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Newman,

Shah, and Collingwood 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck

2017). Trump’s political genius was in making immigration

a salient issue (Kaufmann 2019). He used it not only to dero-

gate out-group members but also to signal “to whites with

higher levels of racial solidarity that he had their group’s

interests in mind” (Jardina forthcoming:8). As Jardina (forth-

coming) observed,

Immigration arguably poses an exceptional threat to whites’

dominance because it introduces foreigners with unfamiliar

cultures and languages that may be perceived as threatening the

nation’s dominant Anglo-Saxon traditions, and it has contributed

to the loss of white Americans’ numerical majority. . . . Several

scholars and pundits have argued that immigration poses a risk

to white American culture. (p. 8, note 8)

Importantly, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) empirical analy-

ses show that not only racial resentment but also white iden-

tity (the importance of being white to one’s identity) and

white consciousness (whites cannot find a job because of

minority hiring, whites must work together to change laws

unfair to them) have political consequences. Using the

(January) 2016 ANES Pilot Study, Jardina (2019b) examined

4 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

how racial beliefs influenced “affective evaluations of Trump

using the 101-point feeling thermometer measures, where

respondents are asked to rate how warm or cold they feel

toward a particular political figure” (p. 235). Beyond the

effects of racial resentment, white identity and consciousness

had a substantively large effect in increasing warmth toward

Trump. Equally instructive, compared with other 2016 pri-

mary and general election candidates, Trump was “unique in

his appeal to racially conscious whites” (Jardina 2019b:239;

see also Jardina forthcoming). The data also demonstrated

that white consciousness contributed to a preference for

Trump in the 2016 presidential vote choice (Jardina 2019b).

“We cannot understand the rise and success of Donald

Trump,” Jardina (2019b) concluded, “without turning our

attention to white racial identity and consciousness” (p. 265).

In this regard, Trump appears to have been remarkably

effective in using racial messages to evoke white allegiance.

Hochschild’s (2016) ethnographic study of Tea Party sup-

porters in Louisiana is revealing. She began by documenting

how whites in bayou country feel “culturally marginalized,”

a “besieged minority” in which “strangers [people of color]

step ahead of you in line, making you anxious, resentful, and

afraid” (pp. 221–22). Attending the then-candidate’s cam-

paign rally, Hochschild noted that “nearly everyone is white;

apart from protesters, the only blacks I see are security

guards or vendors hawking Trump T-shirts” (p. 222).

Hochschild then described Trump’s special talent in appeal-

ing to his followers’ “emotional self-interest,” of providing

“a giddy release from the feeling of being a stranger in one’s

own land” (p. 228; see also Kimmel 2013; Schrock et al.

2017). Trump derogated out-groups such as radical Muslims,

“bad hombres” from Mexico, and blacks and women receiv-

ing unfair advantages. He promised to make America great

again for the real majority of Americans: whites. “The cos-

tumes, hats, signs, and symbols,” observed Hochschild,

“reaffirm this new sense unity” (p. 226). Hochschild used

Emile Durkheim’s concept of “collective effervescence” to

capture the excitement Trump evoked and his ability to

“unify worshipers” (pp. 225–26). Faith in Trump ran high.

As one “middle-aged man” commented, “To be in the pres-

ence of such a man!” (p. 224 emphasis in original).

Research Strategy

In this context, in the current project, we examine whether

three racial beliefs are associated with faith in Donald Trump:

racial resentment and two new constructs, racial sympathy

and white nationalism. The term faith is used because the

outcome is not voting preferences but the belief that the pres-

ident is a strong leader with special talents to protect the

nation and to “make America great again.” Presented in the

“Methods” section, a first and an important task is to show

that the three racial beliefs are empirically distinct. This turns

out to be the case, making further analysis possible. These

results also constitute a unique methodological advance in

the measurement of racial beliefs.

To assess the independent effects of racial beliefs, we pro-

pose four potential models that might predict faith in Trump.

First, in the Trump base model, the president’s support comes

from his political base, which includes men, Republicans,

those living in the South, and evangelicals. Second, in the

political model, support is derived from political values

aligned with conservatives and antisocialist viewpoints.

Third, in the crime salience model, support is tied to Trump’s

ability to quell fears of crime and the perceptions of the dan-

gerousness of the world with his masculinity, bravado, and

support for greater security (e.g., border wall). Fourth, in the

racial model—the main focus of the study—support for

Trump stems from his policy positions and pronouncements

on race in American society. This perspective would propose

that those who harbor racial animus and lack sympathy for

black distress would endorse the president. Given the presi-

dent’s linking of whiteness to what makes American great

and his appeal to whites’ emotional interests (Hochschild

2016), this model would also see white nationalism as a

robust predictor of faith in Trump.

Before proceeding, some attention needs to paid to an

alternative approach that focuses on “white Christian nation-

alism,” including its impact on voting for Donald Trump (see

Whitehead et al. 2018; see also Jones 2016). Research in this

vein surveys whites about their desire for the United States to

be a Christian nation (e.g., “The federal government should

advocate Christian values”). Originally, the view of America

as a “WASP” (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) country was

hegemonic, but eventually Christian nationalism became

associated with conservative social and political views and

concentrated in southern states (Jones 2016). Following

Jardina (2019b) and Kaufmann (2019), we focus on whites’

preference for an in-group nation (white nationalism) sepa-

rately from religion (which we include as a control), assess-

ing their effects independently. Note that support for Trump

is not confined to southern or red states. In fact, because of

population density, more Trump voters (38 million of 74 mil-

lion) live in states won by Biden (Bump 2020). That said, we

In Hard White, Fording and Schram (2020) argued that white

identity’s effects on support for Trump are indirect through out-

group hostility, including anti-immigrant animus. In our Amazon

Mechanical Turk data (discussed ahead), we were able assess this

contention by incorporating into our analysis a five-item scale mea-

suring whether immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border are

seen as hard-working and filling unwanted U.S. jobs or as likely to

commit serious crimes and take jobs from Americans (α = .829,

factor loadings between .716 and .848). This variable was unrelated

to willingness to wear a MAGA hat but was significantly related to

faith in Trump (β = .147). Still, even with anti-immigrant hostil-

ity in the model, white nationalism retained a robust direct effect

on faith in Trump (β = .292). Our YouGov data did not contain a

measure of anti-immigrant hostility, so this analysis could not be

undertaken with those data.

Graham et al. 5

view research on white nationalism and on white Christian

nationalism as complementary and as meriting attention in

future studies.

Methods

Samples

We use two national-level surveys designed by the research

team: one is used for the main analysis conducted by YouGov,

and one serves as a supplementary analysis to assess the

robustness of effects through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk

(MTurk). The first survey was placed in the field June 7 to

10, 2019, by YouGov, an intetrnational survey company with

a pool of more than 2 million U.S. residents who participate

in large, opt-in panels. YouGov’s methodology includes a

three-phase sampling strategy, which is designed to produce

an estimated nationally representative sample of the target

population (Rivers 2006). In the first phase, a synthetic sam-

pling frame is constructed using high-quality probability sur-

veys and large-scale, commercially available databases—in

our case, the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS).

Second, YouGov panel members are matched to this syn-

thetic sampling frame on the basis of several demographic

and behavioral characteristics; in our case, 1,427 panel mem-

bers were matched on the basis of gender, age, race, and edu-

cation. Third, propensity score weighting is used to adjust

any biases within the sample (Rivers 2006; see Thielo 2017

for a detailed review). This methodology has been found to

produce estimates of relational inferences that are in the

same direction and of similar magnitude to large-scale prob-

ability-based samples (i.e., the General Social Survey)

(Graham, Pickett, and Cullen forthcoming).

In our sample, this process led to the approximated repre-

sentative sample of 1,200 respondents. Given the focus of

this study, only white respondents were included in this

study, which reduced the sample to 770 respondents. Finally,

because of missing values (<5 percent), the final analytic

sample was 734 white respondents.

Compared with ACS

estimates of white Americans (in parentheses), this sample

was 51.3 percent female (50.7 percent), 51.7 percent were

married (52.2 percent), 44.6 percent had a college degree or

higher (35.7 percent), 87.8 percent were registered voters

(63.7 percent), and 38.2 percent resided in the South (35.6

percent). Furthermore, compared with Pew Research Center

estimates (in parentheses), 33.9 percent of this sample identi-

fied as Republican (54 percent), and 29.8 percent identified

as evangelical Christians (25.4 percent). Finally, 38.8 per-

cent of our sample identified as politically conservative,

compared with a Gallup estimate of 39 percent of white

Americans.

The second survey, obtained via MTurk, was fielded in

October 2019. Again, these data offered an opportunity to

see if the YouGov findings with regard to racial beliefs had

the same effects across an independent sample. This platform

allows “workers” to select from and complete different tasks

for a small financial incentive—$3.38 for completing our

survey. The use of these opt-in surveys provides the benefits

of reducing satisficing, interviewer effects, and measurement

error (Chang and Krosnick 2009). To recruit high-quality

respondents, only “workers” who had 90 percent or greater

approval ratings were allowed the opportunity to complete

this survey (Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014).

Of the original 763 respondents, the sample was reduced

to 465 responses by removing those who failed any one of

two attention check items (e.g., mark “not likely at all”),

were missing on variables used in the analytic models (<5

percent), and were nonwhite, given our interest in racial

resentment and perceptions of white nationalism. Of this

sample, 37.8 percent were women, 43.4 percent were mar-

ried, 65.8 percent had a college degree or higher, 36.3 per-

cent resided in the South, 26.0 percent identified as

Republican, 12.0 percent identified as religious fundamen-

talist, and 30.1 percent identified as politically conservative.

Note that an emerging literature documents that results

from matched opt-in samples (such as our YouGov sample)

produce results more consistent (i.e., direction and magni-

tude of coefficients) with national probability samples (e.g.,

the General Social Survey) than do nonmatched opt-in sam-

ples (such as our MTurk sample) (see Graham et al. forth-

coming; Thompson and Pickett 2019). Nonetheless, it is

possible that our use of multi-item scales with strong mea-

surement properties (i.e., α, factor loadings) yield compara-

ble findings between the YouGov and MTurk data, resulting

in similar factor loadings and coefficients for racial variables

reported below. Furthermore, on the basis of the ACS white

population estimates (described earlier), we also estimated

these models using poststratification weights with the MTurk

data, again producing similar results. We report the

unweighted results because the use of models’ predictors to

develop weights will unnecessarily increase the standard

errors, thus decreasing the precision of the estimates pro-

duced (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015; Winship and

Radbill 1994).

Dependent Variables

Our key dependent variable, faith in Trump, seeks not to

capture who voted for Trump but those who embrace the

president because they see him as a special leader. They

The YouGov measure of family income included in the core pro-

file items typically has a large number of missing values (n = 77

in our data) because it includes the response option of “prefer not

to say.” As a result, to retain the sample size, we omitted family

income from our main analysis in Table 1. Still, in a supplemen-

tary analysis, we created an economic model that included both full

employment and income. Neither variable had a significant effect.

Thus, adding income to the analysis did not substantively alter the

findings.

6 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

admire his style and strength, his promise to care for them

and protect them from threats, and his unique ability to

return the United States to a nation they once cherished. Our

goal was to select distinctive statements that reflected how

Trump framed his candidacy to the electorate. Thus, using a

Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly

agree), respondents in both samples rated their agreement or

disagreement with five items: (1) “I believe that President

Trump will make America great again,” (2) “President

Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that

gang members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the

U.S.,” (3) “President Trump is the only politician who really

cares about the common man,” (4) “President Trump knows

how to protect America against threats from around the

world,” and (5) “I love President Trump’s style because he

tells it like it is” (see Table 2). These items appear to differ-

entiate those with and without faith in Trump with high reli-

ability (α = .974) and high factor loadings (between .920

and .974).

Unique to our MTurk sample, we asked respondents,

“How willing or unwilling are you to wear a ‘Make

America Great Again’ (MAGA) hat in public?” Response

options ranged from 1 = very unwilling to 7 = very will-

ing. This outcome is important because it represents a

behavioral intention measure of faith in Trump. As noted,

donning a bright red, easily distinguishable MAGA hat is a

public expression of affinity for Donald Trump, one he

encourages (Givhan 2020; see also Crane 2012). Wearing

a MAGA hat is a “declaration of identity” to in-group

members (Givhan 2019); it also risks exposing a Trump

supporter to social exclusion, verbal insult, and even phys-

ical assaults from out-group members (see, e.g., Smith

2020; Torres 2019). If the findings hold with this depen-

dent variable, it provides added confidence that the factor

in question has effects that are robust across different ways

of assessing faith in Trump.

Independent Variables

White nationalism is the key construct in the study. Again,

this is not a measure of white supremacy or of belonging to a

formal white racial organization. Consistent with Kaufmann’s

(2019) use of the concept of ethno-traditional nationalism,

white nationalism is used to capture the belief that the United

States should remain culturally and demographically a white

nation. Building on prior writings, but particularly on

Kaufmann (2019), we developed a four-item scale to mea-

sure the concept, with responses (see Table 2) ranging from

1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree: (1) “The immi-

grants now invading our country—and their liberal support-

ers—want to turn America into a third-world country where

white people are a tiny minority”; (2) “Although people

won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made

America great in the first place”; (3) “Although everyone is

welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a white

nation to remain #1 in the world”; and (4) “We need to reduce

immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which

is what God meant it to be” (α = .872, factor loadings

between .813 and .883; see Table 1). All responses were

recoded so that higher values indicated a greater preference

for white nationalism.

Aside from white nationalism, an averaged four-item

scale of racial resentment drawn from Kinder and Sanders

(1996) asked respondents in both samples to rate their level

of agreement using a five-point Likert-type scale to state-

ments such as “It’s really a matter of some people not trying

hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be

just as well off as whites” (α = .888, factor loadings between

.856 and .885). Responses were coded such that higher val-

ues indicate greater racial resentment toward blacks.

Relatedly and confined to the MTurk sample, these items

were adapted to develop a Hispanic resentment scale to

reflect animus toward Hispanics, a group that Trump has

denigrated publicly, using statements such as “Generations

of discrimination have created conditions that make it diffi-

cult for Hispanics to work their way out of the lower class”

(α = .887, factor loadings between .887 and .916).

Conversely, a four-item scale of racial sympathy devel-

oped by Chudy (2017) was used to capture white distress

over black suffering in the YouGov sample. Respondents

rated their level of sympathy for individuals in four vignettes

on a five-point Likert-type scale, with higher values indicat-

ing more racial sympathy for the individuals in the vignettes

(α = .791, factor loadings between .676 and .872). This scale

was adapted to reflect white distress over Hispanics’ suffer-

ing in the MTurk sample using the same vignettes, but the

word Hispanic was used in place of black (α = .831; factor

loadings between .737 and .875).

A key consideration is whether the three racial beliefs are

empirically distinct. In previous research, Chudy (2017,

2021) demonstrated that racial sympathy and racial resent-

ment were not simply the opposite ends of the same attitudi-

nal spectrum. Although correlated (r = –.45), they loaded

on separate factors in factor analysis. Her analysis is pre-

sented in Table 3, and comparable results are found for both

the YouGov and MTurk surveys. Our study introduces the

measure for white nationalism, which is positively related to

racial resentment (r = .576) and negatively related to racial

sympathy (r = –.465) (see Table 1). The correlation between

racial resentment and sympathy is –.510. Importantly, in

both the YouGov and MTurk data, our exploratory factor

analysis revealed that white nationalism, racial resentment,

and racial sympathy load onto three separate factors (see

Table 3). Taken together, these findings suggest that racial

resentment, racial sympathy, and white nationalism are

independent constructs whose potential separate effects

merit examination both in the present analysis and in future

studies. Note that, in and of itself, this finding represents an

Table 1. YouGov Sample Descriptive Statistics (n = 734).

YouGov MTurk

Mean

or % SD Range

Factor

Loadings

Cronbach’s

Correlations

Mean

or % SD Range

Correlations

Faith in

Trump

White

Nationalism

Faith in

Trump

MAGA Hat

Wearing

Faith in Trump 2.80 1.58 1–5 .920–.974 .974 — .752*** 2.27 1.42 1–5 — .814***

White nationalism 2.27 1.11 1–5 .813–.883 .872 .752*** — 2.38 1.22 1–5 .740*** .633***

Racial resentment 3.15 1.16 1–5 .856–.885 .888 .685*** .576*** 2.59 1.19 1–5 .647*** .482***

Hispanic resentment — — — — — — — 2.58 1.15 1–5 .436*** .264***

Racial sympathy 3.59 1.00 1–5 .676–.872 .791 −.457*** −.465*** — — — — —

Hispanic sympathy — — — — — — — 3.74 .95 1–5 −.397*** −.269***

Fear of crime 2.93 1.00 1–5 .787–.900 .903 .183*** .302*** — — — — —

Dangerous world 3.26 .51 1–5 .741–.840 .796 .285*** .459*** — — — — —

Antisocialism 2.67 .96 1–5 .661–.829 .867 .681*** .596*** — — — — —

Conservative (%) 38.8 — — — — .645*** .446*** 30.1 — — .726*** .655***

Republican (%) 33.9 — — — — .583*** .407*** 26.0 — — .629*** .535***

Evangelical Christian (%) 29.8 — — — — .370*** .255*** — — — — —

Religious fundamentalist (%) — — — — — — — 12.0 — — .445*** .462***

Age 51.20 17.75 19–93 — — .208*** .123** 38.04 11.22 20–73 .047 .019

Sex (% female) 51.3 — — — — −.087* −.096** 37.8 — — −.077 −.091

Full-time employment (%) 40.8 — — — — −.086* −.066 76.8 — — .073 .172***

Married (%) 51.7 — — — — .160*** .133*** 43.4 — — .166*** .212***

Education (% college degree or higher) 44.6 — — — — −.138*** −.163*** 65.8 — — .138** .220***

Registered voter (%) 87.8 — — — — −.056 −.109** — — — — —

Reside in South (%) 38.2 — — — — .159*** .080* 36.3 — — .122** .098*

Note: MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

8 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

important measurement advance in the study of racial

beliefs.

Additionally, views about egalitarianism were identified

through six items in the YouGov sample that were averaged to

reflect antisocialist views (e.g., “We have gone too far in push-

ing equal rights in this country”). For a full listing of items, see

the online Appendix. Respondents indicated their agreement

or disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likert-

type scale (α = .867, factor loadings between .661 and .829).

Respondents’ fear of crime was measured in the YouGov

sample through the average response to five items about fear

of either “you or a member of your household” experiencing

one of these crimes: someone stealing money or property,

home break-in, street robbery or mugging, rape or sexual

Table 2. Faith in Trump, Beliefs in White Nationalism, and MAGA Hat Wearing Responses (%).

TA TD SA A NAD D SD

Faith in Trump (YouGov n = 734)

I believe that President Trump will make America great again. 43.0 43.8 25.0 18.0 13.2 2.9 40.9

President Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that gang

members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.

48.6 41.4 35.4 13.2 10.0 3.9 37.4

President Trump is the only politician who really cares about the common man 29.6 54.0 15.8 13.8 16.4 10.0 44.1

President Trump knows how to protect America against threats from around

the world.

45.3 43.1 21.9 23.4 11.6 4.8 38.3

I love President Trump’s style because he is strong and tells it like it is. 42.4 46.0 25.1 17.3 11.5 5.1 41.0

White nationalism (YouGov n = 734)

The immigrants now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—want

to turn America into a third-world country where white people are a tiny

minority.

35.9 44.4 18.8 17.1 19.7 8.6 35.8

Although people won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made

America great in the first place.

24.6 50.1 8.5 16.1 25.3 16.7 33.4

Although everyone is welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a

white nation to remain #1 in the world.

11.3 69.7 3.7 7.6 18.9 19.4 50.3

We need to reduce immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—

which is what God meant it to be.

9.6 70.9 4.7 4.9 19.5 16.8 54.1

MAGA hat wearing (MTurk n = 465) VU U SU NS SW W VW

How willing or unwilling are you to wear a “Make America Great Again”

(MAGA) hat in public?

58.7 7.1 5.4 5.4 7.1 6.9 9.5

Note: Percentages may not total to 100 percent, because of rounding. A = somewhat agree; D = somewhat disagree; NAD = neither agree nor disagree;

NS = not sure; SA = strongly agree; SD = strongly disagree; SU = somewhat unwilling; SW = somewhat willing; TA = total of strongly agree and

somewhat agree; TD = total of strongly disagree and somewhat disagree; U = unwilling; VU = very unwilling; VW = very willing; W = willing.

Table 3. Comparison of Racial Sympathy and Racial Resentment.

Statistical Properties Chudy Study YouGov Study MTurk Study

Factor Loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

Vignette 1: Laurette—hiring .10 .88 .116 .822 −.194 .118 .823 −.201

Vignette 2: hair salon applicants .05 .86 .105 .851 −.179 .068 .822 −.187

Vignette 3: bus depot −.06 .63 −.140 .722 .228 −.251 .693 .189

Vignette 4: Michael—police −.23 .58 −.354 .588 .063 −.164 .743 .064

Racial resentment—Irish .93 .11 .795 .088 .223 .673 .092 .373

Racial resentment—generations .88 .01 .944 −.043 −.173 .862 −.096 −.112

Racial resentment—try harder .79 −.07 .689 .075 .351 .552 .148 .535

Racial resentment—deserve .84 −.02 .905 −.112 −.196 .869 −.134 −.161

White nationalism—immigrants invading — — .440 .043 .567 .069 −.101 .800

White nationalism—white culture — — .228 −.037 .701 .170 −.015 .795

White nationalism—#1 in the world — — −.132 −.025 .946 −.127 −.023 .958

White nationalism—keep U.S. white nation — — −.148 −.016 .966 −.178 −.020 .969

Explained variance 43% 35% 48.12% 11.99% 13.73% 9.79% 14.44% 60.91%

n 751 734 465

Note: Exploratory factor analyses using promax rotation. Bold variables indicated item loaded on factor. MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk.

Graham et al. 9

assault, and murder. Respondents identified how afraid or

unafraid of these crimes they were on a five-point Likert-type

scale (α = .903, factor loadings between .787 and .900).

Additionally, YouGov respondents reported their beliefs

about the dangerousness of the world more broadly through

four items (e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt

all around us. All signs are pointing to it”; Altemeyer 1988).

See the online Appendix for exact items. Respondents’ beliefs

in a dangerous world were captured through agreement or

disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likert-

type scale (α = .796, factor loadings between .741 and .840).

Given the political divisions within the U.S. geographic

regions, a dummy variable reflecting those living in the South

was created for both samples on the basis of respondents’

identified state of residence and the U.S. census regions.

Relatedly, consistent with previous research (see, e.g., King

and Wheelock 2007; Shelley et al. 2021), political ideology in

both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those who were

reportedly conservative or very conservative in order to avoid

excluding those who were “not sure” about their ideology

(“not sure” n = 42). Additionally, political party affiliation in

both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those identifying

as Republican. Given their central beliefs about the “born

again” experience (conversion), evangelical Christians were

identified in the YouGov sample by their affirmative response

to “Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangeli-

cal Christian, or not?” (Pew Research Center 2018). In the

MTurk sample, religious fundamentalists were identified

through respondents’ describing their religious identity

(“somewhat well” or “very well”) as “fundamentalist,” “born

again,” or “evangelical” and/or endorsement that “the Bible

means exactly what it says. It should be taken literally, word-

for-word,” which is consistent with previous research (Baylor

Religion Survey 2007; Maxwell and Shields 2019).

Furthermore, all analyses for both samples controlled for

sociodemographic variables including age (continuously

measured), sex (1 = female, 0 = male), marital status (1 =

married, 0 = others), and education (1 = college degree or

higher, 0 = less than a college degree). Education was coded

in this way because support for Trump is markedly higher

among non-college-educated whites (Sides 2017; Sides et al.

2017). In addition, the YouGov models controlled for being

a registered voter in 2016 (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Analytic Strategy

The present analysis was carried out in four steps. First, we

assess public attitudes toward Trump and white

nationalism in the YouGov sample descriptively. Second, we

explore a series of regression models using the YouGov sam-

ple to examine predictors of faith in Trump, with a special

focus on the effects of racial beliefs. Third, using data from

the MTurk sample, we explore a series of regression models

using the MTurk data to assess predictors of faith in Trump,

largely reproducing the findings from the YouGov data.

Finally, we examine the MTurk sample’s attitude toward

Trump using a proxy for faith in Trump: willingness to wear

a MAGA hat. All regression models were estimated using

ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. All variance infla-

tion factors were less than the cutoff of 4.0, which indicates

no concern with multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch

1980; Fox 1991). Ultimately, controlling for a range of vari-

ables, the goal is to address the following question: Are racial

beliefs, including white nationalism, related to faith in Trump?

Results

Faith in Trump and Support for White

Nationalism: YouGov Sample

Table 2 reports the extent to which sample members agreed

or disagreed with the items measuring faith in Trump and

white nationalism. In describing the results, we present the

total agree percentage, which includes those answering

“agree” and “strongly agree.” As seen in Table 2, a substan-

tial minority of respondents agreed with the five items used

to measure faith in Trump. Nearly half (48.6 percent) of

respondents agreed that “President Trump is 100% correct

that we need a wall to make sure that gang members, crimi-

nals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.” More than 4 in

10 agreed that “President Trump knows how to protect

America against threats from around the world” (45.3 per-

cent), “I believe that President Trump will make America

great again” (43.0 percent), and “I love President Trump’s

style because he tells it like it is” (42.4 percent). Furthermore,

more than a quarter (29.6 percent) agreed that “President

Trump is the only politician who really cares about the com-

mon man.”

In addition, the respondents expressed a measure of sup-

port for the four items used to measure white nationalism.

More than a third (35.9 percent) agreed that “The immigrants

now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—

want to turn America into a third-world country where white

people are a tiny minority.” Nearly one in four (24.6 percent)

endorsed the view that “Although people won’t admit it,

white people and their culture are what made America great

in the first place.” In addition, roughly 1 in 10 agreed that

“Although everyone is welcome in the country, America

must remain mostly a white nation to remain #1 in the world”

(11.3 percent) and that “We need to reduce immigration to

keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which is what God

meant it to be” (9.6 percent).

At the request of a reviewer, YouGov models were estimated with

the registered voter variable removed from the analysis. Results for

the impact of white nationalism on faith in Trump were substan-

tively the same. Therefore, this variable was retained to produce a

more fully specified model.

10 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump in the YouGov Sample (n = 734).

Trump Base Model Political Model Crime Salience Model Racial Model

Variable b SE β b SE β b SE β b SE β

Racial beliefs

Racial sympathy — — — — — — — — — −.002 .037 −.001

Racial resentment — — — — — — — — — .225 .042 .165***

White nationalism — — — — — — — — — .572 .038 .402***

Crime salience

Dangerous world — — — — — — .238 .047 .131*** .062 .042 .034

Fear of crime — — — — — — .125 .040 .079** −.008 .035 −.005

Political

Conservative — — — .852 .104 .263*** .821 .101 .253*** .599 .087 .185***

Antisocialist — — — .648 .047 .392*** .593 .046 .359*** .180 .052 .109***

Trump base and controls

Age .011 .003 .123*** .001 .002 .014 .002 .002 .019 −.001 .002 −.001

Female −.282 .091 −.089** −.096 .074 −.030 −.163 .074 −.057* −.038 .063 −.012

Full-time employment −.010 .102 −.003 −.025 .083 −.008 −.016 .080 −.005 −.015 .068 −.005

Married .129 .094 .041 .102 .076 .032 .095 .073 .030 .052 .063 .017

Education −.203 .096 −.064* −.211 .078 −.066** −.117 .076 −.037 .008 .065 .002

Registered voter −.650 .142 −.135*** −.506 .116 −.105*** −.455 .112 −.094*** −.224 .096 −.046*

Republican 1.676 .102 .502*** .719 .099 .216*** .681 .096 .204*** .536 .082 .161***

Reside in South .206 .095 .063* .179 .076 .055* .157 .074 .048* .174 .063 .053**

Evangelical Christian .645 .106 .187*** .292 .087 .084** .235 .084 .068** .211 .072 .061**

Constant 2.428 .239 — .920 .222 — −.084 .253 — −.183 .284 —

Adjusted R

.422 .623 .650 .749

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump and MAGA Hat Wearing in the Amazon Mechanical Turk

Sample (n = 465).

Variable

Faith in Trump MAGA Hat Wearing

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

b SE β b SE β b SE β b SE β

Racial beliefs

Hispanic sympathy .028 .048 .019 — — — .106 .091 .047 — — —

Hispanic resentment .125 .039 .101** — — — −.025 .073 −.013 — — —

Racial resentment — — — .214 .039 .180*** — — — .069 .076 .038

White nationalism .501 .039 .431*** .419 .040 .360*** .665 .074 .375*** .576 .078 .324***

Control variables

Age .002 .003 .017 .002 .003 .019 .005 .006 .026 .004 .006 .023

Sex −.103 .075 −.035 −.094 .073 −.032 −.278 .142 −.062 −.255 .142 −.057

Full-time employment −.071 .086 −.021 −.070 .084 −.021 .351 .163 .069* .347 .163 .068*

Married .116 .074 .041 .079 .072 .028 .275 .141 .063 .299 .140 .069*

Education .009 .077 .003 .017 .075 .006 .293 .147 .064* .313 .146 .069*

Republican .478 .114 .148*** .448 .111 .139*** .403 .217 .082 .322 .215 .065

Reside in South .079 .073 .027 .078 .071 .026 .087 .138 .019 .091 .138 .020

Religious fundamentalist .342 .128 .079** .391 .123 .090** .795 .243 .120* .919 .238 .138***

Conservative 1.025 .113 .332*** .963 .112 .312*** 1.615 .214 .343*** 1.579 .216 .335***

Constant .100 .295 — .186 .168 — −.769 .559 — −.383 .325 —

Adjusted R

.729 .740 .581 .581

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Graham et al. 11

Predictors of Faith in Trump: YouGov Sample

Table 4 presents a series of OLS linear regression models,

each with the theoretical potential to explain faith in Trump.

As expected in the Trump base model, being a Republican,

being an evangelical Christian, and residing in the South

were each significant, with Republican affiliation being the

strongest predictor (β = .502). The political model intro-

duced conservative political ideology and antisocialist views,

showing both to be significant predictors of faith in Trump.

The crime salience model introduces belief in a dangerous

world and fear of crime, showing these to also be significant

predictors. Finally, the racial model presents the fully speci-

fied model; key variables from each previous model, with

the exception of the crime salience model, retain significance

in the analysis. Thus, all key variables in the Trump base

model were positively and significantly related to faith in

Trump (Republican, reside in South, evangelical Christian),

as were the variables in the political model (conservative,

antisocialist). Most important, racial beliefs appear conse-

quential. Although racial sympathy was nonsignificant,

racial resentment and white nationalism were the strongest

predictors within the analysis, with white nationalism exert-

ing the largest effect (β = .402). This model explained 74.9

percent of the variation in faith in Trump.

Predictors of Faith in Trump: Supplementary

MTurk Sample

As seen in Table 5, these multivariate findings regarding

faith in Trump were largely reproduced using the MTurk

sample across two models, one with measures of Hispanic

resentment and sympathy and one with the traditional mea-

sure of racial resentment (toward blacks). In both analyses

(models 1 and 2), white nationalism was the strongest pre-

dictor of faith in Trump (β = .431 and .360, respectively)

followed by conservative political ideology (β = .332 and

.312, respectively). In addition, Republican party affiliation

and religious fundamentalism were significant predictors

of faith in Trump. Notably, not only black resentment but

also Hispanic resentment was associated with great support

for Donald Trump. Neither black nor Hispanic sympathy

was significantly related to the outcome variable.

To further test this effect, we used the MTurk sample to

explicitly assess the willingness to wear a MAGA hat, a

proxy for faith in Trump. As seen in Table 2, nearly three in

four (71.2 percent) were either somewhat unwilling, unwill-

ing, or very unwilling to wear this hat. However, a substan-

tive proportion (23.5 percent) expressed a willingness to

wear this symbol of Trump.

As seen in Table 5, consistent with the previous analyses,

white nationalism was the most robust predictor (β = .375

and .324, respectively) of willingness to wear a MAGA hat

in model 3 (using Hispanic resentment and sympathy) and a

close second (β = .324) to conservative ideology (β = .335)

in model 4 (using traditional racial resentment). However,

neither racial resentment (Hispanic and black) nor Hispanic

sympathy was statistically significant in either model.

Finally, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess pos-

sible effects. First, as noted in endnote 1, OLS models were

estimated that included income and full-time employment.

These factors were not significant and did not alter the

results. Second, an interaction effect of racial resentment ×

white nationalism was assessed. The interaction term was

not significant. Third, nonsignificant results also were found

for the interaction term of sex × white nationalism. Fourth,

two of the items in the faith in Trump scale refer to President

Trump’s building a wall to keep criminals from entering the

United States and protecting Americans from threats from

around the world, whereas the white nationalism scale refers

to the need to reduce immigration in two items. It could be

argued that the relationship between these two scales is due

to this overlap. We disagree because one scale asks about

faith in President Trump to prevent external threats, whereas

the other scale asks about the impact of immigration on the

racial composition of the United States. Still, we reestimated

the multivariate analyses deleting the two items from the

faith in Trump scale that referenced these external threats. As

anticipated, white nationalism remained a robust predictor of

faith in Trump in both the YouGov (model 4, β = .411) and

MTurk data (model 1, β = .414; model 2, β = .342).

Discussion

As Jardina (forthcoming) emphasized, public support for

Donald Trump is rooted in his appealing not only to out-

group animus but also to in-group solidarity, a conclusion

reinforced by the present study. As numerous news accounts

document, President Trump’s 2020 electoral strategy

involved openly stoking racial resentment and defending

white nationalism (see, e.g., Costa and Rucker 2020; Dawsey

and Stein 2020; Strauss 2020). Recent examples are legion.

In June, he retweeted a supporter filmed “shouting ‘white

power’ while driving a golf cart bedecked with Trump memo-

rabilia”—later taken down but never condemned (Beggin

2020). His retweet expressed his gratitude for these “great

people” supporting him (Swasey 2020). In his July 4 rally at

Mount Rushmore, he “excoriated racial justice protesters as

‘evil’ representatives of a ‘new far-left fascism’ whose ulti-

mate goal is ‘the end of America’” (Costa and Rucker 2020).

Echoing this animus, he has termed BLM as a “symbol of

hate,” called protesters of police violence “thugs,” and labeled

antiracism rallies “domestic terror” (Beggin 2020). In his trip

to Kenosha, Wisconsin, he refused to meet with Jacob Blake,

the African American man shot by a police officer, and

defended Kyle Rittenhouse, a white teenager who traveled

from Illinois to Kenosha, where he now stands accused of

murdering two people with an AR-15-type weapon (Schechter

2020; Wise 2020). When asked about systemic racism, Trump

said, “I don’t believe in that” (Lizza 2020).

12 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World

He soon followed up by directing Russell Vought, Office of

Management and Budget head, to cancel all federal govern-

ment racial sensitivity training based on “critical race theory”

and notions of “white privilege” (Dawsey and Stein 2020).

Vought’s (2020) memorandum stated that the president

believed that these programs “undercut our core values as

Americans” and are “divisive, un-American propaganda.”

Echoing the same theme, President Trump then attacked the

educational 1619 Project, which reframes American history

through the lens of slavery and the enduring antiblack animus

it promoted. Arguing that “teaching this doctrine to our chil-

dren is a form of child abuse in the truest sense of those

words,” he created the 1776 Commission to develop a patri-

otic, “pro-American curriculum that celebrates the truth about

our nation’s great history” (Watson and Segers 2020). Pollster

Cornell Belcher captured the moment. “Without white resent-

ment, there is no rationale for Donald Trump. . . . Without that,

what reason do his supporters have to be with Donald Trump

if he’s not going to be your tribal strong man? He started there

and will end there” (quoted in Costa and Rucker 2020).

In this context, we explored “who wears the MAGA hat” in

multiple models using two different white samples, numerous

potential predictors, and a measure of faith in Trump, supple-

mented with a specific question on willingness to don a

MAGA hat. The findings reveal that faith in Trump is not fully

contingent on racial attitudes. Allegiance to the president is

also derived from his presumed base of Republicans, those liv-

ing in the South, and evangelical or fundamentalist Christians.

Such support is bolstered as well by those with conservative

political ideology and antisocialist beliefs. However, contrary

to our hypothesized model, crime salience was not associated

with faith in Trump in the model, including all predictor vari-

ables. The important point, however, is that even with controls

for these political and social variables, racial beliefs of whites

matter and are likely integral to understanding the intense loy-

alty of the president’s white followers.

Consistent with academic research and popular commen-

tary, racial resentment was a significant predictor in all mod-

els with faith in Trump as the dependent variable (see Tables 4

and 5). Notably, this effect is demonstrated using the stan-

dard Kinder and Sanders (1996) measure of racial resent-

ment and using an adaptation of this scale to assess Hispanic

resentment. Future research should explore this finding on

types of racial resentment. As a side note, Chudy (2017,

forthcoming) argued that racial sympathy is activated when a

policy is specifically relevant to African Americans (e.g.,

support for affirmative action, sentencing of a black criminal

defendant). Given Trump’s racially charged rhetoric, it

seemed plausible that racial sympathy might evoke less sup-

port for the president. This was not the case. Racial sympathy

might be activated if respondents were asked about race-

specific actions by the president, such as his criticism of

BLM or canceling federal racial sensitivity training, but this

remains to be demonstrated.

The importance of the contributions of Jardina (2019b,

forthcoming) and Kaufmann (2019), and the ethnographic

work of Hochschild (2016; see also Kimmel 2013), is that

these works push social science to move beyond an over-

concentration on out-group racial animus to consider in-

group racial solidarity. Racial resentment remains a robust

predictor essential to any quantitative study, but it is not the

only racial attitude that has political consequences. These

revisionist authors argue that increasing diversity, seen in

both cultural and demographic trends, is fueling the creation

of a group identity and consciousness among a sizable

minority of whites (Jardina 2019b, forthcoming). These

views cannot be reduced to white hatred and supremacy.

Jardina speaks of white identity and consciousness and

Kaufmann (2019) of ethno-traditional nationalism. We

believe that the concept of “white nationalism” is parsimo-

nious, describes beliefs about keeping the United States

white accurately, and has intuitive appeal. Regardless of the

label settled upon, future research on the effects of racial

beliefs will benefit from including this factor in the analy-

ses. The contemporary reality is that political allegiances

and public policy preferences are shaped not only by what

whites think about blacks but also by what whites think

about themselves.

In this regard, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) work is sig-

nificant because it demonstrates empirically that white iden-

tity and consciousness predict warm feelings toward and a

voting preference for Donald Trump. We build on her find-

ings in two ways. First, methodologically, we confirm that

measures of whiteness—in this case, white nationalism—are

conceptually and empirically distinct from other racial

beliefs, such as resentment and sympathy. Second, substan-

tively, we show that white nationalism is a consistent and

robust predictor of faith in Trump for white Americans. This

association is initially demonstrated in the main analysis

with the YouGov sample. With an independent sample, we

then reproduce these results with MTurk data and proceed to

establish that white nationalism also is related to willingness

to wear a MAGA hat—again a behavioral expression of

identity fusion with the president (Kunst et al. 2019). A sea

of whites donning MAGA hats at campaign rallies thus

seems due not only to the Trump camp’s marketing prowess

but also to his follows’ desire to display faith in their man.

Taken together with Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming)

research, the present study appears to confirm what these

observations of Trump campaign rallies suggest: race is inte-

gral to his popularity and electoral success among whites.

Trump’s genius was in understanding that many white

Americans felt like strangers in their own land, to use

Hochschild’s (2016) poignant phrase. “Radical Islamists”

and “bad hombres” as well as proposed bans and walls, were

convenient conduits to communicate that he was on their

side in the culture wars devaluing them and their social

standing. The use of the MAGA acronym communicated that

he was going to make their America great again by slowing

demographic change and by defending the symbols of white-

ness. Trump’s “racialized political narratives,” noted Fording

and Schram (2020), “helped make his campaign slogan to

Graham et al. 13

‘Make America Great Again’ easily be decoded to mean we

need to ‘Make American White Again’” (p. 40). He promised

to be their champion, and they responded with faith in Trump.

He reaffirmed their status and served their emotional inter-

ests (Hochschild 2016).

Two issues remain to be determined. First, Trump’s 2020

campaign focused less on “dangerous” out-groups—

Muslims and Mexicans—and more on animus toward

African American (BLM) protesters. In the aftermath of the

George Floyd incident and rising concern over racial justice

(Eligon 2020), it is unclear if this political strategy will

increase or erode faith in Trump. The recent presidential

election, however, likely did little to suggest a decline in

Trump’s popularity or to provide any incentive from him to

change his political strategy. Although losing to Biden,

Trump amassed more than 74.2 million votes—the second

highest total historically (to Biden’s 81.3 million votes),

including 95 percent of all Republicans and 58 percent of all

white voters. These figures are similar to or higher than in

the 2016 election; Trump even increased his support in 2020

among people of color. Young Americans constitute one

crack in this wall of support. Exit polls report that nearly

two thirds of those ages 18 to 24 (65 percent) cast their vote

for Biden (CNN 2016, 2020). This generational gap in

Trump support may dim the prospect of Trumpism, if not

now, perhaps in the future.

Second, in the post-Trump era, it is unclear whether white

in-group solidarity will grow and intensify or attenuate as

cultural and demographic diversity become an unstoppable

development (Jones 2016). It also remains to be seen if poli-

ticians within the Republican Party will continue to attempt

to capitalize on racial resentment and white nationalism.

Donald Trump shows no signs of receding into the dustbin of

defeated presidential candidates, holding out the promise of

a presidential run in 2024 and threatening to punish any poli-

tician who does not show sufficient loyalty to him, including

in his doomed attempt to retain his office. Trump endures as

the elephant in the Republican room. “Republicans should

wake up,” observed Rubin (2020). “A sizable segment of

‘their’ base is not theirs at all. Those voters are the ones in

red hats hollering that the election was stolen” (see also

Thompson 2020). Indeed, commentators are holding a

requiem for the establishment GOP, noting that the party of

Lincoln is now owned by Trump (The Editorial Board 2020).

According to the New York Times, the party “allowed itself to

be co-opted by Trumpism. Its ideology has been reduced to a

slurry of paranoia, white grievance and authoritarian popu-

lism” (The Editorial Board 2020). Republican presidential

hopefuls are not running away from these sentiments but are

embracing Trumpism and its emphasis on white working-

class resentment toward liberal “socialism,” efforts to

“defund the police,” and talk of “systemic racism” (see

Waldman 2020). Still, central questions remain: Will whites

with this inclination wear MAGA hats for other candidates,

or is their faith in the president a historical quirk unique to

Donald Trump? And what role will be played by racial

beliefs, including white nationalism, in shaping such politi-

cal allegiances?

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Ashley Jardina for her comments on an

earlier draft of this paper.

ORCID iD

Amanda Graham https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7474-2539

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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Author Biographies

Amanda Graham is an assistant professor in the Department of

Criminal Justice and Criminology at Georgia Southern University.

She received her PhD in criminal justice from the University of

Cincinnati. She is a coeditor of Crime and Victimization in the

Trump Era (Taylor & Francis). Her current research interests focus

on the fear of police brutality, perceptions of and reactions to the

coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, the racial sources of crime-

related public opinion, and “criminometrics”—the measurement of

core criminological concepts.

Francis T. Cullen is a distinguished research professor emeritus

and a senior research associate in the School of Criminal Justice at

the University of Cincinnati. He is a past president of the American

Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice

Sciences. His research interests include developing the rehabilita-

tion-redemption model of corrections, advancing a social support

theory of crime, and the criminology of Donald Trump. He is a

coeditor of the forthcoming seventh edition of Criminological

Theory: Past to Present (Oxford University Press).

Leah C. Butler is an assistant professor in the School of

Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska

Omaha. Her research is centered on corrections, with an emphasis

on the effects of race and racial attitudes on public opinion of cor-

rectional policy. She also conducts research in victimology, with a

focus on intimate partner violence, sexual violence, repeat victim-

ization, and strategies for preventing such violence including fed-

eral policy and bystander intervention training. Her recent work has

been published in Crime and Delinquency, Criminal Justice and

Behavior, the Journal of Interpersonal Violence, the Journal of

School Violence, and Victims & Offenders.

Alexander L. Burton is a PhD candidate in the School of Criminal

Justice at the University of Cincinnati. His current research interests

include public opinion on criminal justice policies and improving

correctional officer training. His research has recently been pub-

lished in Justice Quarterly, the Journal of Research in Crime and

Delinquency, and Criminology and Public Policy.

Velmer S. Burton, Jr. is senior vice chancellor for university strat-

egy and performance and professor of criminal justice at the

University of Arkansas at Little Rock. He holds a PhD from the

University of Cincinnati and an EdD from the University of

Pennsylvania. His research in crime and justice has been published

in Criminology, Justice Quarterly, the Journal of Research in

Crime and Delinquency, Criminal Justice and Behavior, and the

Journal of Quantitative Criminology.