United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30306

Hayward Dean, individually and all others similarly situated; Bruce

Dupont; Gary L. Carlton; Ruth Mayeaux; Gregory

Lawrence Sergent; Gregory Williams, Et al.;

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Akal Security, Incorporated,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:17-CV-543

Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit

Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:

The federal government contracted with a security company to

monitor detainees during air travel. Specifically at issue here are return

flights after deportees were taken to a foreign country. Some of the security

company’s employees challenged the company’s meal-period policy. That

policy automatically deducted an hour of pay on return flights that exceeded

90 minutes and had no deportees. The employees argue that this policy

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 22, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted summary

judgment for the company. We AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency

(“ICE”) contracted with Akal Security, Inc., to provide certain personnel for

flights, including those carrying deportees to another country. Akal lost this

contract sometime in December 2017, several months after the named

plaintiff filed his original complaint. The plaintiffs no longer work for Akal,

but they continue to press their challenge to the meal-period policy that

existed during their employment as Aviation Security Officers (“ASOs”)

with Akal.

Akal hired ASOs to control deportees and to respond to their needs

on these flights. The ASOs’ responsibilities ranged from monitoring the

deportees to coordinating deportees’ trips to the restroom. Though there

were pilots and flight attendants on each flight, these individuals were not

Akal employees. The ASOs were nonexempt, hourly employees as defined

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

The dispute before us concerns Akal’s meal-period policy for the

return-flight portion of ICE missions. The policy was this:

There is a mandatory un-paid 1 hour meal period on each shift.

This affects all Aviation Security Officers (“ASOs”) and

Leads operating out of Mesa, AZ, San Antonio, TX,

Alexandria, LA and Miami, FL. This meal period will be taken

by all ASOs and Leads on the return leg of each mission.

Exceptions to this rule are the following:

•A mission on which there are detainees on-board for the

return leg of the trip; there will be no un-paid meal period and

ASOs will be paid for the entire mission.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

•If the return leg of a mission is shorter than 90 minutes, there

will be no un-paid meal period and ASOs will be paid for the

entire mission.

The “return leg” is defined as the last leg of the mission prior

to arriving at the point of origin during which there are no

detainees on board and no security duties are required. During

this un-paid meal period, ASOs and Leads will be expected to

disengage from work duties and may use their time as they

wish. As this meal period will be taken in the workplace,

professional conduct must be maintained and any violations of

company policy will not be tolerated.

Though Akal’s policy covered both domestic and international flights, the

plaintiff ASOs challenged the operation of the policy on flights of 90 minutes

or more returning to the United States after deportations had been

completed.

ASOs across the country have brought individual suits and class

actions against Akal, contesting the legality of the meal-period policy.

The

argument is that Akal violated the FLSA by not paying the required minimum

wage during this one-hour break because those periods either were

compensable travel time or did not qualify as a bona fide meal period.

The appellants here are ASOs in San Antonio, Texas, and Alexandria,

Louisiana. They claimed two FLSA violations: (1) that the meal-period

Two other federal circuits have heard related cases. A panel in the Ninth Circuit

found in favor of Akal, holding that the employee in that appeal did not dispute that he was

relieved of duty during the one-hour break, thus “fail[ing] to raise a triable issue as to

whether Akal is liable for violating the FLSA.” Alonzo v. Akal Sec. Inc., 807 F. App’x 718,

720 (9th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments in January 2021, after a

district court found as a matter of law that the ASOs were not completely relieved of duty

and granted judgment in their favor. Gelber v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 18-14496 (11th Cir. argued

Jan. 15, 2021). These circuits, though, may not apply the same analysis when identifying

whether a bona fide meal period occurred, which we will discuss later.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

policy violated the FLSA because the ASOs were entitled to additional

minimum-wage pay, and (2) that Akal violated the FLSA by not paying the

ASOs’ required overtime wages. The district court granted conditional class

certification, then later dismissed the minimum-wage claim. The ASOs have

not appealed the dismissal of the minimum-wage claim.

Akal sought summary judgment on the remainder of the case, and the

district court granted the motion. It concluded that the ASOs “fail[ed] to

rebut the affirmative showing made by Akal regarding both relief from work-

related duties and the lack of interruption of [the ASOs’] meal breaks due to

such duties.” The ASOs appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the same

standard as the district court.” Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Fire

Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 574, 578 (5th Cir. 2018). There must be “no genuine

dispute as to any material fact” for a proper grant of summary judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing the parties’ evidence, we make all

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; here, the ASOs. Salazar v.

Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 982 F.3d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2020).

The claim here is for a violation of the FLSA. Under that Act,

nonexempt employees engaged in commerce are to be paid a minimum wage

for all hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Any hour worked over 40 hours in

a workweek must be paid at “a rate not less than one and one-half times the

regular rate at which the employee is employed.” § 207(a)(1). This

framework sets the stage for the ASOs’ appeal, as they seek overtime pay for

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

those meal periods that contributed to more than 40 hours worked in a given

week.

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations relevant here are

those that establish “the principles involved in determining what constitutes

working time.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.1. We will defer to DOL regulations

concerning the FLSA when they are “based on a permissible construction of

the statute.” Vela v. City of Hous., 276 F.3d 659, 667 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43

(1984)).

We group the ASOs’ arguments into two categories, though there will

be some overlap. First, we consider whether the entire return flight must be

compensable travel time, which largely but not entirely is an argument that

an uncompensated meal period cannot occur on these flights. Second, we

apply this circuit’s predominant-benefit test to the one-hour breaks that the

ASOs received to determine if a valid, uncompensated meal period occurred.

I. Compensable travel time

Our obligation in this appeal is to apply this simple regulatory

sentence: “Bona fide meal periods are not worktime.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a).

The DOL gives us much more guidance than that sentence, but we wish to

set our course with that clear goal in mind.

The ASOs argue that the entire return flight was compensable.

Because Akal compensated the ASOs for all but one hour of the empty return

flights, the critical question is whether an employee, while engaged in

otherwise compensable air travel, can be subject to a bona fide meal period.

Akal acknowledges “that [if] the meal period is compensable, there is no dispute

that the parties could easily calculate the number of alleged overtime hours that were

unpaid by a review of Akal’s records.”

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

There are travel regulations that mention excluded meal periods, and

there are others that do not. We review the regulatory scheme as a whole

when applying the DOL’s interpretations of travel time and meal periods.

See Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2014).

No DOL regulation prohibits a bona fide meal period during travel.

When overnight travel is required of employees, “[r]egular meal period time

is not counted” as hours worked. 29 C.F.R. § 785.39. Salient, but of

contested application, is a regulation that Akal argues is directly on point

because it discusses meal periods on airplanes. The ASOs argue it is

irrelevant because they were not the kinds of employees within the coverage

of the regulation. That regulation reads:

Any work which an employee is required to perform while

traveling must, of course, be counted as hours worked. An

employee who drives a truck, bus, automobile, boat or airplane,

or an employee who is required to ride therein as an assistant

or helper, is working while riding, except during bona fide meal

periods or when he is permitted to sleep in adequate facilities

furnished by the employer.

§ 785.41. Akal insists the ASOs were required to “ride” in the airplane, but

the rebuttal is that an ASO was not an “assistant or helper” to the “driver.”

One perspective on meaning is that a pilot could not handle all that was

necessary in these flights without considerable help. Still, we conclude the

appeal can be decided without applying that regulation.

One regulation on which the ASOs rely states that “[t]ime spent by

an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as travel from job

site to job site during the workday, must be counted as hours worked.”

§ 785.38. This regulation prohibits a noncompensable meal period, the ASOs

argue, because they were required to return on the airplanes, and they had

additional duties required of them upon landing at their home base. Akal

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

does not dispute those facts, but it certainly has a different view of their

significance.

In support of their interpretation of Section 785.38, the ASOs discuss

an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion. Burton v. Hillsborough Cnty., 181

F. App’x 829 (11th Cir. 2006). The panel of that court held that county

employees who were required to pick up and return county-owned vehicles

that contained the necessary work tools for that day had compensable travel

time retrieving and returning the county-owned vehicles pursuant to Section

785.38. Id. at 837–38. A district court in this circuit also held that, under

Section 785.38, return travel time to a landscaping company’s home base to

conduct additional work constituted compensable time. Cantu v. Milberger

Landscaping, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 918, 922–23 (W.D. Tex. 2014). We need

not determine our agreement with either analysis because even if those

holdings are correct, neither considered a meal period during the travel.

Further, we do not see in Section 785.38 either approval or a bar to a meal

period.

The ASOs next propose that any downtime during the return flights

was compensable. Under Section 785.21: “[a]n employee who is required to

be on duty for less than 24 hours is working even though he is permitted to

sleep or engage in other personal activities when not busy.” Additionally,

under Section 778.223, idle hours may be compensable when the employee is

required to remain on duty. Relatedly, the Supreme Court has allowed

Akal states, in a footnote, that the ASOs were not “traveling” as the term is meant

in the FLSA. There is no significant argument about that point of definition, and we do not

need to address it.

A judge for a Northern District of Alabama case held: “Travel time does not

include a bona fide meal period” under Section 785.38. Hilley v. Tacala, L.L.C., No. 2:12-

CV-2691, 2014 WL 1246364, at *17 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2014). We cite that here as one

opinion that analyzed meal periods specifically in connection with travel.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

certain inactive time to be compensable. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323

U.S. 126, 134 (1944). The Armour Court held that the FLSA mandated

compensation, even though “the nature of the duty left time hanging heavy

on the employees’ hands.” Id. In Armour, though, the district court had held

that the “[u]sual hours for sleep and for eating . . . would not be counted” as

hours worked, id. at 129, and the Supreme Court did not comment on the

exclusion of meal periods from the otherwise compensable downtime in that

case.

In conclusion, we do not find in the regulations or caselaw analyzing

general rules on travel time any bar to providing for a noncompensable meal

period on airplane flights. We now examine the authorities specifically on

meal periods to determine Akal’s compliance with them.

II. Bona fide meal period

Akal argues that one hour of these return flights was noncompensable

because it was a bona fide meal period. Compensation for all hours worked is

the rule, but the regulations provide that an unpaid meal break can occur

during the workday when certain conditions are met.

The most relevant regulation is this:

Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona fide meal

periods do not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These

are rest periods. The employee must be completely relieved

from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals. Ordinarily

30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide meal period.

A shorter period may be long enough under special conditions.

The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any

duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. For example,

an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory

worker who is required to be at his machine is working while

eating.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). The regulation also provides that employees do not

need to be granted permission to leave the premises for a meal period to

occur. § 785.19(b).

Since 1956, Section 785.19(a) has provided that “[t]he employee must

be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals.”

See Roy v. Cnty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 544 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting the

relevant language was promulgated in 1956). Some circuits have interpreted

this language as creating a higher standard than the widely used

“predominant-benefit test.” See, e.g., Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713

F.3d 525, 531–32 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 574 U.S. 27

(2014). In 1998, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the DOL regulation’s

“completely relieved of duty” language did not conflict with the

predominant-benefit test because the Secretary of Labor approvingly cited a

Sixth Circuit case that applied the “‘predominantly for the employer’s

benefit’ standard.” Roy, 141 F.3d at 544 (quoting F.W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v.

Thompson, 194 F.2d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 1952)). The predominant-benefit test

thus survived the language that the DOL implemented in 1956. We adopted

the predominant-benefit test in 1998, joining, at that time, “most circuit

courts.” Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264 n.16 (5th Cir. 1998).

We will explain our considerations under that test later.

The Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits may review under a heightened

standard. The Ninth Circuit seemingly determines, strictly as a matter of

fact, whether the employee has been “completely relieved of duty.” See

Busk, 713 F.3d at 531–32. A panel of that court later applied that test to the

ASOs and mealtimes during flights, then found in favor of Akal because the

employee had at least one hour of free time during the return flights. Alonzo

v. Akal Sec. Inc., 807 F. App’x 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit

has held that “the essential consideration . . . is whether the employees are

in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

meal.” Kohlheim v. Glynn Cnty., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990). It has

also affirmed a district court’s application of the predominant-benefit test.

Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 1994). In January

2021, the Eleventh Circuit heard arguments on another ASO challenge to the

meal-period policy. Gelber v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 18-14496 (11th Cir. argued

Jan. 15, 2021).

The Third Circuit has reasoned that the various Ninth Circuit and

Eleventh Circuit precedents did not actually adopt the completely-relieved-

of-duty test, concluding that neither court actually applied that test. Babcock

v. Butler Cnty., 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015). We mention this view only

as part of the context for considering the differences in resolutions among the

circuits’ review of factually similar cases. Regardless of the proper

understanding of the other circuits’ precedents, we are bound by our own.

We apply the predominant-benefit test. Naylor v. Securiguard, Inc.,

801 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2015); Bernard, 154 F.3d at 264 n.16 (citing five

other circuits as approving of this approach at the time). When we apply that

test, we consider whether the employee or the employer received the

predominant benefit from the meal break. Naylor, 801 F.3d at 506. Factors

relevant for this consideration include:

[1] whether the employees are subject to real limitations on

their personal freedom which inure to the benefit of the

employer; [2] whether restrictions are placed on the

employee’s activities during those times, such as whether or

not the employee may leave the work site if he chooses;

[3] whether the employee remains responsible for substantial

work-related duties; and [4] how frequently the time is actually

interrupted by work-related duties.

Bernard, 154 F.3d at 265.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

This language originated as a quote from a jury instruction. Id. Judge

Wisdom for our court concluded that this “language used by the district

court accurately reflects the standard and factors employed by the courts

when applying the predominant benefit test.” Id. at 266. We continue to

agree with the district court in Bernard when it prefaced its instruction with

the phrase that these were “[a]mong the factors” to consider. Id. at 265

(quoting the jury instruction). There may be other considerations that also

would be relevant. We do not see any others in this case, though.

Before analyzing those factors, we briefly address two preliminary

matters. First, the parties disagree on who bears the burden of proof. This

issue need not be resolved because even if Akal carries the burden of proof,

it succeeded in carrying that burden.

Second, the ASOs posit that this

court’s test is so fact intensive as to preclude granting summary judgment.

Though we acknowledge that the test certainly requires a review of the facts,

that alone would not prevent application of the test at the summary-judgment

stage. See, e.g., Naylor, 801 F.3d at 508 (affirming, in part, summary

judgment in favor of an employer because the mandatory travel time was too

de minimis to interfere with certain employees’ lunch break). As with

summary judgments generally, if there are no genuine disputes of material

fact, summary judgment is appropriate. An example of affirming summary

judgment in a meal-period case is in the nonprecedential decision of Alvarez

v. City of El Paso, 32 F. App’x 126, 2002 WL 334630, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002).

We conclude, as implicitly the Alvarez panel must have as well, that there is

Fifth Circuit precedent clearly places the burden on the employer. See, e.g.,

Naylor, 801 F.3d at 508. Akal’s argument is that intervening Supreme Court authority

requires us to “modernize” the placement of the burden. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v.

Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018). We do not resolve whether revising this circuit’s

position is proper, as we determine Akal succeeded in carrying the burden.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

nothing inherent in the predominant-benefit test’s factors that prevents

summary judgment in an appropriate case.

The preliminary issues resolved, we now apply the predominant-

benefit test. The overall goal of the analysis is to determine “whether the

employee can use the time effectively for his or her own purposes.” Bernard,

154 F.3d at 266 (quoting Henson v. Pulaski Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534

(8th Cir. 1993)). We will return to the initial factor in the analysis, “whether

the employees are subject to real limitations on their personal freedom which

inure to the benefit of the employer,” after considering the categories of

limitations that the other factors describe. See id.

The second factor examines restrictions on the employee’s activities

during the meal breaks, including whether they may leave the work site. See

id. Here, the ASOs are prevented from leaving the worksite during the

mandatory meal break and may not use their cellular phones or other

handheld devices that require internet access. The ASOs contrast these

restrictions to cases where the employees went to break rooms or otherwise

left their “workspaces” to enjoy their meals.

Akal’s restrictions, of course, are inherent to working on an airplane

rather than established at the discretion of the employer. At least one

regulation, previously discussed, applies to those whose job requires

“working while riding [on an airplane], except during bona fide meal

periods.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.41. The only issue as to that regulation, which we

already mentioned, is whether the ASOs are within the class of assistants and

helpers to the pilot that the regulation contemplates. Regardless, a

noncompensable meal period — even if movement is confined to an airplane

or other mode of transportation — is recognized by that regulation. Even

beyond the restrictions that arise from being in an airplane, the regulations

more generally do not require that the employee be allowed to leave the place

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

of work to enjoy a bona fide meal period. § 785.19(b). Many cases

acknowledge that some limitations on an employee are acceptable during a

meal period, such as requiring them to remain in uniform, on the jobsite, and

available to respond to emergencies if needed. See, e.g., Ruffin v. MotorCity

Casino, 775 F.3d 807, 812–15 (6th Cir. 2015).

We conclude that the effect of any limitations on the ASOs’ activities

imposed during an ostensible meal period must be analyzed in the context of

the relevant workplace. These restrictions on the ASOs’ activities do not

undercut the validity of the meal break.

We will consider the final two factors together: “whether the

employee remains responsible for substantial work-related duties; and how

frequently the time is actually interrupted by work-related duties.” Bernard,

154 F.3d at 265. Any infrequent interruptions do not invalidate the policy of

a noncompensable meal period. The Sixth Circuit has held, for example, that

regularly having to monitor a radio during meal periods and responding if

called did not transform the meal period into compensable worktime.

Ruffin, 775 F.3d at 812.

We agree with that analysis. The record here shows

that the ASOs almost always had at least one hour on the return flights when

they had no work-related duties. We discover deposition testimony by one

ASO that she occasionally had to work during a break on these empty return

flights, but there was no evidence of other employees who had to work during

a meal break or of any substantial or frequent interruptions during an

announced meal period. Other employees testified that on return flights they

received at least one hour of free time to spend as they pleased.

We note that the Sixth Circuit places the burden of proof on the employee,

whereas we place the burden of proof on the employer. Compare Ruffin, 775 F.3d at 811,

with Bernard, 154 F.3d at 265. Regardless, we find the analysis of the limitations discussed

in Ruffin persuasive.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

We now return to the first factor. In this context, no benefit to Akal

(not counting the monetary one) has been shown arising from the inevitable

restrictions on mobility or the prohibitions on the use of technological devices

when confined to the airplane. The only limitations were those inherent to

being on an airplane, and they did not inure to Akal’s benefit. As to the

application of the policy, the ASOs have not presented evidence that they did

not regularly receive this one hour of personal time on every return flight,

free from work-related duties. We agree with the district court that the ASOs

“fail to identify any work-related duties they claim interfered with the bona

fide meal periods.” Thus, each “employee can use the time effectively for

his or her own purposes.” Bernard, 154 F.3d at 266.

We conclude that the ASOs were the ones who predominantly

benefited from the one-hour meal periods.

Beyond making arguments about the predominant-benefit test, the

ASOs also argue that the meals needed to be regularly scheduled.

The ASOs

rely on one of our decisions in which this sentence appears: “[t]he meal

period must be scheduled, occur at a regular time, and normally be thirty

minutes or more. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19.” Lee v. Coahoma Cnty., 937 F.2d 220,

225 (5th Cir. 1991). Despite that language, the Lee court held that the law

enforcement agency’s “catch as catch can” meal periods were properly

classified as bona fide and exempt from compensation. Id. A close look at

the sentence in Lee about regular mealtimes reveals that it follows two

sentences that were explicitly about what the employees were claiming, and

Another ASO argument is that the ostensible mealtime did not actually have any

“connection to eating.” We do not see any requirement that an employee actually eat a

meal, only that sufficient time for a meal is provided. Certainly, a mandatory,

noncompensable meal period cannot be unreasonably long. One hour in these

circumstances was a reasonable amount of time. We do not further analyze the length of a

valid meal break.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/22/2021

No. 20-30306

it precedes one final sentence of explanation about the employees’

arguments. Id. In light of the holding in Lee, which did not require a set

schedule for meals, the court when mentioning regularity of meals must have

simply been continuing its explanation of the employees’ position on appeal.

The Tenth Circuit has concluded similarly. See Bates v. Dep’t of Corr. of State

of Kan., 81 F.3d 1008, 1011–12 (10th Cir. 1996). Significantly, this court has

not suggested since Lee that a regular schedule for meals is required.

Finally, Akal’s failure to record when each ASO took a meal break

does not alter our conclusion. An automatic deduction such as was done here

will not itself violate the FLSA. See White v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp.,

699 F.3d 869, 873 (6th Cir. 2012). The ASOs concede that “what matters is

whether the employees are given bona fide meal breaks under the Act.”

These one-hour breaks satisfy the regulation and this circuit’s

predominant-benefit test.

AFFIRMED.

The language of Section 785.19(a) further supports this interpretation, as the

regulation states only that “[t]he employee must be completely relieved from duty for the

purposes of eating regular meals,” not regularly scheduled ones.

Case: 20-30306 Document: 00515910385 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/22/2021