TEXAS MUNICIPAL POWER V. THE BNSF RY. CO. 829
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The prior decision erroneously stated that the complaint named only 4 mines. TMPA 2003,
6 S.T.B. at 581 n.3.
7 S. T. B.
$93,025,753), but reduced that expense by roughly 5.6% due to the smaller
SARR network. This error is corrected here. The correct figure of
$87,800,819 is shown in our new electronic workpapers at “STB Restated
MOW1” spreadsheet “STB Restatement.”
V. Scope of Rate Prescription
The challenged BNSF rate applied to coal movements to TMPA’s
Gibbons Creek plant from 16 named PRB mines: Antelope, Buckskin, Belle
Ayr, Black Thunder, Caballo, Caballo Rojo, Coal Creek, Cordero, Dry Fork,
Eagle Butte, Glovis Point, Jacobs Ranch, North Antelope, North Rochelle,
Rawhide, and Rochelle. TMPA’s complaint was not limited to specific
mines,
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and its SAC evidence covered all 16 mines. Moreover, it is
undisputed that there are no other feasible means of transporting coal from the
PRB to the Gibbons Creek plant. Thus, the rate prescription in this case—the
higher of the SAC rate or the 180% R/VC regulatory floor—should apply to
movements from any of the 16 mines. However, the findings and ordering
paragraph in TMPA 2003, 6 S.T.B. at 608, 612-13 (2003) only mentioned the
two mines from which TMPA’s traffic had moved during the 9-month time
period covered by the evidentiary record (Caballo Rojo and Cordero).
In its petition for reconsideration, TMPA asks that the rate prescription
not be limited to the traffic from those two mines. In fact, it was the Board’s
intention that the rate prescription extend to any mines from which traffic
might move, so long as those mines were covered by both the complaint and
the SAC analysis. In TMPA 2003, 6 S.T.B. at 582-83, the Board expressly
stated that, if Gibbons Creek traffic were to move in the future from other
mines, the prescription would apply so long as the 180% R/VC jurisdictional
threshold was met, and that the parties should themselves make the
determination whether the threshold was met using the variable costing
procedures and findings contained in Appendix A of that decision. In other
words, the order was intended to be self-effectuating: only if the parties could
not agree on the computation of the variable cost of a movement would there
be any need to return to the Board.
BNSF argues that the Board has no authority to assess the reasonableness
of a challenged rate until we have determined that the revenues for the
movement exceed the R/VC threshold contained in the statute. That,
however, is not our reading of the relevant statutory provisions. Under the
statute, we must make an affirmative finding that the rail carrier has “market
dominance,” 49 U.S.C. 10707(b), which is defined as “an absence of effective
competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the
transportation to which a rate applies,” 49 U.S.C. 10707(a). Once the Board
makes that qualitative finding, we may then proceed to examine the
reasonableness of the rate. 49 U.S.C. 10707(c). There is no requirement that
the Board make an independent quantitative determination of the R/VC ratio