The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China

International Education International Education

Volume 42

Issue 1

Fall 2012

The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China

Guangyu Tan

State University of New York-Fredonia

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THE ONE-CHILD POLICY AND PRIVATIZATION OF

EDUCATION IN CHINA

Guangyu Tan

State University of New York-Fredonia

ABSTRACT

China’s one-child policy is one of the most signiﬁ cant, yet controversial, pro-

grams of planned fertility. While the focus of the controversy is on the nature of

the policy (for example, whether the policy is humane, or whether it violates the

basic human rights of individual freedom), the impact of such population control

program on China’s educational policy and practices is understudied. Moreover,

the relationship between the one-child policy and the privatization of K-12 edu-

cation in China remains insufﬁ ciently understood. Therefore, the purpose of this

article is to address this gap in the literature and to explore the impact of one-child

policy on privatization of education, and the transformation of education policy

in China since 1979.

INTRODUCTION

Implemented in 1979, China’s one-child policy is one of the most signiﬁ cant,

yet controversial, programs of planned fertility. It emerged as a panacea for the

country’s many pressing social problems, including population crisis, poverty,

inﬂ ation, agricultural stagnation, inadequate school facilities and unemployment

(Chow & Chen, 1989). The one-child policy was designed to restrict population

growth, thereby advancing economic prosperity in China. Since the inception of

the one-child policy in 1979, China’s population has decreased by about 250 mil-

lion (Kane & Choi, 1999). This reduction in fertility has eased some of the pres-

sures on communities, the state, and the environment in a country that still carries

one ﬁ fth of the world’s population. Moreover, because of the low fertility rate,

China can focus on developing its economy and raising the living standards of its

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people. Since 1979, an unprecedented 150 million people have been lifted out of

poverty (Potts, 2006). As Greenhalgh (2003a) suggests, the one-child policy has

served as a means for China to accelerate its industrialization and modernization,

catch up with the West, and achieve its rightful place in a global stage.

Despite these positive effects, China’s one-child population policy has been

highly controversial and it has been criticized by the Western world as “totalitar-

ian,” “coercive,” “barbaric,” and “uncivilized” ( Ebenstein, 2010; Greenhalgh,

2003a; Li, 1989; and Wasserstrom, 1984). While the focus of the debate is on

the nature of the one-child policy (for example, whether the policy is humane, or

whether the policy violates the basic human rights of individual freedom), the im-

pact of such population control program on China’s educational policy and prac-

tices is understudied. Furthermore, the relationship between the one-child policy

and the privatization of K-12 education in China remains insufﬁ ciently reported.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to address this gap in the literature on the

impact of one-child policy on privatization of education and the transformation of

education policy in China since 1979.

This article is a review of literature and legislation on family planning in

China from 1979 to the present. It aims at answering the following research ques-

tions: 1) What is the relationship between the one-child mandate and the emer-

gence of private education in China? 2) How does one-child policy affect family

choice of schools?

This article begins with an historical overview of China’s one-child policy,

elucidating the historical, social and political context of its implementation. The

article further focuses on the relationship between the one-child policy and pa-

rental school choices in China. It closely examines two forms of private schools:

the elite private schools (Gui zu xue xiao) and the people-run schools (Min ban

xue xiao).

Previous research has considered these private schools primarily as an eco-

nomic response to the liberalized climate of the 1980s when the once intrusive

state acceded a role, even in the provision of education, to entrepreneurs (Kwong,

1997). However, this article argues that the one-child policy has contributed to and

facilitated the emergence of private schools. Because each couple could only have

one child, the parents were not satisﬁ ed with the mediocre educational services

that public schools offered to their single children. Many parents were anxious to

improve the chances for their single children to learn marketable and employable

skills or to gain entrance to Ivy League education. Boasting high educational stan-

dards, strict discipline, highly qualiﬁ ed instructors, and state-of-art technology,

elite private schools (Gui zu xue xiao) have been established to cater to the needs

and demands of a wealthy clientele (Kwong, 1997; Lin, 1994). Indeed, China’s

growing middle class and nouveau riche regard these elite private schools for their

single children as the latest status symbol (Arora, 2010).

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that all private schools are elite, ca-

tering to the rich and the powerful. The people-run schools (Min ban xue xiao) are

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The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China.

often short in funding, lack qualiﬁ ed teachers, and lack high standards in school

administration (Lin, 1994). Nevertheless, these private schools have been set up

to serve the unplanned children or those who were born outside of the family

planning policy. As a result of the one-child mandate, unplanned children or ille-

gitimate children are denied basic beneﬁ ts and rights, including the right to a free

9-year public education (Greenhalgh, 2003b). Therefore, the people-run schools

are a response to the increasing demand for a basic education for unplanned

children. The discrepancy between the elite private schools and the people-run

schools symbolizes the increasing gap between the rich and poor in China, the

second largest economic power of the world.

THE ONE-CHILD POLICY: HISTORICAL AND

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

For thousands of years, the traditional ideal Chinese family was patriarchal

in authority, patrilineal in descent, and patrilocal in residence (Huang, 1982). The

feudal ideology, which values fecundity and favors male offspring to maintain

paternal lineages, has dominated Chinese culture and family life. It was com-

monly believed that the more sons one had, the more good fortune a family would

have. Birth control or family planning has conﬂ icted with such cultural values and

with the patriarchal system, and therefore was alien to Chinese society before the

People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949.

During the ﬁ rst decade of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule between

1949 and 1959, the Chinese leaders introduced the novel concept of state-con-

trolled family planning as “an irrefutable task of the socialist state” (Greenhalgh,

2003b, p. 201). Any unregulated or unplanned human reproduction was consid-

ered antisocialist and contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese state

(Greenhalgh). In keeping with this idea, births were planned by the state on the

basis of the collective good, and state planned birth control has been placed at the

center of China’s approach to population control to this day. Yet, no speciﬁ c poli-

cies or measures were adopted to slow the birth rate.

This birth-control campaign was suspended during the 1960s and 1970s be-

cause a large population was once again considered to be an asset to economic

growth. The Chinese government shifted its focus from overpopulation to the

shortage of manpower (Freeberne, 1965). Unrestrained population growth, a fall-

ing morality rate, and concurrent improvements in health care resulted in a de-

mographic explosion in China that taxed the country beyond its economic and

political resources. China’s population grew from 500 million in 1947 to 800

million by 1970, and was close to one billion in 1980—approximately 22.7% of

the world’s population (Rosenberg & Jing, 1996). If the trend had continued, the

three-child family would have produced a projected population of 1.414 billion by

the year 2000; of 2.923 billion by 2050; and of 4.260 billion by 2080 (Goodstadt,

1982, p. 39).

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In response to this population crisis, the Chinese government launched a

birth-control campaign from 1971-1979, advising its citizens to marry late, not to

have their ﬁ rst child until the age of 25, to have children spaced at longer inter-

vals, and to have fewer offspring (Chow & Chen, 1989). This campaign laid the

groundwork for the one-child per married couple policy instituted in 1979. The

one-child policy was also a result of the government’s effort to improve popula-

tion quality and individual living standards. After decades of political turmoil

(especially ten years of destruction of “Cultural Revolution

” from 1966-1976),

China’s economy was stagnant, and people were living with bare necessity. De-

termined to overcome the sluggish economic growth and low living standards,

the new regime under Deng Xiao Ping’s leadership, launched an economic reform

in 1979, placing the development of “market socialism” and the transformation

of China into a modern nation within decades as the top priority (Greenhalgh,

2003a). As economic goals were expressed as per capita gains, population control

was the key to this new reform agenda. Muhua Chen, vice premier and head of the

State Council Birth Planning Leading Group, stated,

Under present conditions in China, whether or not to control population

growth is deﬁ nitely not merely a question of having fewer or more children,

but a serious question related to the development of our social productive

force, to the realization of the four modernizations, to socialist construction,

and to the strategic transition to communism (Chen, 1979,p. 2; as cited in

Greenhalgh, 2003b, p. 203).

Between the mid1970s and early 1980s, discursive elements from various

sources were drawn and elaborated into a complex conceptual framework that

served to legitimize and, later, in 1980s and 1990s, guided the enforcement of

the one-child policy. This discourse established the basic goals, rationale, and

measures of birth planning and control. The one-child policy generally allows one

child per couple under normal circumstances

(Yang, 2007). However, depending

on the provincial economic development, population size, location, and to some

extent, fertility desires, the one-child policy has varied at the provincial and local

levels. To battle the patriarchal belief of “the more sons, the better,” the Chinese

government offered four major rationales for planned fertility and few children:

better health care for both children and mothers; better social conditions for rais-

ing future generations; increasing work efﬁ ciency and political awareness; and

promoting gender equity (Huang, 1982).

With the introduction of the one-child policy, the Chinese government has

undertaken tremendous efforts and a number of measures, including education,

persuasion, and media promotion coupled with economic rewards or sanctions

(Huang, 1982; Chow & Chen, 1989; Rosenberg & Jing, 1996; Greenhalgh, 2003).

Government policy has emphasized education about modern methods of contra-

ception, eugenics, maternal care and child-care. Furthermore, the government has

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The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China.

dispensed free birth-control pills and devices and has legalized abortion. Couples

who comply with the mandate receive an honorary certiﬁ cate along with mon-

etary awards and privileges such as extended maternity leave, free nursery care,

free medical care, and special access to education and job opportunities (Chow

& Chen; and Rosenberg & Jing). Parents who violate the one-child policy are

severely penalized or disciplined with economic sanctions commonly known as

“social compensation fee [SCF]

,” and they forfeit other social beneﬁ ts (Huang;

and Chow & Chen).

As a result of the one-child policy, the total birth rate decreased from 2.9 in

1979 to 1.7 in 2004, with a rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just under 2.0 in rural

areas (Hesketh, Li, & Zhu, 2005). The policy is estimated to have reduced the

number of births by over 400 million since 1979 (NPDSRG, 2007; Zhang, 2007);

however, the impact of the one-child policy is beyond population control. It has

far-reaching effects on Chinese social structure, women’s roles in production and

reproduction, children’s development and well-being, and education policies and

practices in China. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the im-

pacts of the one-child policy, and, therefore, this article focuses on the role that the

policy plays in the emergence of private schooling in China.

THE ONE-CHILD POLICY AND

PRIVATIZATION OF EDUCATION

Since the launch of the economic reforms in 1979, Chinese education, like

other institutions and enterprises, has experienced the processes of privatization,

commercialization and marketization. In the context of capitalism with Chinese

characteristics, the centralized educational system has been rendered inappro-

priately (Yang, 2004). Acknowledging that the over-centralization and stringent

rules would hinder the initiatives and enthusiasm of local and non-government

educational institutions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called in 1985 for

steps to streamline administration and devolve powers to local government—

steps that would allow them more ﬂ exibility to manage education. Since then,

the state has begun to diversify educational services, allowing and encouraging

the non-government sectors to establish and administer educational institutions.

The central government has changed its monopolistic role to macro-management,

providing the necessary framework for educational development (Hawkins, 2000;

Ngok and Chan, 2003). The retreat of the central government has provided space

for local government as well as non-government sectors to assume more respon-

sibilities for education provision, ﬁ nancing and regulation. Thus, non-government

organizations now provide education services in the formal public education sec-

tor, thereby leading to the emergence of private schools. Compared with public

schools, the private education sector remains small; however, privatization of

education has become an inevitable trend in China. According to China’s Min-

istry of Education [MOE] (2008), there were 95,200 private schools of various

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levels, and 22,300 private vocational training institutions, enrolling as many as 34

million students in 2007. The total number of students in China’s private schools

in 2007 was equivalent to more than half of France’s population and nearly four

times the population of Switzerland (Bing, 2009).

In addition to the top-down educational reform, this article argues that the

one-child policy plays an important role in the emergence of private education in

China. First, the government has made strenuous efforts to limit parents’ child-

bearing in exchange for the greater opportunities it provides for the “only child,”

including educational opportunities. The ofﬁ cial slogan for the one-child cam-

paign is You Sheng You Yu (give birth to fewer children, but give them better

care and education), aimed at improving children’s well-being (Yang, 2007, p.

417). The underlying rationale is that more resources at the national, community,

and household levels will be available for children and that children with fewer

siblings will garner more resources and fare better in physical and intellectual

development (Peng, 1997). The long-lasting You Sheng You Yu campaign has

greatly inﬂ uenced parents’ expectations for the only child and has provided them

incentives to better educate their children. Furthermore, in an era of a competitive

labor market, parents—especially the middle and upper class parents in urban

China—are not satisﬁ ed with the mediocre education provided by public schools,

and they are preoccupied with giving their only child the best education despite

the overwhelming ﬁ nancial burdens (Mok, Wang, & Zhang, 2009). Parents’ ob-

session with children’s education facilitated the emergence of private schools,

private tutoring services, and private extra-curricular classes, which have become

an important component of the marketization of China’s education. For example,

in order to prepare their children for the competitive globalized world, Chinese

parents consider learning English to be very important to the future of their chil-

dren. A growing number of parents have sent their children to private tutoring

classes or to private English schools in order to learn English (Mok, et al). Many

bilingual private schools have been established to cater to the demand of middle

and upper middle class parents. These elite or so called Gui Zu (noble) schools

boast high educational standards, strict discipline, excellent learning conditions

and environment, high technology, and high quality faculty, including some na-

tive English speakers (Lin, 1994). These schools charge stunningly high tuitions

and fees—some equivalent to 35 or more years of income of an ordinary peasant

in rural China (Mok, et al.,). These private schools or “checkbook” schools are a

luxury reserved for nouveau riche.

In addition to academic performance, Chinese parents increasingly expect

their children to master a variety of skills. Equipping their children with artistic or

athletic skills has been popular among urban middle class parents. Such skills can

be counted as part of the national entrance examination scores for college, thereby

giving them a better chance of getting into prestigious universities. These skills

are considered as necessary stepping-stones in getting established in a success-

ful career. According to a survey conducted by a market research company, 52%

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The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China.

of children under the age of 12 in China attend private extra-curricular classes

on weekends, and 62% of children aged 10-12 take additional private lessons in

English, math, music, art, dance and martial arts (Mok, et. al, 2009). Private tutors

and schools are ﬂ ourishing under these demands.

However, private schools and education in China are diverse; the Gui Zu

Xue Xiao, or noble schools, provide sophisticated instructional equipment and

luxurious accommodations serving only the elites, whereas the Min Ban Xue

Xiao, or the people-run schools, operate from makeshift facilities catering to the

masses, especially the unplanned children who were born out of the family plan-

ning policy (Kwong, 1997). As mentioned above, couples who have unplanned

births are subject to severe penalties, including the high “social compensation

fee [SCF],” job loss or demotion (Yang, 2007). Government policy also punishes

unplanned children by denying them essential rights and social support. Ineligible

for Hu Kou or the household registration

, the unplanned children have no right

to schooling, health care, state-sector employment, and a host of other state ser-

vices and beneﬁ ts (Fan & Huang, 1989). Parents still demand a basic education

for their unplanned children. Under this social context, the Min Ban, or people-

run schools, are set up in response to the inability of the current educational sys-

tem to adapt to the rapid social reconﬁ gurations and changes in society. These

schools have played a supplementary and self-help function within the present

educational system (Han, 2004). The emergence and expansion of Min Ban or

people-run schools have basically ﬁ lled the gap in compulsory education for un-

planned children.

Moreover, the internal migration has also contributed to the emergence of

the people-run schools. Since the economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s,

China has undergone rapid modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. As

urbanization expanded, so did the discrepancy between urban and rural incomes

and living standards (China Labour Bulletin [CLB], 2009). As a result of such

discrepancy, millions of farmers have left their homes and migrated to the cities

in search of work and a better life. Large-scale internal migration has thus be-

come one of the most prominent by-products of the socioeconomic development

of China. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China (2009),

there are 225.42 million migrant workers in China—more than the populations

of the United Kingdom, France, and Australia combined (Hamey, 2008). An es-

timated 19 million children have accompanied their migrant parents to the cities

(Chan, 2009). Because urban governments are only responsible for the education

of children with an urban hu kuo, they have no obligations to educate migrant

children. As the governments of the host cities do not have a responsibility to pro-

vide social welfare and services to migrants and their children, migrant children’s

basic rights to health care, education, and socialization are denied, leading to a

higher rate of emotional, behavioral, and psychological problems (Chan, 2009).

Ignored, migrant children have become the city’s “invisible population.” As a

collective response to such educational inequity, migrant communities are try-

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ing to rebuild social networks and renew the sense of hope among the children

through people-run migrant schools. People-run schools are thus an alternative

for migrant children’s education.

Nonetheless, many of the Min Ban, or people-run schools, are plagued by high

turnover of students, high rate of teacher turnover, less qualiﬁ ed teachers, poor

school conditions, and substandard curriculum. Furthermore, Min Ban schools,

face the problem of recruiting and retaining qualiﬁ ed teachers. The teacher turn-

over rate is high due to low wages and heavy teaching loads. For example, accord-

ing to a survey of 59 Min Ban schools in Shanghai, Ding (2004) reports that about

78.3 percent of the teachers earned a monthly income of RMB 700 yuan or less,

and, of these, 13.7 percent earned between RMB 300 yuan and RMB 500 yuan.

The average monthly income for local ofﬁ ce workers, however, was RMB 2,815

yuan (US$339)

in 2004. Moreover, the operating conditions in Min Ban schools

vary greatly, because these schools are set up with private funds and rely mainly

on student tuition as revenue. Some more effective schools lease empty public

school buildings, whereas others have classes in civilian homes, dilapidated ware-

houses, or primitive jerrybuilt houses (Ding, 2004; Han, 2004). Classrooms are

overcrowded with as many as ninety-three students (Ding). Lighting, heating, and

ventilation are poor; some lack ﬁ re exits, drinking water, sanitary facilities, health

clinics, and playgrounds. The inequity of unplanned children’s education is fur-

ther exacerbated by the substandard curriculum in Min Ban schools. Due to lack

of funding, qualiﬁ ed teachers and facilities, many Min Ban schools can only offer

basic Chinese language and math classes. In contrast, the urban students in public

schools or in elite private schools have the opportunity to learn English, computer

skills, music, arts, social studies, science, and so forth (Han, 2004).

The emergence and growing importance of private education in China have

indeed evolved from China’s unique transitional social and economic context. Gui

Zu or noble private schools are catering to China’s nouveau riche’s demand for

the best education for their only children, who are often referred to as “the little

emperors.” Moreover, these parents regard the elite private schools as a symbol

of high social status (Arora, 2010). On the other hand, for parents of unplanned

children and for many migrant parents, Min Ban, or people-run private schools,

are “merely temporary venues for education, providing their children with a basic

knowledge of mathematics, reading and writing” (Han. 2004, p. 44). Nonethe-

less, with the increasing number of self-ﬁ nancing students and non-government

education providers (including elite private schools and people-run schools), Chi-

na’s education has been undergoing diversiﬁ cation, marketization, privatization,

commodiﬁ cation and decentralization (Borevskaya, 2003; Mok,et al., 2009). The

one-child policy has led to inequities in schooling experiences for planned and

unplanned children in China.

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The One-Child Policy and Privatization of Education in China.

CONCLUSION

It is evident that one of the foremost objectives of China’s one-child policy

is to control population growth in order to ensure quality of life. As noted at the

Cairo Conference on Population in 1994, “any effort to slow population growth

necessarily involved reducing poverty, seeking economic progress, improving the

status of women, environmental protection, and reducing unsustainable consump-

tion and production” (United Nations General Assembly, 1994, p.2). The profound

impacts of the one-child policy on family structure, women’s rights and roles, and

socialization process have been wildly acknowledged (Goodstadt, 1982; Chow &

Chen, 1989; Greenhalgh, 2003; Yang, 2007). Less well known, however, is the

nature and extent of this policy’s effect on the privatization of education in China.

Therefore, this article reviews literature, media reports, and laws in order to docu-

ment the direct and indirect impact of the one-child policy on China’s education

system. It further investigates the relationship between the policy and the emer-

gence of two types of private schools (Gui Zu Xue Xiao and Min Ban Xue Xiao). I

argue that parents of only children put all their hopes on the single child and have

higher expectations for him or her. Parents devote more ﬁ nancial resources, time,

attention, and energy to the only children, which may contribute to their cognitive

advancement and increase the ability of the children to compete academically.

Gui Zu Xue Xiao have emerged to cater to these parents’ needs and demands.

For many parents of unplanned children or migrant parents, Min Ban Xue Xiao

are the alternative venue that their children can receive a basic education, since

unplanned children are deprived of basic rights and social services.

Educational stratiﬁ cation and inequality is evident between the Gui Zu Xue

Xiao and the Min Ban Xue Xiao, which reﬂ ects the increasing gap between the

rich and the poor, and intensiﬁ ed social inequality between the haves and the

have-nots. What will the Chinese government do to alleviate the growing tensions

between different social groups, for example, the elite and the poor, the planned

and unplanned people? Will China move towards attracting capital ﬂ ows to cities

and the amelioration of the unequal distribution of knowledge, power, language

and material resources to growing populations? Will China develop into a society

of fundamental social divisions between the poor and the rich with the emergence

of binary provision in education? Will the education system continue to deny

basic education rights to the unplanned children? What is the future of private

schools (both the Gui Zu Xue Xiao and the Min Ban Xue Xiao) like? These are the

questions that future research should address. Policy makers should also focus on

new approaches to family planning and ways of improving educational and social

equality for unplanned children. If the Chinese government fails to properly bal-

ance the tensions between economic efﬁ ciency and social inequality, these social

problems could escalate and cause signiﬁ cant political pressures and turmoil.

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NOTES

1. The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (1966-76) was launched by Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong to stem what he perceived as the country’s drift away from social-

ism and toward the “restoration of capitalism.” The Cultural Revolution is now referred to in China as

the “decade of chaos” and is generally regarded as one of the bleakest periods in the country’s modern

history. The movement’s ideals were betrayed at every turn by its destructive impulses. The much–

vaunted initiatives that were to transform the nation often had disastrous consequences for China’s

education and cultural life. Economic development was disrupted by factional strife and misguided

“ultraleftist” policies (Joseph, 2001).

2. Normal circumstances are broadly deﬁ ned as that the couple is not ethnic minorities, is not

from overseas, has siblings, has a healthy child. If, for example, the ﬁ rst child has health problems

(broadly deﬁ ned), the couple is allowed to have a second birth (Yang, 2007).

3. Currently, the amount of SCF to be paid for an out-of-plan birth is from 2 to 3 times the

amount of the local per capita annual income (Yang, 2007, p. 473).

4. The government instituted a permanent and rigorous system of household registration or hu

kou in 1955 to control migration (Han, 2004). A rural household (nong cun hu kou) or an urban house-

hold (cheng shi hu kou) was assigned to a Chinese citizen based on his or her mother’s residence.

Local governments were responsible for providing the residents whose hu kou was registered in its ju-

risdiction with welfare and social services, including education, housing, and health care (CLB, 2009).

Residents were not allowed to work or live outside the administrative boundaries of their household

registration (hu kou) without permission of the authorities.

5. The current exchange rate is one US dollar equals 6.5 Ren Min Bi [RMB] yuan.

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