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Additionally, no tugboats were used either
as escorts or as a “barrier” to prevent a runaway
ship from ramming the shore or colliding with
another marine asset. And no environmental
controls, such as the Corps of Engineers’
opening of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, were put
in place to reduce river flow or current.
On the river itself, the
Bright Field
was
operating at full speed in high-river and high-
current conditions. Apparently, neither the pilot
nor crew considered procedures that might be
employed to maximize the time available to
respond to an emergency. For example, the main
engines were being operated in bridge control,
and although this may have created a time
penalty in responding to an emergency, the pilot
and bridge crew did not discuss engine control
location prior to commencing the trip
downriver. In his testimony, the pilot claimed
that it was necessary to operate the
Bright Field
at maximum speed to attain reasonable
maneuverability of the vessel in the operating
environment of high water, rapid current, and a
heavily laden ship designed to be maneuverable
at lower speeds.
Several days after the accident, Safety
Board investigators boarded a fully loaded
vessel of similar size, displacement, and power
to the
Bright Field
that was operating
downbound in similar high water conditions.
During this transit, the pilot did not use full
speed to maneuver the ship. Each ship handles
differently, but the operation of the
Bright Field
at full speed left no margin for error. For
example, the main engine tripped off line
because of a temporary loss of lubricating oil
pressure. The oil pressure and engine operation
were restored within about 2 minutes, which is a
reasonable amount of time. However, operating
at full speed in high-river conditions, the ship
had no room to maneuver out of the emergency.
The Safety Board concludes that operating a
vessel at full speed in the restricted waters of the
Mississippi River may not allow sufficient time
or distance to recover from an emergency. The
Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard
should take the lead in working with the pilot
associations serving the Port of New Orleans to
evaluate the impact of operating vessels at full
speed in the Mississippi River and incorporate
that information in its risk-management and
risk-reduction strategies for the port area.
High-river conditions are repeatedly cited as
cause for concern. For example, various port
risk assessments cite local experts, in interviews
and in response to questionnaires, clearly
expressing that high river stage is an important
factor in river casualties. This opinion is
strongly supported by available data. Eleven
years of casualty data from the Port of New
Orleans and the Coast Guard clearly show a
seasonal trend to river casualties. The high
water months of February, March, April, and
May experience two to three times the casualties
that occur during the low-water months of July
through October.
In addition, the studies point out that the
Coast Guard acknowledges the fast Mississippi
River current and low seasonal water
temperatures as creating a very hostile
environment. No matter how many Coast Guard,
State, local, and other resources respond to a
casualty involving a large number of persons in
the water, it would be difficult to rescue
everyone. The Coast Guard 1994 search and
rescue exercise lead to the conclusion that,
under adverse conditions, the Coast Guard could
expect to rescue and save only a small
percentage of the people in the water. This
finding should be unacceptable to the Coast
Guard and the Port of New Orleans, and the two
agencies should consider alternative means to
deal with this emergency. For example, prior to
the
Bright Field
accident, the Bonnet Carré
Spillway had only been opened seven times to
alleviate high water conditions, apparently
because of the cumbersome and lengthy tasks
necessary to do so. Nonetheless, the risks
associated with high water and rapid current
were considered “unusual” enough that in
March 1997, the spillway was opened for the
eighth time. The Port of New Orleans, the Coast
Guard, and the Corps of Engineers might
consider more aggressive use of the Bonnet
Carré Spillway to alleviate these high water
conditions and to deal with the safety issues
created by them. Further, if the major
impediment to opening the spillway is the time
and effort it takes to do so, it may be appropriate
for the Corps of Engineers to consider ways to
make the spillway more usable and to employ it
for risk mitigation as well as for flood control.
No practical physical barrier aboard ship
exists that will safely stop a runaway vessel. In