1030 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1012
rights possibly, in part, because of the historical lack of constitutional
protections afforded students at school.
133
While ensuring student safety is one of the most critical missions
of school officials,
134
courts seem to find that the general threat of
school safety overrides almost any concern for students’ constitutional
rights.
135
The idea of crime in schools, often identified as either drugs
or weapons, is occasionally portrayed as a new or unprecedented
threat, which requires special vigilance by schools and courts.
136
Sta-
tistical evidence, however, indicates that America’s schools remain ex-
ceptionally safe environments for students.
137
The Nebraska Supreme Court emphatically rejected the dissent’s
warning of the dangerous consequences of the majority’s holding.
138
(2011) (“[T]he narrative of youth criminality as a serious threat to society re-
mains a potent theme in American culture and a driving force of public policy.”).
133. For example, the doctrine of
in loco parentis
, expressly rejected by
T.L.O.
, has
continued to sporadically influence judicial thinking. Under this standard, school
officials act under the delegated authority of the student’s parents, and the stu-
dent enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection in school.
See
Alysa B. Koloms,
Stripping Down the Reasonableness Standard: The Problem with Using
In Loco
Parentis
to Define Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights
, 39 H
OFSTRA
L. R
EV
. 169,
189 (2010);
see also
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 383
(2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the search in question should be upheld
under an
in loco parentis
standard or, alternatively, under
T.L.O.
’s reasonable
suspicion framework); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–25 (2007) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (stating that the Court should overturn prior constitutional limits
imposed on public school officials conduct and replace it with an
in loco parentis
standard); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a school principal’s search of a student’s hotel room on school-sponsored trip did
not need to be supported by reasonable suspicion because the principal was act-
ing
in loco parentis
).
But see
Rhodes v. Guarricino, 54 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting Webb’s
in loco parentis
analysis in regards to chaper-
one’s search of student’s room on school-sponsored trip).
134.
See
W. David Hatkins & John S. Hooks,
The Legal Aspects of School Violence:
Balancing School Safety with Students’ Rights
, 69 M
ISS
. L.J. 641, 645 (1999) (not-
ing that school safety remains a significant concern despite statistical reductions
in violent occurrences).
135. Beger,
supra
note 131.
136. The Court in
T.L.O.
considered recent “particularly ugly forms” of school disorder
such as drug use and gang violence. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339
(1985). But this language should be read in the context of the 1980s when crime
in schools reached its zenith.
See
Forman,
supra
note 132, at 315;
see also
Stefkovich,
supra
note 84, at 119 (noting that courts tend to erroneously treat
drug and weapon possessions as equally immediate threats).
137. Beger,
supra
note 131, at 338 (citing a number of empirical studies to demon-
strate that school violence rates dropped significantly over the course of the
1990s); Hatkins & Hooks,
supra
note 134, at 644 (noting that less than one per-
cent of homicides and suicides among school-aged youth nationwide occur in the
school context).
138. J.P.
ex rel.
A.P. v. Millard Pub. Sch., 285 Neb. 890, 909–10, 830 N.W.2d 453,
467–68 (2013) (“The facts of this case demonstrate the fallacy of the dissent’s
suggested parade of horribles.”) (internal quotations omitted).