statute, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), prohibits indemnification clauses where the indemnitee (or
promisee) is indemnified for acts caused solely by its own negligence in contracts involving
construction or the maintenance of a building structure:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to a
contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a
building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to require that one party to such contract or
agreement shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the other party to the contract or
other named indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, against
liability or claims for damages, losses, or expenses, including attorney fees, arising out of
bodily injury to persons, death, or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole
negligence of the indemnitee, or its, his, or her officers, agents, or employees, is against
public policy and void and unenforceable. This subsection shall not affect any obligation
under workers' compensation or coverage or insurance specifically relating to workers'
compensation, nor shall this subsection apply to any requirement that one party to the
contract purchase a project specific insurance policy, including an owner's or contractor's
protective insurance, builder's risk insurance, installation coverage, project management
protective liability insurance, an owner controlled insurance policy, or a contractor controlled
insurance policy.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2010).
Because O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 changes the common-law rule allowing a party to protect himself
by contract from liability for the consequences of his own negligent acts, one would think
that the courts would strictly construe the statute. See, e.g.
Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 639 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1981); Rey Coliman Contrs., Inc. v. PCL Constr. Servs., 2009
Ga. App. LEXIS 344 (Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2009) (explaining that it is well settled that statutes
in derogation to the common law are strictly construed). However, the Georgia courts have
instead applied the statute very liberally. See
Federal Paper Bd. Co. v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc.,
53 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
There are two threshold issues which Georgia courts examine in determining whether this
statute is applicable to a particular contract. The first is whether the agreement pertains to the
“construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance” of a “building structure, appurtenance or
appliance.” The second is whether the indemnity clause attempts to indemnify against the
indemnitee’s own, sole negligence. National Candy Wholesalers v. Chipurnoi, Inc.
180 Ga.
App. 664, 350 S.E.2d 303 (1986); Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
, 639 F.2d 1235 (5th
Cir. 1981).
It is difficult to state with certainty when a court will deem a contract to involve the
“construction, alteration, repair or maintenance” of a “building structure, appurtenance, or
appliance,” except to say that the statue has been applied liberally. See
World Championship
Wrestling, Inc. v. City of Macon, 229 Ga. App. 248, 493 S.E.2d 629 (1997) (applying § 13-8-
2(b) to lease of arena for wrestling event); Terrace Shopping Center Joint Venture v. Oxford
Group, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 346, 384 S.E.2d 679 (1989) (applying § 13-8-2(b) to management
agreement between shopping center owner and managing company); National Candy
Wholesalers, Inc. v. Chipurnoi, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 664, 350 S.E.2d 303 (1986) (applying §
13-8-2(b) to space lease agreement); and Big Canoe Corp. v. Moore & Groover, Inc.
, 171 Ga.
App. 654, 320 S.E.2d 564 (1984) (applying § 13-8-2(b) to rental and maintenance agreement
between resort owner and maintenance company). Moreover, the Georgia courts have applied
§ 13-8-2(b) to contracts for repair and maintenance within an existing commercial structure.
See, Tuxedo Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Lie-Nielsen
, 245 Ga. 27, 262 S.E.2d 794 (1980)