Title:
Fraud Penalties and Sanctions
Lead department or agency:
Department for Work and Pensions
Other departments or agencies:
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
Impact Assessment (IA)
IA No:
Date: 23 November 2011
Stage: Final
Source of intervention: Domestic
Type of measure: Primary
Legislation
Contact for enquiries:
Summary: Intervention and Options
What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?
The government is concerned that the existing provisions for imposing sanctions on benefit claimants where there is
benefit fraud are simply too lenient, do not have an appropriate level of consequence for offences and fail to deter
repeated benefit fraud adequately. This applies equally to high volumes of claimant error. The annual cost of welfare
benefit fraud and error (including Tax Credits) is assessed to be £5.3 billion. The intention is to reduce this monetary
loss and to discourage fraud and negligent behaviour within the benefit system.
What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?
The policy intention is to prevent, deter and increase the consequences of benefit fraud and reduce claimant error,
which costs taxpayers money and undermines public confidence in the welfare system. As part of this, the government
wants the ability to impose tougher penalties for benefit fraud. This will mean the introduction of a new minimum
administrative penalty of £350 for benefit fraud or 50% of the amount overpaid whichever is greater up to a maximum of
£2000; increase in the detection rate of attempted fraud; extension of the loss of benefit sanction for 1 to 3 strikes which
will mean a loss for 13 weeks, 26 weeks and 3 years and; immediate 3 year loss of benefit for serious organised benefit
fraud cases. Hardship payments at a reduced rate will be available for
vulnerable groups. Allied to this is the
introduction of a new civil penalty of £50 for claimants who are negligent in maintaining their benefit claim in order to
encoura
e and
romote
ersonal res
onsibilit
for such claims.
What policy options have been considered? Please justify preferred option (further details
in Evidence Base)
Do nothing approach – the current policy does not adequately address the problem, and the current sanction regime
needs reviewing and strengthening in light of claimant feedback.
Financial Penalties – Higher and lower amounts for the fraud penalty were considered, and the £350 rate was the
most appropriate as a middle point between existing administrative penalties of £15 minimum and £600 maximum. It
will be offered to claimants, not imposed, and there will be a 14 day cooling off period. If it is refused, the Department
may consider prosecution.
Attempted Fraud - The Department already has the necessary powers to prosecute claimants who attempt benefit
fraud; however, improved /quicker access to intelligence will increase the number of attempted frauds detected, and the
new administrative penalty of £350 will apply as an alternative to prosecution for such cases.
Loss of Benefit Extension - Longer and different combinations were considered as a way to increase the
consequences of fraud. The periods of 13 weeks, 26 weeks and 3 years were determined to be most appropriate to
achieve an appropriate strengthening of the sanction regime and consistency of approach with conditionality sanctions
under Universal Credit. In recognition of the serious nature of organised attacks a higher 5 year loss of benefit was
considered for such cases, but it was limited to 3 years to ensure proportionality and a consistent approach.
Civil Penalty – A new penalty will deter errors and place greater emphasis on personal responsibility for errors that
could have reasonably been prevented. Different amounts were considered, but a £50 flat rate was determined as an
appropriate starting point for benefit claimants to encourage better care of their claim. The option of increasing the civil
penalty to £300 to recognise higher value overpayments and mirror existing HMRC compliance penalties was
considered but rejected.
When will the policy be reviewed to establish its impact and the
extent to which the policy objectives have been achieved?
It will be reviewed within 3
to 5 years time
Are there arrangements in place that will allow a systematic
collection of monitoring information for future policy review?
Yes, see Annex 1
1